Globally, it is increasingly common to find populist leaders at the head of popularly elected governments. Latin America is no exception, contemporary democracy and populism seem to show tensions whose derivations can be diverse, examples of which are Nayib Bukele (El Salvador) and Javier Milei (Argentina).
Democracy is not only competitive and representative, but also plural. This means that multiple voices must coexist; when only one exists, or the others are silenced, plurality disappears and with it, the true democratic spirit. Thus, in a democracy there must be: government and opposition; multiplicity of political parties; diversity in the sources of information; freedom of expression, worship and other forms of manifestation of such plurality.
The problem is that populist leaders and parties, while accepting in broad terms the rules of the democratic game, have a rhetoric that strains the pluralist component of democracy and present an irreconcilable division between “us” and “them”. An “us” that, in the light of their vision of the world, would be legitimate and “them” that is illegitimate, corrupt and to be marginalized. In other words, for the populist vision there is “only” one legitimate vision: their own.
The Bukele model
In democracy there is a scenario that tips the balance towards the predominance of a “single voice”: the majority government. This is the one in which the governing force obtained such a level of electoral support that it has the necessary majorities to promote its government agenda. This basically implies not only having control of the executive, but also of the legislature.
Therefore, if a “populist” leader finds himself in such a situation, he could carry forward his “antagonistic” agenda by sustaining his rhetoric critical of “them” without major real costs, since there would be no strong opposition. Personalistic decisions are very common in a scenario with these characteristics, which for many implies an “erosion” in the democratic quality.
Nayib Bukele’s government falls into this category. Unlike the traditional Salvadoran bipartisanship, this one obtained support that allowed him to win comfortably in 2019 and to have a majority and personalist government. In addition, he promoted, without major vetoes (although with complaints), policies of restriction of movement during the pandemic and confrontation against organized crime and, thanks to the popularity achieved, he ended up being reelected, although forcing the constitution, in 2024.
In that time, the Salvadoran democratic quality was cut. According to the Freedom House index, the score El Salvador had when Bukele took office was 67/100, but the last measurement, in 2024, shows a value of 53/100, which transforms it into a “partially free” country.
The case of Milei
In contexts of greater political fragmentation and without the existence of a majority government, the tension between populism and democracy takes on a different form. This is because the conflict is now explicit between the antagonistic sectors. Why? Because “they”, or at least a part of this group, has more institutional weight here, and can become a veto (if the democratic institutions work properly) to the immediate political objectives of the government.
This is something logical, expected and even healthy to happen in a “plural” democracy, but it can clearly be conflictive for the populist political worldview, which is more linked to absolutes than to intermediate results.
There are different alternatives to address this tension, and two of them are clearly evident in Javier Milei’s government. The first is to maintain antagonism, which can lead to a lack of consensus -generating institutional paralysis — and the search for a greater concentration of power in the Executive, bypassing Congress and favoring discretionary decision making. The latter practice is usually associated with democracies of lower institutional quality, such as the so-called “delegative democracies”.
During his first year in office, the relationship with the National Congress has been especially conflictive, to the point that, from the ruling party, the legislature was described as a “rat’s nest”. Furthermore, the non-submission of the 2025 Budget anticipates a greater discretionality in the allocation of resources for next year in Argentina.
The second possibility is negotiation and the search for consensus, something desirable in a fragmented democracy. If this occurs, the extremes should weaken and intermediate results should prevail. This would not erode democracy, but rather populist antagonism (for many this is part of the so-called “democratic resilience”).
Here appears the second, more political, face of Milei’s government. Although he maintained his “us versus them” rhetoric in several spheres, at certain moments he sought to generate consensus. On the way to the ballot he promoted a “tabula rasa” with part of the opposition with which he had antagonized until then. This “dialogist opposition” is the one that has allowed him, in the conflictive legislative context mentioned above, to pass some laws.
What is clear is that without these agreements, however short term they may be, Milei’s government would not have had any chance to prosper in the legislative field, since it was a minority government. Being aware of this, his antagonistic discourse should give way to dialogue and agreement, at least in part and with some sectors, in order to sustain governability.
As a final reflection
Whichever path is chosen, the incompatibility between a quality democracy and the antagonistic rhetoric of populism is evident. Personalistic decisions, irreconcilable conflict and the search for agreements generate tensions with some of these aspects. In practice, either “democracy” or “populism” ends up prevailing, but not both.
However, in the cases mentioned, where democracy faces these tensions either by personalistic decisions or conflict with “them”, governments have achieved visible results aligned with their agendas. For example, the reduction of insecurity in El Salvador or macroeconomic stabilization in Argentina, which allows them to maintain high levels of popularity.
In this context, what do citizens prioritize today: immediate results, even if they are achieved at the cost of institutional tensions, or the strengthening of democratic quality in their countries? The dilemma is on the table and will continue to be key in the future.
*Machine translation proofread by Janaína da Silva.
Autor
Political scientist, professor and researcher at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. PhD in Social Sciences (UBA) and Master in Public Policy (UTDT).
