Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, took advantage of his presence at the World Economic Forum held in Davos to deliver a speech that dotted the i’s on geopolitical matters. In it, he acknowledged that the rules that emerged after the Second World War, conceived to preserve global balance, are now broken. He argued that this order no longer exists and that we are not in a transition toward a new model based on universal rules. On the contrary, he described a world governed by the interests of the major economic and military powers—United States, China, and Russia—bent on controlling the future of humanity.
The problem is that, even today, both international organizations and many world leaders act as if those rules still fulfill the function assigned to them at the end of the Second World War, especially through what was their highest institutional expression: the creation of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
Carney argues that the world is not undergoing a transition toward a new geopolitical model, but rather a rupture of the international order, in which economic integration has been transformed into a weapon of pressure through tariffs, supply chains, and financial mechanisms. Thus, the global stage is defined by economic rivalry among the great powers, with the United States, China, and Russia acting without clear limits, while weaker countries suffer the consequences.
In the face of this shift in the world order, the Canadian prime minister calls on middle powers to build strategic autonomy in key areas such as energy, food, minerals, finance, and supply chains.
The logic is clear: if international rules no longer protect a country, that country must protect itself. But how does this reflection fit in countries with hybrid or openly autocratic models? For Carney, his proposal is tremendously pragmatic: it is not naïve, but realistic, and nothing less than grounded in democratic values, very much in line with what the European Union advocates. The dilemma for countries with hybrid or autocratic systems lies in remaining within a model of subordinated integration or aligning with values that guarantee social and political cohesion in the medium and long term.
Mexico finds itself at that crossroads as it advances toward an autocratic precipice, with the capture and weakening of democratic institutions—one need only look at the judiciary, selected through electoral reforms that have favored openly declared members of the party Morena. This structural weakness has allowed the government of Donald Trump to use it for its own geopolitical purposes, increasing pressure on the administration of Claudia Sheinbaum. It is clear that a leader with autocratic ambitions, even if still limited by legislative checks, does not tolerate another similar attempt arising within his national sphere if it conflicts with the interests of MAGA.
Nevertheless, the government of Claudia Sheinbaum maintains a daily rhetorical sovereignty, while in practice yielding to the geopolitical needs of the northern country in matters such as trade, migration, and organized crime. For this reason, Carney warns that economic integration can become a form of subordination.
This is especially delicate for Mexico due to its structural dependence on U.S. markets, which account for 80% of the country’s foreign trade, its deep integration into production chains, and its vulnerability to tariffs, sanctions, or regulatory pressures.
Worse still, and at a time when mistakes are more costly, not only has the judiciary been weakened by aligning it with the ruling party, but also autonomous bodies and economic regulators, while the credibility of the electoral process has been called into question. Carney sums up the risk of this situation with a forceful and unsurpassed phrase: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”
The postwar model is undoubtedly broken. In the past, markets tolerated a certain democratic deficit as long as there was political stability; today, they no longer do. What matters now is institutional trust, a fundamental geopolitical asset, because investment flows toward predictable states, with credible rules and respect for contracts and trade agreements.
And if Mexico wants to be at the table, it will have less room for discretionary policies and will face greater punishment for ideological decisions that could relegate it behind other more reliable middle powers, such as Canada, South Korea, or Australia. And, in addition, because of unrelenting criminal violence. It is a major weakness that organized crime replaces the State in entire territories. These weaknesses affect supply chains, security, and territorial stability, which translates into a diminished capacity to take advantage of opportunities in nearshoring, logistics infrastructure, or high-value industrial integration.
By contrast, middle powers coordinated in the face of the new international scenario could establish a system of common rules, build strategic autonomy, and defend shared standards.
Unfortunately, the Mexican government today offers no institutional guarantees and appears only to be seeking to buy time. But time for what? Is it waiting for Trump to weaken in the medium term in order to return to the stage when everything seemed to be going swimmingly for the 4T, the ambitious political project of Andrés Manuel López Obrador? And if that were so, could it really benefit more by aligning with China or Russia? What is needed is a break from the ideology of obradorismo, which continues to see a world in which nation-states are governed by postwar dictates. With these weaknesses, they persist in that idea, failing to perceive that international reality is closing in on their president.
Returning, however, to the subtext of Carney’s speech, he calls on countries like Mexico to take one step back in order to take two steps forward, rebuilding the dismantled checks and balances and thereby sending clearer signals to markets and political allies. Strategic cooperation with the United States and Canada requires, immediately, reversing the autocratic drive.
The problem for President Sheinbaum is that she shares power with López Obrador, and any movement in that direction, however minimal, shakes the ground beneath her. It is difficult for her to acknowledge that co-government. The situation becomes even more complicated if Trump were to demand the extradition of narco-politicians from Morena.
Sheinbaum celebrated Carney’s speech, despite how uncomfortable it is for the Mexican government, because it starts from a clear premise: in a world without solid rules, institutional weakness comes at a high price. Quasi-autocratic models lose room for maneuver, become more dependent on the outside world, and are easier to pressure or discipline within a system driven by geopolitical interests. In other words: sovereignty is built and strengthened through institutions, not through posturing or fiery speeches in the public square.
Autor
Professor at the Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa. D. in Political Science and Sociology from Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Member of the National System of Researchers of Mexico.
