{"id":60055,"date":"2026-10-23T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-10-23T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/?p=60055"},"modified":"2026-10-23T12:28:05","modified_gmt":"2026-10-23T15:28:05","slug":"judge-jury-and-liberator-bukeles-changeable-plans-for-conditional-release","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/judge-jury-and-liberator-bukeles-changeable-plans-for-conditional-release\/","title":{"rendered":"Judge, jury and liberator? Bukele\u2019s changeable plans for conditional release"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

On 13 October, Latin America\u2019s favourite strongman made a surprising admission. Asked about the review of prison cases, Nayib Bukele said his government was considering the early release of roughly half of those jailed for collaborating with gangs. \u201cHe is guilty,\u201d<\/a> he explained, \u201cbut release him conditionally.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three days and a deluge of unfavourable headlines later, Bukele returned to the podium, insistent that the press had twisted his words. Only 10,629 of the more than 93,000 detained under the state of exception  would have their cases reviewed, he said, and those who qualified would first have to work their way out through a prison labour scheme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

For a leader as unyielding as Bukele, even a limited review represents a major retreat. Just last year, he promised that the prisoners would not be freed \u201cnot now, not ever\u201d, and said he \u201ccouldn\u2019t care less\u201d if his detractors called him a dictator. So what could have prompted this sudden change of heart? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mounting pressure<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since Trump\u2019s return to the White House, Washington\u2019s protection has largely kept Bukele\u2019s critics at bay. But with the US midterms forecast to return a less forgiving Congress, and Democrats already voicing concern about the regime<\/a>, that indulgence may not survive the upcoming vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foreign investors, too, would welcome a softer image. Few companies want their names associated with headlines about mass detention, which is presumably why Bukele first floated early release while unveiling a $2.9 billion investment by the Spanish energy group Cox.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Closer to home, pressure from detainees\u2019 families and rights groups is another likely concern. At least 554 prisoners have died in custody<\/a>, according to the rights group Socorro Jur\u00eddico Humanitario, and security forces and prison staff face more than 6,400 complaints of abuse. Next week, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights will hold a hearing on the treatment of those detained under the state of exception, which could become a first step towards binding judgments from the Inter-American Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Domestic opinion, meanwhile, pulls in two directions. With the election just over four months away, seven in ten Salvadorans<\/a> now name the economy as their principal concern. Bukele\u2019s one-trick pony approach to security has got him this far, but his popularity will keep suffering unless he can deliver on the economy as convincingly as he has on crime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But even if a prison system holding some 2 per cent of the population is an expensive way to keep the peace\u2013\u2013$200 million a year, by the president\u2019s own estimate\u2013\u2013the crackdown has not lost its charm. In the same IUDOP poll, carried out in May, almost 70 per cent wanted the state of exception extended. That helps to explain his subsequent retreat, but it raises an obvious question: why risk such an unpopular offer in the first place?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Debts and copycats<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some commentators in the region suspect Bukele has other debts to settle, not to voters but to the gangs. This suggestion<\/a>, first raised by the Salvadoran journalist Walter Raudales, may not be as outlandish as it first seems. In 2023, US prosecutors alleged that Bukele\u2019s government had eased prison conditions for MS-13 leaders in exchange for votes and fewer public killings, and the prisons chief who would oversee the releases, Osiris Luna, is the official the US Treasury sanctioned for negotiating those benefits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Raudales also asks whether a disorderly release might be the prelude to \u201cfresh outbreaks of crime\u201d, justifying the state of exception for years to come. There is precedent for that in Salvadoran politics, too. ARENA\u2019s Plan Mano Dura was launched in 2003 just as homicides were falling, and the head of the party later admitted that crime had been \u201cdeliberately politicized\u201d for electoral gain. Mano dura has proven to be the gift that keeps on giving: two decades on, Bukele governs on the strength of having defeated the maras that those mass arrests helped create.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Across the region, many have scrambled to copy the formula, hoping to emulate Bukele\u2019s success. According to InSight Crime<\/a>, 16 mega-prisons have been proposed in ten countries since CECOT opened in 2023, the most recent of which was inaugurated in Costa Rica the day after Bukele first floated his plan. Some have gone further still: in Brazil, presidential hopeful Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro wants chemical castration for sex offenders,  Daniel Noboa has declared Ecuador at war with criminal groups, while Colombia\u2019s Abelardo de la Espriella\u2013\u2013who once dismissed Bukele as \u201ca boy scout\u201d\u2013\u2013has taken to posing on social media among the bodies of so-called \u201cnarco-terrorists\u201d slain by security forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A savvy Bukele, who spent many years in advertising before assuming the presidency, may have seen a market saturated with copies of his product as an opportunity to launch something new. Answering what he calls the \u201cremission\u201d of the gang \u201ccancer\u201d with mercy would certainly set him apart from an increasingly hardline crowd. Stepping back as his admirers rush forward would also offer another  has a further advantage: if Washington\u2019s mood turns, they, not Bukele, will be first in the firing line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Freedom by decree<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whatever Bukele\u2019s motivations, human rights defenders shouldn\u2019t hold their breath. Even the possible releases hinge on presidential whim, not due process, and Bukele has already shown that what he gives today, he can take away tomorrow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 2021, Bukele\u2019s legislature has packed the Constitutional Chamber and the attorney general with loyalists; habeas corpus petitions, once a meaningful check, are now almost never admitted. The courts that remain convict en masse. Earlier this year, Human Rights Watch found that one public defender was given ten minutes to defend 102 people, while anonymous judges handed 30-year sentences to alleged gang \u201ccollaborators\u201d without a single acquittal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The review process is similarly opaque. According to the president\u2019s brother Ibrajim, who has no official role but nonetheless wields considerable influence, cases are assessed by an anonymous \u201cindependent team\u201d made up of prosecutors, the prison service, and the First Lady\u2019s office. Salvadoran law offers no alternative. Conditional release is reserved for convicted prisoners who have served two-thirds of their sentence, and more than 90 per cent of detainees have yet to stand trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the select few who may still qualify under the revised plan, freedom means accepting the government\u2019s version of events, and the label that comes with it. As Abraham \u00c1brego, legal director of the rights group Cristosal, points out, Bukele\u2019s speaks only of \u201ccollaborators\u201d, never the innocent. Calling them anything else would admit wrongful detention and risk opening the door to costly compensation claims. The courts manufacture guilt in bulk; the president hands out mercy case by case. Bukele is no longer just judge and jury. He is a fair-weather liberator, too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The show must go on<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThere is one thing I am afraid of,\u201d Bukele told his cabinet in November 2023, \u201cand that is leaving a bad legacy.\u201d The past week will not have assuaged his fears. His brief experiment with leniency pleased neither his supporters, who dread the gangs\u2019 return, nor his critics, who see more arbitrary power. It also showed something voters rarely see from Bukele: doubt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Still, the confusion may matter less than what it obscures. For four years, images of men packed into CECOT drew the world\u2019s gaze while, out of shot, Bukele dismantled the courts, scrapped presidential term limits, and drove his critics into exile. The new show of mercy, however scaled back, deserves the same suspicion. It raises many questions the government has yet to answer: who is released, by whom, and in exchange for what.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Bukele softens his plan to release thousands of prisoners amid political and economic pressure, reigniting questions about his motives.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":753,"featured_media":60001,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[16885,16886],"tags":[15635],"gps":[],"class_list":["post-60055","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-bukele-en","category-el-salvador-es-en","tag-debates"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60055","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/753"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60055"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60055\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":60057,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60055\/revisions\/60057"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/60001"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60055"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60055"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60055"},{"taxonomy":"gps","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/gps?post=60055"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}