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<\/a><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nThe separation between a provisional Trade Agreement and an Association Agreement \u2014 an alternative that facilitates approval of the trade component by European institutions \u2014 clearly signals the Commission\u2019s intent to move forward and avoid blockages caused by potential vetoes. The question now is whether this time a conclusion will truly be reached, or if the process will once again remain open. For now, it is the Mercosur countries that await Europe\u2019s final position<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the Council, international trade agreements require a qualified majority: at least 55% of member states (15 of 27), representing at least 65% of the EU population. While unanimity is not required, the relative weight of France and other agriculturally sensitive states poses a real risk, as opposition from even one major player can seriously complicate the process. In the European Parliament, approval requires only a simple majority of votes. This condition, seemingly favorable, cuts both ways \u2014 it can make approval easier, but also rejection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The European Commission is trying to persuade reluctant states<\/a> by incorporating additional safeguards \u2014 introduced on October 7 \u2014 aimed at strengthening protections for European farmers. Italy appears to have been convinced. Poland, however, remains dissatisfied, though its Minister of Agriculture has stated that potential mechanisms to protect producers are being explored, prompting opposition criticism for what was seen as yielding to Brussels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this context, the \u201cFrance factor\u201d remains decisive. The pressure from the powerful rural lobby and the political consensus around defending agricultural interests explain France\u2019s resistance. Recent statements by Emmanuel Macron \u2014 amid a prolonged domestic political crisis \u2014 seemed to suggest some willingness to reconsider the veto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz caused confusion by wrongly claiming that at the October 23 European Council meeting all member states had unanimously supported the signing of the agreement<\/a>, Macron stated that \u201cthe work continues\u201d to finalize the safeguard clauses introduced by the European Commission, which Paris deems \u201cessential\u201d to improve the text. He also expressed his wish for the process to conclude soon and for Mercosur countries to receive formal notification and provide the necessary assurances requested by France.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The desire of countries such as Germany and Spain to move quickly once again runs up against France\u2019s protectionist demands. In recent days, the recently resigned and subsequently reinstated Prime Minister S\u00e9bastien Lecornu addressed the European Commission to reaffirm France\u2019s discontent with the agreement and demanded measures to prevent unfair competition from South American farmers. Lecornu sent a formal letter to the Commission \u2014 a sensible precaution following the mysterious disappearance of Macron\u2019s emails to Ursula von der Leyen reiterating France\u2019s opposition to the deal. Von der Leyen is currently under investigation for this matter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tensions are also evident in the European Parliament. The dividing lines are largely national: French, Polish, and Irish Members of European Parliament (MEPs) across the political spectrum oppose the agreement, while those from Germany, Spain, and Portugal are among its strongest supporters. In the Netherlands and Austria, criticism of the agreement is widespread, though MEPs are divided.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ideologically, divisions persist as well: a faction of left-wing MEPs is promoting a resolution to challenge the agreement before the EU Court of Justice. Although the European People\u2019s Party (EPP), the largest group, supports ratification, forty MEPs \u2014 including fourteen from the EPP itself \u2014 sent a letter to the Commission expressing reservations and warning of potential impacts on the agricultural sector. Other MEPs are conducting field visits<\/a>; a group from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development is currently in Brazil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU\u2013Mercosur agreement would be the largest trade deal in the history of both blocs. Yet, to paraphrase Borges, \u201cit is not love that unites them, but dread.\u201d Beneath asymmetrically complementary trade flows and clearly defined offensive and defensive interests on both sides, the protectionist policies of the Trump administration have functioned as a decisive external factor, spurring an approach that might otherwise have been difficult to achieve. While Mercosur seeks to consolidate its role as a strategic partner and has shown greater flexibility, the EU remains constrained by the need to protect sensitive sectors of its economy \u2014 once again positioning itself as the actor with the greater defensive interests \u2014 even as it maintains a strong rhetorical commitment to promoting a rules-based multilateral trading system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would not necessarily be catastrophic. Mercosur\u2013EU relations have more than thirty years of history without a formal, ambitious agreement. If it is not signed and ratified, it would simply mark another episode in a relationship long characterized by partial advances, setbacks, and resilience.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" After more than two decades of promises and disagreements, the Mercosur\u2013European Union agreement remains bogged down amid European protectionism, French agricultural pressure, and South American impatience.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":463,"featured_media":52724,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[16830,16831],"tags":[15635],"gps":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-52749","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-mercosur-en","8":"category-union-europea-es-en","9":"tag-debates"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/52749","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/463"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=52749"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/52749\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/52724"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=52749"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=52749"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=52749"},{"taxonomy":"gps","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/gps?post=52749"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}How the trade agreement is voted on in the EU<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
What is the balance of power in the Council and the Parliament?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
What would it mean if the agreement is finally concluded?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
And if it does not happen?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n