For the second time, Evo Morales’s photo will not appear on the ballot for the upcoming August elections. In response, the former president has on three occasions ordered his followers to block roads and attack law enforcement. The most recent 15-day mobilization not only deepened the collapse of the national economy, but also exposed that in Bolivia there are vast territories where the authority of the state does not reach and illicit activities reign. If we already knew that the Chapare region is a red zone where coca is cultivated and processed, today we sadly learn that the historic mining town of Llallagua not only produces tin and silver, but also marijuana and contraband.

The long years of prosperity from the sale of raw materials (2006–2014) did not serve to improve state capacity. Although during the years of export surpluses more schools were built, healthcare services were expanded, and roadways were developed, illegal businesses and enterprises also grew in power and size, enriching themselves under the shelter of illegality.

For instance, while in 2006 the number of mining cooperativists stood at 54,200 people, fifteen years later that number had risen to 135,436 members. Under the laughable claim that cooperatives serve a “social function,” they were gifted machinery, facilities, and land, as well as granted tax exemptions. This has turned them into a powerful economic and political force, whose strength is displayed in streets and highways every time the state attempts to regulate their environmental damage or labor exploitation. A similar situation exists with the smuggling of old cars from Chile to Bolivia. In July 2014, then Minister of Hydrocarbons Marlene Ardaya announced restrictions on gasoline sales to undocumented vehicles; a decade later, not only was this measure never implemented, but illegal auto markets have sprung up everywhere. What’s more, a congresswoman from the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party argued that these cars, popularly known as chutos, served a purpose for farmers in their work. Likewise, coca production has become more competitive: while in the Yungas coca is harvested up to twice a year, in the Chapare it is harvested six times.

Successive governments of the plurinational state have flirted with illegality and crime. Much of the new elite that MAS supported and sheltered grew thanks to the broad opportunities provided by a state that makes deals and strikes bargains with those who defy laws and regulations.

This has severe effects on civic culture. In a context where it is easier to build wealth through wrongdoing than through doing what is right, the practice of “playing smart” has become institutionalized. For those who earn an honest living, seeing corrupt individuals embedded in institutions amassing great fortunes becomes a disincentive to act honestly and with initiative. This “criollo cunning,” being neither legally punished nor socially condemned, becomes a sinister behavioral norm—where acquiring money and power takes precedence over honor and dignity.

This breeds public dissatisfaction with democracy. With a weak state, political parties that are mere acronyms, and institutions hijacked by the usual schemers, what remains of democracy in Bolivia is very little—perhaps only the disciplined turnout on election days. Therefore, if going to the polls were enough to change judicial administrators, Bolivia’s justice system would long since be among the best; if electing leaders through open elections were sufficient to secure citizenship and efficiency, Bolivia would already be a full democracy. Times of economic prosperity are also opportunities to build institutions. That opportunity has been lost—or rather, squandered.

Without a strong state, no neoliberal, libertarian, statist, or socialist project can succeed. As long as the state is at the mercy of groups operating outside the law, no economic or political initiative will be viable. As long as the state negotiates its authority with white-collar elites who protect their own interests, it matters little who holds the reins of government. The current challenge is to build a strong state; whether it is large or small, afterward is a minor detail.

_{*Machine translation proofread by Janaína da Silva}