The energy transition must be understood from a multiscalar perspective, one that encompasses the complex interplay of global and international interests converging within it. For this reason, we must first situate the issue within a broader framework—that of the capitalist world order and the profound inequalities that constitute it—before returning to the question of the risks surrounding external dependency.
Green capitalism as an alternative to crisis?
The current global situation is one of ecological emergency. Yet this emergency is only one of the multiple dimensions of a broader crisis affecting the globalized, neoliberal, financialized, and fossil-based capitalist order itself. What we are witnessing is a transformation of this order in several respects, among them in a “green” direction. This transformation represents a moment of adaptation, of systemic adjustment aimed at its own reproduction.

At the center of this green turn lies the energy transition which, as an expression of the coordination among governments, investment funds, big tech companies, and energy corporations to generate renewable energy sources, seeks to strengthen a form of capitalism that, since 1970, despite ever-increasing scientific and technological development, has been marked by a tendency toward a falling rate of profit.
This tendency has been aggravated in recent decades by the prolonged effects of the 2008 economic-financial crisis, the Covid-19 health crisis, armed conflicts such as those in Ukraine and Gaza, and the repeated unilateral actions taken by the United States against the international order. In other words, economic deterioration—which has laid bare the inequalities of neoliberal globalization—has been accompanied by an environmental crisis that deepens by the second. In response, some of the debates emerging in the Western world, such as the Green New Deal, argue that it is possible to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation through (among other measures) the transition toward a new energy matrix.
This transition has been promoted as an “inevitable solution” to global warming, which last year broke records and exceeded forecasts. There is no doubt that the climate crisis affects the world, but the ecological emergency is not limited solely to climate change. In this sense, we cannot overlook the fact that, as currently conceived, this energy transition prioritizes productive and technological dimensions at the expense of broader ecosocial transitions that would foster structural transformations.
In other words, beyond reflecting on how energy is produced and on alternative sources (which is what prevails under the hegemonic perspective), the challenge lies in understanding where and how energy is consumed, as well as the urban, cultural, and food-related dimensions—beyond the necessary technological component of a just transition. By promoting the idea of a “neutral,” “technical,” “depoliticized,” and “de-ideologized” energy transition, the hegemonic narrative creates a false illusion of a “green solution.” One that does not question patterns of consumption and production, nor the displacement of the transition’s costs onto countries of the Global South, destined to supply the raw materials necessary for the North’s technological development.
Latin America: New outfit, same dependency?
Although countries in the region account for less than 8% of global greenhouse gas emissions, they bear the extractive pressure on strategic natural resources and the overexploitation of labor, reinforcing productive specialization, deforestation, poverty, and socio-environmental devastation. What is unfolding, therefore, is a corporate, technocratic, and neocolonial transition.
Through export-oriented extractivism and technological and financial dependency, this transition ensures the continuation of the traditional conditions of subordination of the Latin American periphery. With regard to export extractivism, major powers continue to treat Latin American territories as “sacrifice zones.” They compete—through investments or loans aimed at the exploitation and export of natural resources—for access to “critical minerals” essential for the production of batteries and high-performance magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and industrial robotics, as well as in advanced military technology and oil extraction.
While Latin America is often portrayed as a privileged recipient of “green” external financing—which may, to some extent, positively impact local economies—one must remain aware of the risks posed by foreign control over energy resources, as well as by the expansion of the extractive frontier and its socio-environmental consequences. Experience shows that safeguards or state mechanisms to protect traditional and Indigenous communities from corporate interests are largely lacking.
Moreover, there is a significant absence of technology transfer or contracts guaranteeing investment in scientific and technological development. What exists instead is training for personnel who will operate imported technology. To the payment of royalties for imported technology are added loans for infrastructure and equipment. Through such loans, Latin American countries accumulate debt and move toward fiscal austerity, which in turn limits the capacity of states to formulate and implement more ambitious social and climate agendas.
In short, debate and reflection in our region must broaden their horizons beyond the question of simply boarding the train and taking advantage of external demand linked to the construction of a supposed green capitalism. Vulnerabilities must be addressed—in terms of accelerating ecological devastation and deepening external dependency. But so too must the opportunities to develop long-term national projects of strategic autonomy, articulated regionally wherever possible. Today more than ever, solutions must be conceived on integrated, sovereign, popular, and just foundations.











