The study of Chinese influence in Latin America has undoubtedly focused on the economic and trade relations between the Asian giant and the countries of the region. While there is a considerable body of research on, for example, China\u2019s soft power, analyses of the country\u2019s political and institutional influence in the region are less common.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Among Beijing\u2019s instruments of political internationalization are people-to-people diplomacy<\/a>, Chinese paradiplomacy, and the multilateral engagement of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Latin America through forums such as the China-CELAC Forum and its various subforums, which facilitate exchanges with media outlets, think tanks, political parties, and civil society sectors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These mechanisms, which in democratic countries function as vehicles of sharp power, acquire particular significance in their interaction with non-democratic regimes. In Central America, the cases of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras\u2014classified by V-Dem<\/a> respectively as a closed autocracy, an electoral autocracy, and a gray-zone electoral democracy\u2014illustrate how these ties can be instrumentalized in two directions: on the one hand, recipient governments use them to reinforce practices of power concentration; on the other, China leverages them to consolidate its strategic presence in the isthmus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this regard, cooperation between China and these countries should not be understood merely as an exchange of resources or investments, but as a broader web of institutional, technological, and ideational interactions that, in certain contexts, may contribute to the reproduction of authoritarian dynamics, as highlighted in the report Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics<\/em> by the think tank Expediente Abierto<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n People-to-people exchanges constitute one of the most visible\u2014and at the same time most underestimated\u2014instruments of China\u2019s international projection. On the surface, these mechanisms aim to foster understanding between societies. However, they form an integral part of the CCP\u2019s foreign policy and operate under strong state control, building networks of influence that connect foreign actors with China\u2019s political apparatus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Latin America, and particularly in Central America, these exchanges have expanded beyond cultural or academic spheres to include sensitive sectors of the state apparatus. Delegations of police officers, military personnel, judges, and prosecutors have participated in training programs in China, where they are exposed to operational doctrines and governance models related to public order control and the administration of justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Nicaragua, officials from the National Police have held bilateral meetings with China\u2019s Ministry of Public Security and participated in training programs that include instruction in riot-control tactics, the use of drones in police operations, criminal investigation techniques, and dignitary protection. This cooperation also extends to participation in international security platforms led by China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Similarly, in 2024, Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yanhui, accompanied by newly appointed Defense Attach\u00e9 Dai Zenggang, held an official meeting with El Salvador\u2019s Minister of Defense, during which they discussed expanding cooperation in key defense areas, signaling a deepening of military ties between the two countries. These interactions go beyond the defense sphere and extend into the legal and prosecutorial domains. In 2023, Supreme Court President \u00d3scar L\u00f3pez met in Beijing with Zhang Jun, President of China\u2019s Supreme People\u2019s Court, where they signed judicial cooperation agreements. Subsequently, in 2024, Attorney General Rodolfo Delgado met with his Chinese counterpart to strengthen cooperation between their respective justice institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A similar pattern can be observed in Honduras, where Supreme Court President Rebeca R\u00e1quel Obando participated in a judicial cooperation forum organized by China in Quanzhou in 2023 and met with Chinese Ambassador Yu Bo in 2024 to expand bilateral legal cooperation. Such exchanges have facilitated the circulation of experiences related to judicial digitalization, criminal management, and the construction of the so-called \u201crule of law,\u201d in a context where the executive branch has expanded its control over the judiciary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That said, it would be inaccurate to assume that these exchanges automatically lead to the adoption of the Chinese model. Rather, their significance lies in the gradual socialization of political and administrative elites into frameworks that offer alternatives to liberal democracy. As has been noted, these spaces function less as platforms for horizontal dialogue and more as mechanisms for integrating foreign actors into CCP-led networks of influence, where an idealized vision of one-party rule and development without political liberalization is promoted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If people-to-people exchanges operate at the level of elite socialization, the export of technology constitutes their material counterpart. In Central America, this dimension has developed primarily through the provision of digital infrastructure, telecommunications systems, surveillance platforms, and \u201csmart city\u201d solutions, many of them promoted by companies linked to the Chinese state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government has promoted systems such as SINAREM (National Emergency Response System) with Chinese assistance. This type of technological architecture, based on centralized data and integrated surveillance, has obvious applications for social control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Likewise, the National Library of San Salvador, built by Chinese companies, incorporates facial recognition systems and automated services. In addition, Salvadoran officials have visited companies such as Huawei, China Mobile, and BYD as part of training programs in China, where they have been exposed to 5G technologies, connectivity platforms, and digital governance solutions. Although presented under the banner of modernization, these tools expand the state\u2019s capacity to manage data and monitor public spaces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Honduras is at a more incipient stage of technological cooperation with China but follows a trajectory similar to the other cases. Honduran officials have participated in \u201csmart city\u201d programs in China<\/a>, where they have been exposed to \u201curban brain\u201d systems based on big data, sensors, and integrated surveillance. Domestically, the national 911 emergency system\u2014which includes license plate recognition and thousands of interconnected cameras\u2014has been linked to technologies associated with Huawei and other related companies. Although presented as public security infrastructure, this system provides the foundations for broader monitoring capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\nPeople-to-people exchanges: Elite socialization and the transfer of practices<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Technology and control: The material dimension of cooperation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n