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Electoral Uncertainty in Venezuela

Although the figures show a clear advantage of the opposition candidate, this is not enough to assure that he will be the eventual winner and that, if this trend continues, he will be proclaimed by the electoral body.

According to a poll conducted in July by the Andrés Bello Catholic University and the pollster Delphos, the voting intention in favor of Edmundo González Urrutia, the candidate of the Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (PUD), is 59.3%, while it is 34.8% for Nicolás Maduro Mora, the incumbent president and the candidate of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV). This implies a clear difference of more than twenty percentage points in favor of the PUD.

Although the figures show a clear advantage of the opposition candidate, this is not enough to assure that he will be the eventual winner and that, if this trend is maintained, his triumph will be proclaimed by the electoral body, the National Electoral Council (CNE).

It is known that a poll is a snapshot of a moment, but it is not the only thing that must be considered for a political change to take place, especially in a context as complex as the one in the Venezuelan political system where other aspects must be considered.

Roads and paths

A well-known fact in Venezuela is that we are not in the presence of a democratic regime that respects electoral rules, the separation of powers and institutionality. We are in the presence of an authoritarian government that has co-opted all the institutions of the state. Although the different branches of the Public Power are maintained, in practice, the indications coming from Miraflores are followed.

In addition, the highest hierarchies of the Armed Forces, mainly due to personal and patrimonial interests, are affected by Nicolás Maduro. In a scenario in which Edmundo González Urrutia obtains the highest number of votes and Maduro’s government recognizes his triumph, the great challenge would be to ensure governability in the face of a military institutionality and public powers that are clearly pro-Chávez, including the National Assembly composed mostly by government supporters. At the same time, the actions of the military leadership and its respect for the constitution and the rule of law will be of particular importance.

It should also be considered that the inauguration of the new president (in case there is a change) would be in January 2025, which would imply six long months when the internal situation may be particularly complex. And, in the face of so much uncertainty, there seems to be certainty that after the presidential elections, there will be a transformation in Venezuela and, although the course is not known, it will be marked by situations that could jeopardize the governability of the country.

Another factor is that it may be costly for the leaders of the regime to leave power, and they would only do so if they had no other way left, which would imply the establishment of channels for negotiation, with the distrust in this mechanism due to the results that have been obtained in the different instances of dialogue that have been established between the opposition, or part of it, and the Maduro government.

If there is no negotiation, in this scenario it is very difficult for Maduro to leave power. Here the great challenge for the PUD is for this alliance, which brings together such diverse groups, to reach agreements on this issue.

Despite this, it must be pointed out that, as never before in 25 years, there is much hope among the population —including people who have been faithful followers of Hugo Chávez, but who dissociate themselves from Nicolás Maduro— that change is possible.

Road to the “orchestration” of the regime

Violations of human rights in general, and in particular civil and political rights and liberties are systematic in Maduro’s government.

According to the Foro Penal, a non-governmental organization for the defense of human rights, there are a total of 301 people considered political prisoners in the country and only in 2024 there have been 114 arbitrary detentions, of which 102 are linked to the team or tours of María Corina Machado and candidate Edmundo González Urrutia.

The Maduro regime has established, unsuccessfully, different strategies to prevent Machado and González Urrutia from touring the Venezuelan territory: road closures, obstacles in the way, tax penalties to those who provide them with any kind of collaboration or service during the tour. Hotels, restaurants and other establishments have been closed to lodging or feeding them. Despite this, there are people who are willing to take the risk, another sign of the generalized unease.

In addition to this, the government’s communication strategy seeks to instill fear in the population by pointing out that, if Maduro does not win, the country “will run a bloodbath”, and that only his government can ensure stability.

This path of threats, arbitrary detentions and violations of rights is similar to that of Daniel Ortega, although Nicolás Maduro is not a Nicaraguan leader, nor is the PSUV the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

As in the Central American country, the regime has absolute control of the electoral body; there is little transparency in the electoral process, which was demonstrated in the way the registration of Edmundo González Urrutia took place. The installation of the polling stations and the certification of the electoral witnesses will also be an issue to which it will be necessary to pay close attention on election day to evaluate if there is electoral advantage on the part of those in power.

It is worth asking whether the ultimate goal of the regime is to instrumentalize the elections with the ultimate intention of maintaining power, neutralize any opposition, carry out a self-coup, commit electoral fraud following the path of its friends Daniel Ortega or Vladimir Putin.

The leadership of María Corina Machado

Together with Leopoldo López and Antonio Ledezma, she was part of the most radical wing of the opposition. She favored abstention, of the economic blockade by the United States and her position toward the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (previous platform that united the opposition) was very critical. The 2023 primary elections gave her a new lease of life, as she won with more than 92% of the votes. This catapulted her as the undisputed leader of the Venezuelan opposition.

It should be noted that her case is sui generis in Latin America. Machado did not count on the support of a male leadership to promote her, hers was built by her own means and something unprecedented: it was she who supported the candidacy of Edmundo González Urrutia, to whom she transferred her political capital. Her triumph and the support of the population have been very much marked by the distrust and delegitimization suffered by some political leaders of the opposition, among them, the so-called interim president Juan Guaidó.

During this electoral campaign, in which she has toured the country, Machado’s arrival to populations far from the centers of power has agglutinated people around her figure. In her speech she appeals to the emotionality and feelings of the people, who feel identified with her words.

The electoral results will have a significant impact on his political destiny. A triumph of the PUD candidate could strengthen her leadership, but an electoral defeat, regardless of the reasons for which it occurs, could mean a very high political cost and be taken advantage of by those within the unit who oppose her to hold her responsible for not having obtained what was expected.

Edmundo González Urrutia, the conciliatory candidate

In comparison with the discourse of María Corina Machado and other opposition leaders, Edmundo González Urrutia’s discourse is more restrained and open to a possible negotiation to achieve a transition. At different times he has reiterated that “there is room for everyone in Venezuela”, including those who support Chavism.

There is a radical sector that is categorically opposed to negotiating with the regime, however, the political transition that Venezuela needs so much will be impossible without dialogue, without consensus, without making room for the different political actors, including the Chavista sectors. This does not imply denying the need for the establishment of a Truth Commission, the clarification of the facts and reparations to the victims of the human rights violations that occurred during the 11 years of Nicolás Maduro’s government.

González Urrutia’s words are very prudent for such critical moments as the ones Venezuela is going through.

Brazil and Colombia, the position of neighbors

Gustavo Petro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, leaders of the Latin American left, have been dissociating themselves from Maduro’s government, after the process of registration of presidential candidacies, where the violation of political rights by the Venezuelan regime was clear, and under the pressure of public opinion in their respective countries. Since April, they have been trying, unsuccessfully, to sign an agreement in which the parties commit to abide by the electoral results.

Due to their geographical proximity to Venezuela, there is no doubt that the electoral results will have repercussions in their countries, one of the most worrying problems (not the only one) being a new migratory exodus.

There are currently almost 8 million migrants of Venezuelan nationality who fled their country due to the humanitarian crisis and the electoral results may increase this figure. Data show that every time there is an election that favors the regime, the number of people leaving Venezuela increases significantly. If this happens again, Colombia and Brazil would be some of the preferred destinations with the challenges that this implies.

Considering this scenario, in Venezuela there is an expectation mixed with fear, but at the same time hope that a political change is possible. Although there is so little time left, there is no clarity in this regard, which is why the international community is asked not to intervene, but to be very attentive to how events develop and to be ready to strongly reject any human rights violations that may occur in the coming days.

*Translated by Janaína Ruviaro da Silva from the original in Spanish.

Autor

Otros artículos del autor

Political scientist and lawyer. Professor at the Central Univ. of Venezuela and researcher at the Simón Bolívar Univ. (Colombia). Responsible for the Gender, Leadership and Participation line of the HILA Network.

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