unique conceptual framework<\/a> adapted to the local context: \u201ccultural soft power.\u201d According to offensive realism, the anarchy of the international system leads to security dilemmas and zero-sum games, which would frame China’s rise as a hegemonic struggle. However, since China proposed its \u201cpeaceful development path\u201d in 2004, its trajectory has challenged the liberal narrative of development, going beyond the Western explanatory framework. Starting in 2017, with the advent of a \u201cnew era,\u201d the primary social contradiction has been redefined as the tension between the growing demand for a better life\u2014especially culturally\u2014and still unbalanced and insufficient development. Cultural soft power has become fully integrated into the country\u2019s strategy of \u201cpeaceful and civilizational rise.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nDespite the rapid growth of China’s hard power capabilities, its soft power has yet to match its international status, and the cultural foundation of its rise remains unsolidified. Some Chinese scholars argue that the country\u2019s rise should not be understood solely as an economic or geopolitical phenomenon but as the revitalization of a civilization with its own trajectory. The concept of the \u201ccivilizational state,\u201d formulated by Zhang Weiwei, has shaped the fundamental logic of both China\u2019s model and discourse. According to this view, China is not only a modern sovereign state but also a civilization that coexists with others, such as Western Christian or Islamic civilizations. This notion points to a development model distinct from Western liberalism, based on local values, institutions, and traditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By challenging the Western metanarrative of the nation-state, China proposes an alternative form of modern state-building, arguing that so-called \u201cuniversal values\u201d lack true universality, and that each country must define its own path based on its historical and cultural conditions. In 2022, the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China incorporated concepts such as \u201cdiversity of civilizations\u201d and \u201cChinese-style modernization\u201d into its national strategy. This marked the beginning of the institutionalization of its civilizational narrative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The continuity of a great power\u2019s rise and its international role largely depend on the values underpinning its development process. In this sense, nationalism alone is no longer sufficient to support China’s development. Since the Opium Wars, China has shifted from a nationalist orientation to a more cosmopolitan vision, incorporating key notions from Hehe<\/em> (\u548c\u5408) culture, such as Tianxia<\/em> (\u5929\u4e0b, \u201call under heaven\u201d), Datong<\/em> (\u5927\u540c, \u201cgreat harmony\u201d), and harmonious coexistence. This vision promotes a cooperative globalism with mutual benefit, without abandoning its traditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe concept of a Community of Shared Future for Mankind represents a contemporary expression of Hehe<\/em> culture. It integrates a Tianxia<\/em> worldview, a notion of harmony in diversity, a vision of balance between justice and interest, and an idea of unity between heaven and humanity. All of this constitutes a Chinese proposal for global governance. The Belt and Road Initiative is a practical crystallization of both Hehe<\/em> culture and the concept of a community of shared destiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\nAs Joseph Nye noted, in the information age, global competition revolves around \u201cwho tells better stories.\u201d The cultural industry, as a channel for creating, narrating, and disseminating stories, is a key pillar in building shared values. In recent years, China\u2019s digital cultural industry has expanded its international presence through new narrative actors, disseminating values such as harmony and coexistence within the framework of the Belt and Road. Notable examples include science fiction cinema, with productions like The Wandering Earth<\/em>; the ACG subculture, represented by titles like Ne Zha<\/em>, Genshin Impact<\/em>, and Black Myth: Wukong<\/em>; and social media content creators, both Chinese and foreign. Influencers like Li Ziqi and Ding Zhen have showcased rural life, cultural tourism, and poverty alleviation through an aesthetic and accessible narrative. At the same time, collectives like YChina and creators such as Jerry Kowal or Ryo Takeuchi have offered foreign perspectives on China, acting as cultural bridges. In contrast to macro-level narratives of traditional media, these voices stand out by highlighting the everyday, refreshing China\u2019s image and connecting with digital generations.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Chinese case, moving from a focus on \u201chow they are perceived\u201d to building a shared space of meaning with the world, offers a useful reference for Latin America<\/a>, where there is an urgent need to build cultural languages from local experiences. In this process, youth emerge as central actors in digital public opinion. Likewise, symbolic interaction in the Global South should not be limited to unilateral projection. The creation of inclusive platforms that integrate media, youth, institutions, and cultural actors will contribute to a more diverse and grounded communication ecology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n*Machine translation proofread by Jana\u00edna da Silva.<\/sub><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In 1874, senior Qing dynasty official Li Hongzhang warned of a \u201cgreat transformation not seen in a thousand years,\u201d referring to the disparity between China and the West and a grave survival crisis. Today, the international order and balance of power are rapidly evolving, placing the world at the brink of a transformation unprecedented in […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":746,"featured_media":48155,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[16849,16850,16868],"tags":[15635],"gps":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-48174","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-politica-exterior-en","8":"category-china-es-en","9":"category-relaiciones-internacionales-en","10":"tag-debates"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48174","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/746"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=48174"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48174\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/48155"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=48174"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=48174"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=48174"},{"taxonomy":"gps","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/gps?post=48174"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}