The damage generated by the trade policy of the United States government is attributed almost exclusively to the imposition of customs tariffs and its rejection of the multilateral order. But public opinion assumes that such restrictions neither impede nor distort trade or economic integration agreements, including those concluded with the same North American power.
Economic multilateralism is not as it is portrayed
These assumptions are erroneous. While the violation of tariff commitments seriously affects the multilateral order, such transgressions do not exhaust the obligations assumed within the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Trade agreements and, in general, processes of economic integration can only bear fruit if they adhere to the recognition of countries that “do not” subscribe to them. In other words: preferences or concessions, when they are not extended to all WTO Member States, are discriminatory in nature and therefore exceptional, and must comply with certain requirements and be multilaterally consented to. To begin with, between developed and developing countries, the multilateral order does not allow the negotiation of limited or partial-scope trade preferences or concessions; rather, they must cover the substantial matter of trade between the parties (at least free trade areas).
Abandoning multilateralism has costs
When the United States disregards the multilateral order, it produces cascading damage. The inducements to other countries to conclude partial-scope agreements under the promise of lifting arbitrary tariffs and other restrictive measures are deceptive.
Such “agreements” generate uncertainty because, by departing from the formats provided for in the WTO, they subordinate compliance with what is agreed to the unilateral will of the developed country. Meanwhile, the less developed counterparties lack multilateral grounds to obtain equitable treatment and, even less so, to bring claims in the international arena in the event of a dispute. This has been made evident in White House statements of November 13, 2025, indicating the successful conclusion of bilateral trade negotiations with Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
Among the clauses incompatible with multilateral disciplines, what has been agreed with respect to subsidies and intellectual property stands out. By contrast, the commitments relating to the capture and manipulation of data through the digital economy illustrate not only the violation of WTO disciplines, but also their current insufficiency.
Industrial policy
“(Argentina; El Salvador; Guatemala) has committed to address potential distortive actions by state-owned enterprises and to correct industrial subsidies that may have an impact on the bilateral trade relationship.”
These bilateral statements by the United States with Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador ignore the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). This omission is not innocent, because treaties negotiated under the multilateral umbrella adhere to the requirements of the SCM Agreement. In particular: (a) not all state incentives are punishable; rather, they must at least be limited to specific sectors; (b) they must cause serious or significant injury to the production of like goods in the importing country; (c) it is necessary to prove the existence of the subsidy, the injury, and the causal link in order to justify the application of countervailing measures.
Intellectual property
The foreign ministries of Argentina and Ecuador acknowledge the U.S. domestic legal source that authorizes trade retaliation against national policies deemed unsatisfactory to U.S. interests. Accordingly, both Latin American governments “have committed” to addressing issues identified in respective internal administrative determinations of the Office of the United States Trade Representative.
This acknowledgment implies a renunciation of the policy space contemplated by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), particularly with regard to the protection of public health, nutrition, and the promotion of technological innovations for the well-being of the population.
Moreover, in the Argentine case, consideration will be given to “patentability criteria, delays in patent prosecution, and geographical indications, as well as (…) working to harmonize its intellectual property regime with international standards.” Thus, Argentina subscribes—without prior engagement in the multilateral arena—to the view that its intellectual property regime is not harmonized with international standards.
Although no sectoral aspirations are mentioned, the United States seeks to capture bio-pharmaceutical markets through the indefinite extension of patents by treating irrelevant modifications as if they constituted inventive activity (evergreening).
This zeal contrasts with its disregard for intellectual property when it comes to capturing information abroad in order to train generative artificial intelligence (AI) models. The double standard becomes evident when it repudiates the safeguards adopted by the European Union and Brazil prohibiting transnational corporations from such manipulation of their residents’ personal data.
Digital economy
By way of example, the four statements below contain clauses that portend a contentious future for the Latin American countries that have signed them. These countries have committed with the United States to “facilitate digital trade” in the cases of Ecuador and El Salvador; not to discriminate against “U.S. products distributed digitally, ensuring the free transfer of data across secure borders” in the case of Guatemala; and to recognize the United States as an “adequate jurisdiction, pursuant to Argentine law, for the transfer of data, including personal data” in the case of Argentina.
With the exception of the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, which applies on a temporary basis in the WTO, the remaining obligations assumed lack multilateral grounding.
The United States government backs the strategies of transnational corporations that monopolize the global digital economy market. In this vein, the quoted paragraphs reveal an exploitation of the vulnerability of numerous Latin American countries to protect their populations from the risks of disinformation and the manipulation of personal data. The lure is the invocation of the principle of “non-discrimination,” when the EU has pointed out that, given the dominant position of transnational corporations of U.S. origin, the sanctions established in each case due to their abusive practices cannot be deemed discriminatory.
Countries in the region should make their voices heard to rebuild multilateral rules and, in particular, to reclaim policy space in industrial policy and intellectual property, as well as international regulation of disruptive activities such as the digital economy and artificial intelligence. Without an adequate multilateral reordering, peripheral countries will continue to suffer the harassment of geopolitical confrontation and corporate voracity.
Autor
Sociologist. PhD from the National University of Córdoba (Argentina). Consultant for international integration and cooperation organizations. Researcher and teacher at the Institute of Latin American Integration of the National University of La Plata.
