The second-round election, or runoff, is a majoritarian electoral formula that serves as a “tie-breaking mechanism” in presidential elections. It was gradually introduced in several Latin American countries during the democratic transitions of the late twentieth century. It is currently in place in fourteen Latin American countries, but its use varies. In some countries, such as Nicaragua, it has never been used, while in Argentina it has been used only twice. In Guatemala, by contrast, ten elections between 1985 and 2023 have been decided through this mechanism. In Brazil, ten presidential elections have been held since 1989, and in eight of them, candidates have had to proceed to a runoff because they failed to secure an absolute majority of 50% plus one vote in the first round. However, in the seven previous elections, the runoff was “unnecessary,” because the winner of the first round was confirmed in every second round. This trend could be repeated in the election between Flavio Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. However, the recent election is the first in which the gap between the first- and second-place candidates has been less than 2%, reflecting the polarization of Brazilian politics, which is present across virtually the entire continent.
Artificial legitimacy
One of the main arguments in favor of the runoff is that it confers greater legitimacy on presidents. But this is not the case, since such legitimacy is artificial and gradually fades once the president takes office. In Chile’s 2021 presidential election, José Antonio Kast received nearly 28% of the votes in the first round, while Gabriel Boric received just 26%. In the runoff, Boric received 30% more votes than in the first round and 20% more than Kast.
The same scenario has unfolded in Peru’s last two elections. In 2021, Pedro Castillo received just 19% of the votes in the first round, while in 2026, Keiko Fujimori received just 17%. In the runoffs, both secured the presidency with only a narrow margin above an absolute majority. These vote totals have never been enough in themselves: electoral legitimacy is important, but it does not guarantee good governance.
Once in office, a president’s legitimacy increases or decreases depending on other factors, such as respect for the rule of law and effective performance. Presidents elected in runoffs often end their terms badly because they neglect these aspects.
Unnecessary
In general, runoffs tend to be “unnecessary.” In most cases in which they have been held, the presidents who had already won the first round have ultimately been elected. Reversals of the result—that is, cases in which the candidate who finished second in the first round wins the presidency in the second—are relatively rare.
Since 2020, twelve presidential elections involving runoffs have been held in Latin America, and the result has been reversed in only three. One emblematic case was Javier Milei’s election in Argentina in 2023. He received nearly 30% of the votes in the first round, while Sergio Massa received 38%. The runoff ultimately favored Milei, who won by a margin of nearly 10 percentage points.
Reversals of election results reflect the electorate’s strategic, punitive voting: voters end up choosing a candidate not because that person is the best option, but because they want to punish the party in power, as in Argentina, or because they do not want a particular candidate to take office, as happened with the election of Guillermo Lasso in Ecuador in 2021 and Bernardo Arévalo in Guatemala in 2023.
Weak governments, irresponsible presidents
The main problem created by runoffs, however, is that they generally produce governments without solid legislative majorities. With a few exceptions, such as Colombia, presidential and legislative elections in Latin America tend to be held simultaneously, either partially or entirely. This works against the newly elected president, especially when the result is reversed in the runoff or when the president’s party receives a low share of the vote in the first round. In these cases, the runoff neither creates a solid partisan base nor fosters legislative majorities that would support the president.
Moreover, recently, runoffs have “allowed” political outsiders to reach the presidency, only for their governments to end badly or for them to interpret the runoff results as a popular mandate to subvert the existing constitutional order. Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Alberto Fujimori and Pedro Castillo in Peru, Javier Milei in Argentina, and Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia are some representative examples of this situation.
Should it be abolished?
If runoffs are generally unnecessary, create artificial legitimacy that offers little practical benefit for governing, and may also contribute to divided government, should they therefore be abolished? Not necessarily.
Despite these consequences, runoffs can have a compensatory effect in highly competitive elections or in contexts of significant party fragmentation. The 2026 runoff elections illustrate this point. Keiko Fujimori would have had less chance of consolidating her government if she had assumed Peru’s presidency with only the 15% of the vote she received in the first round. In Colombia’s elections, the gap between Abelardo de la Espriella and Iván Cepeda was almost the same in the first and second rounds, but taking office with 43% of the vote was not the same as doing so with nearly 50%.
In short, the runoff should be evaluated solely as a formula for electing political leaders, without overstating its effects, since democratic stability depends on much more than votes.
Autor
Political Scientist. Professor at the University of Guanajuato (México). PhD. in Political Science from the University of Florence (Italy). His areas of interest are politics and elections in Latin America and modern political theory.
