{"id":58474,"date":"2026-08-22T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-08-22T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/?p=58474"},"modified":"2026-08-24T01:36:12","modified_gmt":"2026-08-24T04:36:12","slug":"how-does-the-albanian-mafia-operate-in-latin-america","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/how-does-the-albanian-mafia-operate-in-latin-america\/","title":{"rendered":"How does the Albanian mafia operate in Latin America?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Albanian clans were the first to boost cocaine trafficking from Latin America to Europe. In the new DP Focus 20, Arturo Torres investigates the modus operandi of this criminal group.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three factors were crucial for the Albanian mafia and other Balkan clans to turn Ecuador into an incubator of transnational crime: institutional weakness and latent corruption in control agencies, a dollarized economy with incipient anti-money laundering controls, as well as the significant increase in cocaine production and demand in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Europe, the cocaine market has quadrupled in the last 15 years. During this period, almost every Latin American country has become a key link in the cocaine trade, whether as producers, processors, transporters, or havens for money laundering. The region now produces more than twice as much cocaine as it did a decade ago. Coca cultivation in Colombia, the source of most of the world’s cocaine, has tripled, reaching 3,000 tons annually, according to UN figures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The beginnings<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Around 2009, the first Albanians arrived in Ecuador. They were following the directives of the Italian mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, which sought direct access to cocaine purchases from Colombia for distribution in Europe. The Albanians found a number of advantages, especially in the coastal city of Guayaquil, with its robust network of eight ports. Most of these ports were dedicated to exporting bananas and other products to Europe and other continents. They realized that exports, due to the large volume of containerized cargo, would be an ideal vehicle for drug trafficking.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At that time, police investigations focused on drug shipments arriving via the beaches and small ports of Manab\u00ed and Esmeraldas, using speedboats bound for Central America and the United States. The Sinaloa Cartel was dominant, with no competitors in transporting the drugs sold to them by Colombian traffickers through Ecuador by land, sea, and air. Their partner in Ecuador, responsible for transportation and logistics, was the Los Choneros gang.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2007, Rafael Correa<\/a> had just come to power and made a series of decisions that would irreversibly weaken Ecuador’s anti-narcotics efforts. In 2008, he formally severed relations with Colombia and, de facto, with the United States. The catalyst was the bombing of the FARC camp in Agostura by Colombian aircraft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This led to the abrupt suspension of information sharing, cooperation, and joint operations against drug trafficking groups on the border. Correa dismantled the intelligence systems that coordinated with Colombia and the US. He removed port control responsibilities from the Navy, transferring them to the Ministry of Transportation. Since then, maritime surveillance has been leaderless. The final blow was the approval, in the new Constitution (2009), of the concept of Universal Citizenship, which allows any foreigner to enter the country without a visa or a criminal background check. A few months after these entries began, organized crime networks from Russia, the Middle East, and China opened new routes for human trafficking to the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Modus operandi<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the Albanians’ initial plan was to settle in Colombia, they preferred to test their criminal formula in Ecuador: Guayaquil was their main laboratory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In those early years, Arber \u00c7ekaj, an Albanian, arrived in the port city. He founded a banana export company, which he used to conceal narcotics on cargo ships, acting as a representative of the Italian ‘Ndrangheta. Around the same time, Dritan Gjika \u2014a prominent figure in the Albanian mafia\u2014arrived in Ecuador on a temporary visitor visa. In 2012, Dritan Rexhepi, considered the pioneering boss of the transnational Albanian cartel Compa\u00f1\u00eda Bello, arrived in Ecuador.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Initially they stayed for one to two months, then permanently. They obtained false identity documents from the Civil Registry or paid for permanent residency or investor visas. They also married Ecuadorian women, paying them to participate in the charade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Through local collaborators, they identified loopholes in the corporate and banking system. They began acquiring and establishing dozens of fruit and seafood exporting companies, using the facade of young entrepreneurs. This allowed them to penetrate Guayaquil’s high society (known for its bold business spirit) with relative ease. They quickly learned Spanish, as well as other languages. With this strategy, they cultivated contacts and became close friends with businesspeople, politicians, high-ranking officers in the police and navy, judges, and prosecutors. It was the beginning of the contagion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Institutional contagion <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Discreetly, these Balkan structures infiltrated Ecuadorian institutions. Their objective was to seize control of key parts of the cocaine supply chain and unleash a deluge of drugs in Europe: an annual cocaine market worth over $12 billion. These profits allowed them to diversify their income streams, not relying solely on drug trafficking, and instead invest their proceeds in other activities, such as illegal gold mining. According to official estimates, endorsed by President Daniel Noboa, criminal economies, led by Balkan mafias, currently generate approximately $26 billion in revenue, equivalent to 20% of GDP. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This lucrative criminal enterprise has serious consequences. Since 2021, insecurity has spiraled out of control in Guayaquil and, over the years, has spread to the country’s main cities, including Quito. Some 50 gangs currently operate in Ecuador. Many of these groups provide services, indiscriminately, to transport and store cocaine in Ecuador for cartels, not only those from the Balkans but also Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation. Disputes over control of more territory for criminal activity have fueled the violence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In January 2024, the government declared a state of war against criminal groups, but without a clear plan to reverse this trend. The homicide rate rose from 6 to 50.9 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants between 2019 and 2025. Ecuador became the most violent and unsafe country in Latin America in just four years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the midst of this crisis, the US and the European Union significantly increased their cooperation from distinct but complementary perspectives. The European approach is more comprehensive. It seeks to address the structural causes of crime through training, support for social programs, and intelligence sharing. The US maintains its commitment to providing equipment and infrastructure to law enforcement agencies, as well as intelligence. Despite all its efforts, with an emphasis on punitive measures, increased military and police presence on the streets, and constant arrests of gang members, the state remains stuck in the reaction-containment phase. It has lost its capacity for prevention and for truly reclaiming the increasingly vast territories where criminal governance prevails. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

So far, the government lacks an effective, multidimensional strategy to overcome the security crisis, which is the main problem gripping Ecuador and threatening its democratic survival.     <\/p>\n\n\n\n

*This article was originally published in Di\u00e1logo Pol\u00edtico<\/sub><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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