The dispute currently pitting Ecuador against Colombia, framed as a trade war, is in fact a symptom of something more delicate: it could mark the beginning of the collapse of the practical cooperation needed to govern a border and a regional economy that no longer moves solely along geographic boundaries, but through transnational criminal networks.
When these two neighbors replace technical coordination with economic punishment, the problem ceases to be bilateral and becomes a cost multiplier for the entire Andean region. Ecuador justified the 30% security surcharge on Colombian goods by citing a lack of cooperation against drug trafficking, while Colombia responded by imposing a 30% tariff on more than twenty Ecuadorian products and suspending electricity sales. Ecuador’s trade deficit with Colombia amounts to hundreds of millions, so we are not talking about a marginal exchange, but a large-scale one involving medicines, industrial inputs, agrochemicals, and consumer goods.
But Ecuador’s underlying argument is not the deficit, but security—and here arises the question that should guide any editorial: is the border the problem, or is it a mirror of a larger one? In the past, drugs crossed the border, and they still do. However, it would be a mistake to believe that contemporary drug trafficking depends primarily on land crossings. The business is no longer tied to a borderline as a single corridor, but is connected to a multi-node chain that includes ports, containers, maritime routes, money laundering, corruption, and prison control.
Ecuador recorded 9,216 murders in 2025, a 30% increase in just one year, according to data from the Ministry of the Interior. This is an indicator of a state under pressure from gang wars and criminal realignments. Therefore, to understand why violence has surged in Ecuador, despite the country not being a major coca cultivator, one must analyze its role as a transit country. Official sources indicated that in 2024, 278 tons of drugs were seized (28% more than in 2023), which highlights the magnitude of the Ecuadorian corridor on the regional map.
The Ministry of Defense reported that, as of October 30, 2025, 135 tons had been seized in maritime operations, confirming that the drug corridor is no longer limited to border crossings. Therefore, when the bilateral conflict is framed as the fault of the border, it simplifies a network that operates across multiple layers. Supply also exerts pressure from the Colombian side; for instance, in 2023 Colombia reached 253,000 hectares of coca (10% more than in 2022) and a potential production 53% higher than the previous year. This increase raises competition for routes and the need for outlets to external markets. In other words, even if one segment is closed, the business finds another. And when the costs of legal trade rise due to tariffs, frictions, or improvised controls, the incentive for smuggling and the capture of illegal rents also increases.
The idea that everything is due to crops is also incomplete. Cultivation is the origin, but the problem lies in the chain. Ecuador does not need to cultivate massively to become a node; it only needs to function as a logistical and financial platform. In this context, the border operates as a coupling zone for fuel, weapons, people, illegal mining, gang-imposed taxes, and drugs. The border matters, but by itself it does not explain the collapse of order Ecuador is experiencing. That is why the Noboa government declared an internal armed conflict in January 2024 and designated 22 gangs as terrorist organizations, in an attempt to justify military participation in internal security, which thus far remains limited.
Within this framework, it is worth asking another question: are the FARC more divided? The answer is yes, and this fragmentation is also relevant for Ecuador. A report by the Australian government notes that, following the dissolution of the FARC, more than 30 dissident groups emerged with shifting factions and alliances, with a collective strength of between 4,000 and 8,000 members.
Fragmentation alone does not automatically export violence, but it does multiply the number of actors competing for routes, charging for protection, and seeking logistical partners. And when the Ecuadorian side has strong local gangs and a penetrated prison system, the connection becomes functional.
This is where the economic retaliation approach becomes strategically clumsy. If the objective is to improve security, tariffs do not seize cocaine or dismantle networks. If the objective is to pressure for cooperation, breaking coordination channels makes joint work more costly and slower. And if the objective is political, the cost may outweigh the benefit: consumers pay more, companies reconfigure their supply chains, and border territories such as San Lorenzo and northern Esmeraldas become even more exposed to illegal economies that feed on state friction.
Homicide data show severe internal pressure, seizure figures demonstrate that the country lies along a major route—especially maritime—and the fragmentation of armed and criminal actors to the north increases complexity. In that context, turning the dispute with Colombia into a tariff war is like trying to put out a fire with fiscal gasoline: it may generate immediate applause, but it also opens space for the real beneficiaries of friction—smuggling, corruption, and criminal networks—and, moreover, raises the cost of formal trade that sustains jobs and legal supply.
The way forward is to design verifiable cooperation, with concrete targets and figures, not press releases. If Ecuador accuses a lack of cooperation, it should put clear indicators on the table regarding what it demands: how many joint operations it expects, how many high-value targets, how many coordinated controls, how much shared port traceability, how much judicial information exchanged. And if Colombia responds, those figures should be transformed into sustainable protocols, not political ammunition. Because the underlying question is not whether drugs crossed the border before—a tired and sterile debate—but whether Andean states will quarrel among themselves while illegal economies, which are global, coordinate better than ever.
Integration is not tested in quiet years; it is tested when crime pushes, violence rises, and politics looks for shortcuts.
Autor
PhD in Automation and Robotics. He has conducted research at various universities in France, Spain, and Ecuador on energy, technology, and development. His research focuses on the social economy, industrial transformation, and educational development.
