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<\/figure>\n\n\n\nAnother pathway that has been used for regularization is access to refugee status. In theory, this route offers stronger protection and long-term security. In practice, however, few countries in the region have applied the expanded definition of refugee established in the Cartagena Declaration to Venezuelans, despite widespread recognition of the serious human rights violations taking place in the country. In addition to the causes contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention<\/a>, it contemplates \u2018persons who have fled their countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Brazil stands out as an exception. In 2019, it adopted a simplified procedure to recognize Venezuelans as refugees. This decision was shaped by political factors, including Bolsonaro\u2019s geopolitical opposition to Nicol\u00e1s Maduro\u2019s regime, as well as practical considerations: reducing a growing backlog of asylum claims and addressing documentation barriers that prevented many Venezuelans from accessing other forms of regularization. Importantly, this policy has continued even after diplomatic relations with Venezuela were partially restored, despite concerns that the expanded definition might be revoked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Together with Operation Welcome (Opera\u00e7\u00e3o Acolhida<\/em>), a large-scale humanitarian response focused on reception and internal relocation, Brazil\u2019s approach has been celebrated internationally and presented as a model for the region. Yet this positive image hides important contradictions. Refugee status has not become the main pathway for Venezuelans in Brazil \u2013 only around 20% all Venezuelans have obtained refugee status \u2013 and recent asylum practices increasingly clash with the country\u2019s reputation as a leader in international protection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In fact, Brazil has recently adopted a series of administrative measures that restrict access to the asylum system, particularly for non-Venezuelan nationalities. The death of Evans Osei Wusu<\/a> (Ghanaian citizen) in 2024, after falling ill while awaiting authorization to enter Brazil at Guarulhos International Airport, exposed serious human rights concerns in these border spaces. Rather than strengthening protection mechanisms, the state has increasingly relied on visa requirements and other administrative barriers that prevent some people from even applying for asylum in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These measures are often justified as tools to combat migrant smuggling or human trafficking, especially when Brazil is portrayed as a \u201ctransit country.\u201d In practice, however, they tend to penalize the very people they claim to protect\u2014those fleeing violence, poverty, or persecution. The impact has been dramatic: in 2025, asylum applications at Guarulhos Airport dropped by 94% compared to the previous year, largely due to these new barriers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another concerning trend is the requirement of private sponsorship for humanitarian visas. While initially praised as an innovative and humane policy, this mechanism increasingly shifts responsibility away from the state. People fleeing contexts of severe instability may now depend on sponsors to access protection, undermining the idea of asylum and humanitarian visas as rights rather than favors. This approach raises serious questions about Brazil\u2019s commitment to consolidating a coherent National Policy on Migration, Refuge, and Statelessness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These developments would already be troubling on their own, but they become even more alarming when placed in the broader regional and global context. Migration and asylum have become increasingly politicized, especially following Donald Trump\u2019s return to power in the United States. Across the Americas, public debate and policy measures increasingly blur the distinction between migrants and refugees, framing human mobility as a threat or \u201cinvasion\u201d and prioritizing containment and expulsion over protection. There is also a growing risk that Venezuelan displacement may be instrumentalized in upcoming elections, with migration narratives being mobilized to fuel fear, securitization agendas, and political polarization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this new scenario, the widespread use of temporary and extraordinary regularization schemes deserves critical scrutiny. Historically, such measures have often served as tools of migration control. Today, they also generate detailed digital information systems that can later be used for surveillance, exclusion, or deportation, as recent statements by Chile\u2019s president-elect suggest<\/a>. This is particularly dangerous in a context where respect for international law is being openly challenged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When regularization programs are discretionary, temporary, and poorly anchored in the law, they offer little protection against sudden policy reversals. Anti-immigration discourse has grown more radical, targeting not only new arrivals but also people who have lived for years in destination countries, often from places where human rights violations are widely recognized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n