Javier Milei came to the Argentine presidency not only as an “outsider” but also through an “anti-establishment” discourse against the entire “political caste.” This —initially— allowed him to present himself as a figure who offered a “double” novelty to Argentine society: he came from outside politics and entered the political arena outside of traditional parties. It was something new, different, even disruptive.
Milei quickly managed to build electoral expectations thanks to the most favorable context for such profiles: a political and economic crisis, the perfect scenario for the proliferation of the “anger vote.”
However, building an “anti-political establishment” discourse to present oneself as entirely different is one thing, and sustaining it in practice from within the government of a democracy is another. This can only occur in scenarios with a legislative majority, without the need for political consensus with other parties. This has not been Milei’s scenario since taking office. His government has been and remains a minority (lacking a majority in both chambers of the National Congress).
The result is that, sooner or later, the confrontational style of the current Argentine government would face greater resistance. The question was when.
Popularity as a safeguard to the minority
The arrival of La Libertad Avanza and Milei to power in 2023 took place in a context of minority at all political levels (without governors and with a minority in Congress), but with high popularity (he ranked among the most popular leaders in the world).
This popularity was built both on the unpopularity and disarray of the opposition and on “macroeconomic” achievements (a decline in inflation and poverty). As political science literature suggests, the absence of opposition coordination combined with a popular leader increases the costs of opposing.
These two factors allowed him, in the first year of his administration, to gain subnational support from provincial governments (including some Peronist ones) and from part of the opposition (mainly the PRO, the more dialogue-oriented faction) to approve some of the reforms he promoted (such as the “Bases Law”) and to sustain vetoes against projects passed in Congress that he opposed under the zero-deficit narrative (such as the university budget or pension increases).
In a way, these achievements were also the result of a “partial contextual adaptation” of Milei’s movement, in line with what was mentioned above: the “us versus them” discourse, typical of anti-establishment logic, was impossible to sustain against the entire opposition in a minority government. From the “blank slate” after the first-round elections, Mileism occasionally resorted to negotiation.
However, this periodic negotiation (a form of realpolitik) with governors and parts of the opposition coexisted with a discourse, both public and on social media, that continued to be antagonistic (often even toward those with whom agreements were sought). This was even more evident with those who expressed reservations or criticisms of the model. The “opposition” profiles have been diverse: cultural figures, retirees, university students, media outlets, healthcare personnel, lawmakers (who did not vote as the government wanted) in general, and Kirchnerists in particular—even people with disabilities. None of these actors would be considered part of the “good Argentines.” They are essentially the “them.”
The problem: nothing lasts forever
The “popularity” of the disruptive, confrontational discourse (insulting toward the various sectors that raised objections) has begun to show signs of wear and fatigue. Milei’s “I will no longer insult” is an initial indication of official recognition of this situation. According to the Government Confidence Index of the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Milei’s administration currently has the lowest approval rating since his term began.
In addition to this wear, a series of events have undermined the government’s popularity and its “novel” discourse. Macroeconomic achievements (such as reduced inflation) have not translated into microeconomic benefits (incomes and consumption remain largely stagnant). Corruption allegations have also emerged against government officials, striking at one of La Libertad Avanza’s central claims: that they were different from previous elites (commonly and legally linked to such crimes). Thus, the “us versus them” narrative is devalued.
In other words, the limits of the economic results achieved, the fatigue of the confrontational discourse, and corruption allegations erode the novelty of the political sector currently governing Argentina. This situation illustrates a central issue in contemporary global politics: the establishment-anti-establishment divide is as volatile and short-lived as political personalism.
The growing challenge: Congress, governors, and votes
If this reasoning is correct, the situation should lead to several consequences: declining popularity would increase the likelihood of challenges that had so far been held back (as seen in Congress with the veto of the disability law and the approval of the university budget); it would fuel doubts and challenges among current allies—internally (with governors increasingly coordinating their own federal electoral alternative) and externally (with recent market tensions around the dollar, for example)—and would negatively impact electoral support (as evidenced in the Buenos Aires Province elections).
Milei’s government is today weaker than when he came to power. His discourse has weakened, and his ability to impose the “them” has less capacity to prevent the resistance currently observed. This situation, therefore, highlights another weakness of permanent antagonism in democracy: the “us versus them” logic is “difficult” to sustain in a fragmented political landscape and “impossible” in one where popularity is declining.
Does this mean Milei’s government is finished? Not at all, especially with two years of his term remaining. But current evidence suggests that the governing style thus far has reached its limits. It requires an adaptation consistent with the balance of forces in today’s Argentina. Fewer insults and “games of chicken”; more agreements in a federal and fragmented Argentina.
*Machine translation, proofread by Ricardo Aceves.
Autor
Political scientist, professor and researcher at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. PhD in Social Sciences (UBA) and Master in Public Policy (UTDT).
