![\"\"](\"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/L21-Banner-INGLES-1024x190.png\")
<\/a><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nBut the defeat has consequences that extend beyond US borders. Constrained by Congress, Trump will have greater incentives to seek abroad the political victories that will now be harder to secure in Washington. Latin America occupies a prominent place in that calculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trump will be institutionally weaker, but he could prove more dangerous to a politically fragmented region. He retains the power to impose unilateral decisions, while Latin American governments lack a common position from which to negotiate with Washington.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A weakened president, but not disarmed<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nThe new Democratic majority will take office on January 3, 2027, with control of both chambers. In the Senate, Democrats will hold at least 54 seats, rising to 56 if their leads in Alaska and Mississippi are confirmed. They will be able to block Republican initiatives, investigate presidential decisions, and challenge the federal budget.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, they will not have the 60 votes needed to overcome a filibuster or the two-thirds majority required to override a presidential veto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Congress will be able to investigate military operations in Venezuela, question the funding of the war with Iran, and activate the mechanisms established under the War Powers Resolution. It can also place conditions on funding for military and security cooperation in Latin America.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trump, however, retains instruments that do not depend on legislative majorities, including sanctions within existing legal authorities, executive agreements, and commercial and military powers. Back in 2018, when Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives, congressional oversight increased without preventing Trump from taking unilateral action. The difference now is that he faces a broader opposition and a war whose political costs have already been reflected at the ballot box.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Negotiate or apply pressure: Trump’s dilemma in Latin America<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nTrump has two possible paths for dealing with his weakened position. He can negotiate agreements that allow him to claim international successes, or intensify pressure on foreign governments through tariffs, sanctions, and selective military cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These strategies are not mutually exclusive. A trade threat can precede negotiations, while a show of force can later be presented as a diplomatic victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is also a doctrinal framework for this pressure. The December 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly revived the Monroe Doctrine through what it calls the “Trump Corollary.” This asserts US preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and seeks to prevent powers from outside the region, particularly China, from controlling strategic assets such as rare earths and other critical minerals, infrastructure, and trade routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The “Shield of the Americas,” presented in March 2026 alongside twelve Latin American and Caribbean governments, is part of this strategy. Under the stated objective of combating drug trafficking, Washington is seeking to consolidate a network of political allies. Colombia joined in August, following Abelardo de la Espriella’s election as president. Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, and Guatemala remain outside the initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Republican defeat will make it harder to consolidate a lasting hemispheric structure if Congress challenges its funding or operations. But Trump still has the option of concentrating his efforts on bilateral agreements with like-minded governments, which are less costly and easier to present as immediate achievements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The paradox is clear: a weaker hemispheric strategy could translate into more US intervention, not less.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Venezuela: Sovereignty mortgaged for a century<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nVenezuela offers the starkest example. Following the US military operation of January 3, 2026, and the capture of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, Washington assumed a decisive role in the country’s political and oil-sector reorganization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In August, an agreement was announced granting North American Blue Energy Partners, a company controlled by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt, 100-year exploitation rights over 17 oil fields. The arrangement provides for a 35% stake for the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital and gives the State Department the right to purchase 20% of production at cost. The concessions were granted by the interim authorities headed by Delcy Rodr\u00edguez.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Senator Jack Reed, the leading Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, described the agreement as “a blatant abuse of power and taxpayer money” and demanded full accountability regarding its legal basis. Former US energy advisers have also warned that a future government could challenge the agreement. The new congressional majority will have more tools to investigate it, although it has no automatic means of overturning it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The uncomfortable question goes beyond Washington. Where is the regional response to an agreement that commits Venezuela’s strategic resources for an entire century?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Brazil and Mexico: Two different capacities to negotiate<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nOn October 25, Lula was reelected with 51.8% of the vote, compared with 48.2% for Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro, a candidate closely identified with Trumpism. The defeated candidate announced that he would seek to have the election annulled on the grounds that voting hours had been extended. The margin was 4.4 million votes; just over 35,000 ballots were cast after 5 p.m. Trump wrote this script in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lula will negotiate trade disputes with Washington from a renewed position, backed by trade diversification and Brazil’s ties with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mexico faces a different situation. Its integration into US production chains makes any economic distancing unfeasible. The review of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles, and security-related demands will continue to shape bilateral relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For President Claudia Sheinbaum, the new Congress represents an opportunity to broaden the range of interlocutors on trade and migration issues. At the same time, Mexico’s exclusion from the Shield shows that Washington distinguishes between its economic partners and its political allies. Interdependence is a vulnerability for Mexico, but it is also a negotiating asset. The challenge is to make use of that leverage without allowing disagreements over security or China to subordinate the entire relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Argentina: The cost of betting on Trump<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nJavier Milei faces a different problem. His government turned its political affinity with Trump into an international asset and received extraordinary financial support in return. In October 2025, Argentina’s Central Bank and the US Treasury signed a currency swap agreement worth up to $20 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Democratic-controlled Congress will be able to scrutinize the terms of that assistance. The agreement will not disappear with the change in congressional majority, but its future use will face greater political scrutiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Milei bet on a privileged relationship with Trump. He must now find out how much of that support reflects the enduring interests of the United States and how much depended on a political situation that has just changed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The real risk: A divided Latin America<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nTrump’s defeat will not have uniform consequences across the region. Brazil has a diversified economy and greater political autonomy. Mexico has the leverage that comes with its integration into US production chains. Argentina depends on external financial support, specifically from the United States, while Venezuela is facing direct intervention in its strategic resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This heterogeneity is Trump’s main remaining advantage in the region. He does not need to rebuild a fully institutionalized hemispheric hegemony to achieve results. He only needs to exploit existing asymmetries by rewarding allies, pressuring adversaries, and setting different conditions for each country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The coming months will show which path prevails. Budget decisions on military cooperation, scrutiny of the Venezuelan oil agreement, trade negotiations, and the future of the Shield will provide important signals. The 2028 horizon will also matter: Trump cannot seek reelection, and some governments will try to secure commitments before January 2029, while others will seek to buy time. None of these strategies offers guarantees, because competition with China and US hemispheric interests extend beyond Trump’s presidency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Republican defeat creates opportunities to renegotiate agreements, broaden the range of interlocutors, and review existing commitments. But each government negotiates from its own immediate priorities, and this fragmentation limits what the region can achieve. The danger, therefore, lies not only in Trump, but also in a region that continues to confront the pressure of a far more powerful country on an individual basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trump lost at the ballot box in his own country. The question remains whether Latin America will know how to gain something from that defeat or whether each government will once again negotiate, on its own, the terms of its own subordination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Trump\u2019s electoral defeat weakens his room for manoeuvre at home, but could intensify the pressure he exerts on Latin America –a divided region with little capacity for a unified response.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":171,"featured_media":60495,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[16868,16805],"tags":[17180],"gps":[],"class_list":["post-60488","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-relaiciones-internacionales-en","category-donald-trump-en","tag-ideas"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/171"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60488"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":60490,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488\/revisions\/60490"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/60495"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60488"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60488"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60488"},{"taxonomy":"gps","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/gps?post=60488"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
Trump has two possible paths for dealing with his weakened position. He can negotiate agreements that allow him to claim international successes, or intensify pressure on foreign governments through tariffs, sanctions, and selective military cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These strategies are not mutually exclusive. A trade threat can precede negotiations, while a show of force can later be presented as a diplomatic victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is also a doctrinal framework for this pressure. The December 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly revived the Monroe Doctrine through what it calls the “Trump Corollary.” This asserts US preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and seeks to prevent powers from outside the region, particularly China, from controlling strategic assets such as rare earths and other critical minerals, infrastructure, and trade routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The “Shield of the Americas,” presented in March 2026 alongside twelve Latin American and Caribbean governments, is part of this strategy. Under the stated objective of combating drug trafficking, Washington is seeking to consolidate a network of political allies. Colombia joined in August, following Abelardo de la Espriella’s election as president. Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, and Guatemala remain outside the initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Republican defeat will make it harder to consolidate a lasting hemispheric structure if Congress challenges its funding or operations. But Trump still has the option of concentrating his efforts on bilateral agreements with like-minded governments, which are less costly and easier to present as immediate achievements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The paradox is clear: a weaker hemispheric strategy could translate into more US intervention, not less.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Venezuela: Sovereignty mortgaged for a century<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nVenezuela offers the starkest example. Following the US military operation of January 3, 2026, and the capture of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, Washington assumed a decisive role in the country’s political and oil-sector reorganization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In August, an agreement was announced granting North American Blue Energy Partners, a company controlled by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt, 100-year exploitation rights over 17 oil fields. The arrangement provides for a 35% stake for the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital and gives the State Department the right to purchase 20% of production at cost. The concessions were granted by the interim authorities headed by Delcy Rodr\u00edguez.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Senator Jack Reed, the leading Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, described the agreement as “a blatant abuse of power and taxpayer money” and demanded full accountability regarding its legal basis. Former US energy advisers have also warned that a future government could challenge the agreement. The new congressional majority will have more tools to investigate it, although it has no automatic means of overturning it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The uncomfortable question goes beyond Washington. Where is the regional response to an agreement that commits Venezuela’s strategic resources for an entire century?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Brazil and Mexico: Two different capacities to negotiate<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nOn October 25, Lula was reelected with 51.8% of the vote, compared with 48.2% for Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro, a candidate closely identified with Trumpism. The defeated candidate announced that he would seek to have the election annulled on the grounds that voting hours had been extended. The margin was 4.4 million votes; just over 35,000 ballots were cast after 5 p.m. Trump wrote this script in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lula will negotiate trade disputes with Washington from a renewed position, backed by trade diversification and Brazil’s ties with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mexico faces a different situation. Its integration into US production chains makes any economic distancing unfeasible. The review of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles, and security-related demands will continue to shape bilateral relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For President Claudia Sheinbaum, the new Congress represents an opportunity to broaden the range of interlocutors on trade and migration issues. At the same time, Mexico’s exclusion from the Shield shows that Washington distinguishes between its economic partners and its political allies. Interdependence is a vulnerability for Mexico, but it is also a negotiating asset. The challenge is to make use of that leverage without allowing disagreements over security or China to subordinate the entire relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Argentina: The cost of betting on Trump<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nJavier Milei faces a different problem. His government turned its political affinity with Trump into an international asset and received extraordinary financial support in return. In October 2025, Argentina’s Central Bank and the US Treasury signed a currency swap agreement worth up to $20 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Democratic-controlled Congress will be able to scrutinize the terms of that assistance. The agreement will not disappear with the change in congressional majority, but its future use will face greater political scrutiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Milei bet on a privileged relationship with Trump. He must now find out how much of that support reflects the enduring interests of the United States and how much depended on a political situation that has just changed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The real risk: A divided Latin America<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nTrump’s defeat will not have uniform consequences across the region. Brazil has a diversified economy and greater political autonomy. Mexico has the leverage that comes with its integration into US production chains. Argentina depends on external financial support, specifically from the United States, while Venezuela is facing direct intervention in its strategic resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This heterogeneity is Trump’s main remaining advantage in the region. He does not need to rebuild a fully institutionalized hemispheric hegemony to achieve results. He only needs to exploit existing asymmetries by rewarding allies, pressuring adversaries, and setting different conditions for each country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The coming months will show which path prevails. Budget decisions on military cooperation, scrutiny of the Venezuelan oil agreement, trade negotiations, and the future of the Shield will provide important signals. The 2028 horizon will also matter: Trump cannot seek reelection, and some governments will try to secure commitments before January 2029, while others will seek to buy time. None of these strategies offers guarantees, because competition with China and US hemispheric interests extend beyond Trump’s presidency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Republican defeat creates opportunities to renegotiate agreements, broaden the range of interlocutors, and review existing commitments. But each government negotiates from its own immediate priorities, and this fragmentation limits what the region can achieve. The danger, therefore, lies not only in Trump, but also in a region that continues to confront the pressure of a far more powerful country on an individual basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trump lost at the ballot box in his own country. The question remains whether Latin America will know how to gain something from that defeat or whether each government will once again negotiate, on its own, the terms of its own subordination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Trump\u2019s electoral defeat weakens his room for manoeuvre at home, but could intensify the pressure he exerts on Latin America –a divided region with little capacity for a unified response.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":171,"featured_media":60495,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[16868,16805],"tags":[17180],"gps":[],"class_list":["post-60488","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-relaiciones-internacionales-en","category-donald-trump-en","tag-ideas"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/171"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60488"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":60490,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488\/revisions\/60490"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/60495"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60488"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60488"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60488"},{"taxonomy":"gps","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/gps?post=60488"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
On October 25, Lula was reelected with 51.8% of the vote, compared with 48.2% for Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro, a candidate closely identified with Trumpism. The defeated candidate announced that he would seek to have the election annulled on the grounds that voting hours had been extended. The margin was 4.4 million votes; just over 35,000 ballots were cast after 5 p.m. Trump wrote this script in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lula will negotiate trade disputes with Washington from a renewed position, backed by trade diversification and Brazil’s ties with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mexico faces a different situation. Its integration into US production chains makes any economic distancing unfeasible. The review of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles, and security-related demands will continue to shape bilateral relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For President Claudia Sheinbaum, the new Congress represents an opportunity to broaden the range of interlocutors on trade and migration issues. At the same time, Mexico’s exclusion from the Shield shows that Washington distinguishes between its economic partners and its political allies. Interdependence is a vulnerability for Mexico, but it is also a negotiating asset. The challenge is to make use of that leverage without allowing disagreements over security or China to subordinate the entire relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Argentina: The cost of betting on Trump<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nJavier Milei faces a different problem. His government turned its political affinity with Trump into an international asset and received extraordinary financial support in return. In October 2025, Argentina’s Central Bank and the US Treasury signed a currency swap agreement worth up to $20 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Democratic-controlled Congress will be able to scrutinize the terms of that assistance. The agreement will not disappear with the change in congressional majority, but its future use will face greater political scrutiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Milei bet on a privileged relationship with Trump. He must now find out how much of that support reflects the enduring interests of the United States and how much depended on a political situation that has just changed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The real risk: A divided Latin America<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nTrump’s defeat will not have uniform consequences across the region. Brazil has a diversified economy and greater political autonomy. Mexico has the leverage that comes with its integration into US production chains. Argentina depends on external financial support, specifically from the United States, while Venezuela is facing direct intervention in its strategic resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This heterogeneity is Trump’s main remaining advantage in the region. He does not need to rebuild a fully institutionalized hemispheric hegemony to achieve results. He only needs to exploit existing asymmetries by rewarding allies, pressuring adversaries, and setting different conditions for each country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The coming months will show which path prevails. Budget decisions on military cooperation, scrutiny of the Venezuelan oil agreement, trade negotiations, and the future of the Shield will provide important signals. The 2028 horizon will also matter: Trump cannot seek reelection, and some governments will try to secure commitments before January 2029, while others will seek to buy time. None of these strategies offers guarantees, because competition with China and US hemispheric interests extend beyond Trump’s presidency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Republican defeat creates opportunities to renegotiate agreements, broaden the range of interlocutors, and review existing commitments. But each government negotiates from its own immediate priorities, and this fragmentation limits what the region can achieve. The danger, therefore, lies not only in Trump, but also in a region that continues to confront the pressure of a far more powerful country on an individual basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trump lost at the ballot box in his own country. The question remains whether Latin America will know how to gain something from that defeat or whether each government will once again negotiate, on its own, the terms of its own subordination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Trump\u2019s electoral defeat weakens his room for manoeuvre at home, but could intensify the pressure he exerts on Latin America –a divided region with little capacity for a unified response.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":171,"featured_media":60495,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[16868,16805],"tags":[17180],"gps":[],"class_list":["post-60488","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-relaiciones-internacionales-en","category-donald-trump-en","tag-ideas"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/171"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60488"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":60490,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488\/revisions\/60490"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/60495"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60488"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60488"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60488"},{"taxonomy":"gps","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/gps?post=60488"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
Trump’s defeat will not have uniform consequences across the region. Brazil has a diversified economy and greater political autonomy. Mexico has the leverage that comes with its integration into US production chains. Argentina depends on external financial support, specifically from the United States, while Venezuela is facing direct intervention in its strategic resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This heterogeneity is Trump’s main remaining advantage in the region. He does not need to rebuild a fully institutionalized hemispheric hegemony to achieve results. He only needs to exploit existing asymmetries by rewarding allies, pressuring adversaries, and setting different conditions for each country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The coming months will show which path prevails. Budget decisions on military cooperation, scrutiny of the Venezuelan oil agreement, trade negotiations, and the future of the Shield will provide important signals. The 2028 horizon will also matter: Trump cannot seek reelection, and some governments will try to secure commitments before January 2029, while others will seek to buy time. None of these strategies offers guarantees, because competition with China and US hemispheric interests extend beyond Trump’s presidency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Republican defeat creates opportunities to renegotiate agreements, broaden the range of interlocutors, and review existing commitments. But each government negotiates from its own immediate priorities, and this fragmentation limits what the region can achieve. The danger, therefore, lies not only in Trump, but also in a region that continues to confront the pressure of a far more powerful country on an individual basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trump lost at the ballot box in his own country. The question remains whether Latin America will know how to gain something from that defeat or whether each government will once again negotiate, on its own, the terms of its own subordination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Trump\u2019s electoral defeat weakens his room for manoeuvre at home, but could intensify the pressure he exerts on Latin America –a divided region with little capacity for a unified response.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":171,"featured_media":60495,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[16868,16805],"tags":[17180],"gps":[],"class_list":["post-60488","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-relaiciones-internacionales-en","category-donald-trump-en","tag-ideas"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/171"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60488"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":60490,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60488\/revisions\/60490"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/60495"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60488"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60488"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60488"},{"taxonomy":"gps","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinoamerica21.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/gps?post=60488"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}