The architecture of security in Latin America is undergoing a transformation due to the consolidation and transnational projection of criminal organizations such as the First Capital Command and the Red Command (PCC and CV, respectively, for their acronyms in Portuguese). These are models of illicit governance of high technical complexity that challenge institutional legitimacy in strategic territories.
According to the assessment provided by regional security specialists (InSight Crime, 2025), these structures now operate through the capture of logistical routes and the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the social fabric.
This is a phenomenon that originated in the Brazilian prison system, which became a hub for coordination and operational command for these factions. Critical overcrowding, affecting more than 700,000 people, has allowed prisons to function as incubators of loyalty and centers for strategic recruitment (Swissinfo, 2025). From there, the PCC has refined a highly centralized and disciplined management model, with a corporate logic that facilitates its expansion into financial and real estate sectors. For its part, the CV has opted for a decentralized franchise structure that grants it notable criminal resilience in fragmented urban environments, such as the favelas of Rio de Janeiro (El País, 2025). In short, these factions have managed to adapt swiftly to state pressures, maintaining their operational capacity even after the capture of their visible leadership.

The Amazonian ecosystem and the capture of transnational corridors
The external projection of Brazilian criminal organizations responds to an imperative need to control the logistical corridors that connect Andean production with global consumer markets. According to research on the dynamics of organized crime in the region, their operational presence has been consolidated in at least 28 countries, acting as a critical intermediary in narcotics supply chains—particularly through strategic corridors such as the Amazon basin and the Solimões River, which function as fluvial arteries linking production in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia with large-scale export ports.
Consequently, the diversification of illicit economies has allowed these factions to move beyond traditional drug trafficking into illegal gold mining, cargo theft, and systematic extortion. Estimates indicate that these activities generate approximately $273 billion annually in the region, providing criminal groups with financial power that facilitates their infiltration into local levels of government.
At the same time, the technological sophistication of these organizations—including the use of drones for perimeter surveillance and the manufacturing of weapons through 3D printing—reveals a shift toward equally challenging models of criminal innovation.
Toward a reengineering of state policy and institutional strengthening
The need to adopt state policies that prioritize financial intelligence and the strengthening of the justice system over the exclusive and reactive use of lethal force is evident. Historical experience shows that isolated military interventions often generate collateral effects that strengthen local militias or reconfigure the criminal landscape without weakening its structural foundations. Therefore, an effective containment strategy must be grounded in the recovery of territorial control through the comprehensive presence of public institutions.
But security is not exclusively an operational problem. The roadmap must be structured around pillars that address the root of the issue: the prison system, capital traceability, and multilateral cooperation.
The first axis of action requires a profound reform of detention centers to dismantle internal command structures. The state must reclaim authority within prison facilities by professionalizing custodial staff and effectively blocking communication between leaders and their external networks.
Secondly, strengthening financial intelligence is vital to suffocate the operational capacity of these factions. The resilience of the PCC and CV depends directly on their cash flow; therefore, detecting money laundering in both the formal sector and new technological platforms is an existential priority. The third pillar calls for the consolidation of shared border governance in the Amazon that goes beyond traditional diplomatic agreements and establishes real-time joint patrol protocols. Only through effective territorial control and a state presence that guarantees basic services to vulnerable populations will it be possible to reduce the room for maneuver of criminal governance.
Ultimately, security must be understood as a necessary condition for the full realization of human dignity and social development. The expansion of the Red Command and the First Capital Command represents a symptom of accumulated institutional failures that can only be resolved through a firm commitment to transparency and democratic strengthening. The strategic goal for the beginning of the next decade must be the restoration of the rule of law in every territory under criminal influence, ensuring that national sovereignty is not replaced by the de facto power of criminal multinationals. Containing the phenomenon analyzed requires a resilient and coherent state vision, above all grounded in regional cooperation to confront a threat that disregards national borders.










