{"id":49808,"date":"2025-08-10T07:00:00","date_gmt":"2025-08-10T10:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/?p=49808"},"modified":"2025-08-08T21:24:46","modified_gmt":"2025-08-09T00:24:46","slug":"bukele-and-indefinite-reelection-a-point-of-no-return","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/bukele-and-indefinite-reelection-a-point-of-no-return\/","title":{"rendered":"Bukele and indefinite reelection: a point of no return"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In 2021, when Nayib Bukele updated his bio on X to read \u201cThe coolest dictator in the world,\u201d he was flirting with a reality that had yet to fully unfold. But on July 31, 2025, the prophecy he once made on social media came true: with 57 votes in favor and just three against, the Legislative Assembly approved <\/a>a constitutional amendment allowing Bukele to govern indefinitely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among both supporters and critics, this latest assault on democracy comes as little surprise. Bukele\u2019s presidency has long borne the hallmarks of an aspiring despot: subordination of the judiciary to the executive, a shrinking and reconfigured legislature, and more recently, forcing journalists and dissidents into exile under the Foreign Agents Law. Still, few doubt that last Thursday\u2019s vote marks the darkest chapter yet in El Salvador\u2019s accelerating descent into authoritarian rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For now, the Salvadoran president appears untouchable. His radical security policy\u2014despite serious human rights violations against both alleged and actual gang members\u2014has transformed the former homicide capital of the world<\/a> into one of the safest countries in the Western Hemisphere, winning him overwhelming support at home and abroad. He\u2019s also been bolstered by a weak opposition, close ties to Trump and the so-called \u201cnew right,\u201d and the conspicuous silence of Western leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, according to a survey by LPG Datos, only 1.4% of Salvadorans<\/a> find it troubling that power is concentrated in a single person\u2019s hands. Still, Bukele will face future hurdles in holding on to power. What happens when Bukele\u2019s brand of \u201cpeace\u201d becomes normalized? Or when the country is hit by an economic, social, or environmental crisis? It seems unlikely that the self-proclaimed dictator would willingly cede power or allow a new government to take over following an electoral defeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Democratic erosion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Last week\u2019s constitutional reform, which removed term limits for the presidency, also extended the presidential term from five to six years, eliminated run-off elections, and brought forward the 2028 presidential election to 2027 to align it with legislative and municipal elections\u2014an attempt to capitalize on Bukele\u2019s electoral momentum. These are merely the latest blows to El Salvador\u2019s already fragile democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just a year after his first presidential win in 2019, Bukele evoked memories of the civil war that plagued the 1980s. Flanked by heavily armed soldiers, he stormed into Congress<\/a> to demand a $109 million loan for his \u201cwar\u201d against gangs. In 2021, he went after the judiciary<\/a>, purging the courts and replacing independent judges with loyalists from his party, Nuevas Ideas. But it was in 2022 that his presidency entered its defining phase with the declaration of a \u201cstate of exception,\u201d which the Legislative Assembly has since renewed<\/a> 41 times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For decades, El Salvador was caught in the crossfire between the notorious Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 gangs (both Sure\u00f1os and Revolucionarios), which controlled nearly every aspect of daily life. Attacks on businesses were common, and brutal killings occurred frequently and with impunity. Many families stopped sending their children to school, as the journey often meant crossing gang-controlled territories. Nearly every aspect of social life was confined to one\u2019s neighborhood or home.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Because Salvadoran gangs were not major players in international drug trafficking\u2014unlike Mexican and Colombian cartels\u2014violent extortion became their main source of income. In 2014, the Central Bank calculated<\/a> that the cost of extortion in El Salvador equaled more than 3% of GDP; that same year, public spending on education was 3.8% of GDP<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Every administration before Bukele promised to take on the gangs, but all failed to end the bloodshed. Clearly, their \u201ctough\u201d approach wasn\u2019t tough enough. These broken promises, made over and over by the two dominant parties\u2014right-wing ARENA and leftist FMLN\u2014only deepened public disillusionment and a sense of chaos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Opposition missteps<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite his rising popularity as mayor of Nuevo Cuscatl\u00e1n under the FMLN\u2014where he began his political career in 2012\u2014Bukele\u2019s relationship with his former party deteriorated. In October 2017, the FMLN finally expelled him<\/a> for \u201cdefamatory actions,\u201d following an incident in which he allegedly threw an apple<\/a> at a party colleague. But the decision backfired: during the next year\u2019s legislative and municipal elections, which Bukele had been poised to win, the FMLN suffered crushing defeats. In part, this was because a bitter Bukele had urged voters<\/a> to spoil their ballots or stay home. With the FMLN stripped of its historic majority in the legislature, ARENA and the broader right were poised to take control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The FMLN\u2019s hostility toward Bukele has hurt it ever since he became president in 2019. His critics\u2014both inside and outside the party\u2014have largely focused their attacks on his security policies, a strategy that has failed for several reasons. First, mass incarceration of gang members is the bedrock of Bukele\u2019s popularity. Attempts to discredit him over human rights abuses tied to the Territorial Control Plan don\u2019t resonate with voters whose own rights were routinely violated by the same gangs that the opposition now appears to defend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second\u2014and more importantly\u2014security is just the visible tip of the \u201cBukelismo\u201d iceberg. While his blatant disregard for the rights and freedoms of detainees (many imprisoned without trial in megaprison CECOT) deserves condemnation, the broader democratic backsliding\u2014total institutional control, indefinite reelection, and an unprecedented concentration of power\u2014is the more enduring threat to the future of this Central American nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A fleeting calm?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

No one should be surprised by the popularity of a figure like Bukele<\/a> in a country like El Salvador. After all, living without fear is a basic human right that Salvadorans were denied for far too long. Bukele\u2019s ability to provide security where all his predecessors failed spectacularly explains not only his staggering popularity, but also the Salvadoran people\u2019s willingness to discard their own democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the region is full of cautionary tales about what comes next. Although Bukele has gained support faster and more decisively than others, it\u2019s worth remembering that there was a time when Ortega enjoyed broad support in Nicaragua\u2014just as Ch\u00e1vez did in Venezuela. Like Bukele, those leaders promised to cure ailments long deemed incurable. But when their people no longer wanted the medicine, it was already too late.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For now, Bukele\u2019s indefinite reelection is cloaked in his immense popularity. It lends him a veneer of democratic legitimacy, in the narrowest sense of the word. But someday\u2014perhaps sooner than expected\u2014the Salvadoran people may find themselves suffocated by the iron hand that once gave them \u201cbreath.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

*Machine translation, proofread by Ricardo Aceves.<\/sup><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Bukele’s indefinite reelection marks a dangerous turning point for El Salvador, masked by popularity and a fleeting sense of security.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":753,"featured_media":49921,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[16885,16886,17142],"tags":[15635],"gps":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-49808","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-bukele-en","8":"category-el-salvador-es-en","9":"category-autocracia-en","10":"tag-debates"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49808","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/753"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=49808"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49808\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/49921"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=49808"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=49808"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=49808"},{"taxonomy":"gps","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/gps?post=49808"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}