The recent meeting of foreign ministers of the Organization of American States did not resolve Nicaragua’s crisis, but it established a monitoring mechanism, set deadlines, and kept open the possibility of adopting further measures. This is an important step forward, although an insufficient one. Its true significance will depend on governments’ political will to respond to noncompliance and prevent the Sandinista regime from using the process to buy time.
Nicaragua represents a test of the OAS’s credibility. International organizations often demonstrate firmness when describing crises, but they face greater difficulties when they must translate their resolutions into concrete decisions. The coming months will reveal whether a new phase of diplomatic action is beginning or whether the process ultimately dwindles into statements without consequences.
A political and geopolitical crisis
The situation in Nicaragua cannot be analyzed solely as a democratic breakdown and a human rights crisis. A system has become entrenched in the country that lacks effective electoral competition, an independent judiciary and other branches of government, a free press, and institutional checks and balances. At the same time, the authorities have expanded their security, intelligence, and technological cooperation ties with Russia, China, Iran, and other actors from outside the hemisphere.
The problem is not that Nicaragua is diversifying its international relations, but rather the lack of transparency surrounding the scope of these agreements, their oversight, and the possible use of technologies to strengthen surveillance and repression.
In a state without democratic checks and balances, biometric systems, facial recognition, communications platforms, and large-scale data analytics can become instruments of repression against dissent. Contemporary geopolitical influence operates not only through military bases, but also through servers, algorithms, technical training, and security agreements that remain beyond public scrutiny.
Foreign cooperation must therefore be examined responsibly and transparently, with independent verification mechanisms and without making accusations unsupported by evidence.
The ministerial group’s challenges
The foreign ministers’ main decision was to establish a Ministerial Monitoring Group. Its first test will be its composition. It will need governments with diplomatic experience, knowledge of the crisis, and the ability to maintain firm positions in the face of the regime’s delaying tactics. The balance should not be sought between democracy and authoritarianism, but rather among regional representativeness, political firmness, and the capacity for dialogue.
The second test will be Managua’s response to a request for a visit. The regime could reject it, delay it, impose conditions on it, or use partial concessions to feign openness. Obstruction should not be interpreted as a mere protocol-related difficulty. Preventing independent meetings, controlling the agenda, or selectively managing information constitutes a political response that must have consequences.
The third test will be ensuring dialogue with a broad range of stakeholders. The mechanism must hear from the democratic opposition, civil society, churches, productive sectors, victims, and exile communities. A legitimate way out of the crisis cannot be negotiated exclusively with those who control the state or with subordinate organizations artificially presented as expressions of pluralism.
Exiles must play a central role. Any democratization process must provide for safe return, restoration of nationality, restitution of rights and property, and full reintegration into public life.
Three possible scenarios
The first scenario is a controlled opening. The regime could allow limited contacts, release some detainees, or agree to a visit under strict conditions. These measures would be positive, but they would not amount to institutional transformation. The release of political prisoners cannot substitute for the restoration of civil liberties, pluralism, an independent judiciary and other branches of government, and competitive elections.
The second scenario is open obstruction. Managua could refuse to recognize the mechanism, block the visit, and adopt a more confrontational tone toward the OAS. In that case, governments will need to move beyond general appeals and work toward more effective diplomatic and legal coordination. This could include the international preservation of evidence, support for accountability mechanisms, investigations into financial networks, and rigorous oversight of security and technology agreements.
The third scenario is diplomatic dilution. The Ministerial Group could be established late, hold protocol-driven meetings, and recommend extending dialogue indefinitely. This would be the outcome most favorable to the regime, as it would create the appearance of progress while leaving the authoritarian structure intact.
To prevent this, public benchmarks must be established: the group’s composition, a request for access to the country, meetings with independent stakeholders, consultations with exiles, an analysis of foreign cooperation, and the timely submission of recommendations.
A regional crisis
The Nicaraguan crisis directly affects Costa Rica and the rest of Central America. Political repression drives people out of the country, destroys human capital, weakens economic ties, and increases pressure on host countries. Furthermore, transnational persecution can extend intimidation and surveillance to people living in exile.
If the state’s technological capabilities are used to track opponents beyond the country’s borders, host countries will need to strengthen their protection and investigative mechanisms. Protecting exiles thus becomes a matter of regional security and sovereignty.
Sovereignty belongs to the people
The Sandinista regime will attempt to portray any international initiative as a violation of sovereignty. However, sovereignty does not belong to the government, a political party, or a family. It belongs to the people.
There can be no self-determination when the population cannot choose among genuine alternatives, organize freely, or hold those in power accountable. Nor can sovereignty be invoked to justify the deprivation of nationality, forced exile, property confiscation, or the elimination of political competition.
The OAS must move quickly to establish the Ministerial Group, set verifiable benchmarks, ensure dialogue with a broad range of stakeholders, investigate the technological dimension of repression, and prepare responses to a lack of cooperation.
Dialogue can be useful, but it requires conditions, deadlines, verification, and consequences. Dialogue without limits can give a dictatorship more time. Dialogue with conditions can begin to take that time away.
The foreign ministers’ meeting kept Nicaragua’s case open, but opening a case file is not the same as opening a path to democracy. The real test will be to turn consensus into pressure, pressure into decisions, and decisions into real conditions for the restoration of democracy.
Autor
President of Ipades, trained in Administration and Political Science from the University of Costa Rica. Researcher and strategist in democratic governance and human rights, with international experience and youth leadership in public advocacy and regional institutional strengthening.
