On the night of November 30, Honduras once again sounded all its alarms. What was supposed to be an election day with quick results and an orderly transition ended up becoming a process full of interruptions, cross-accusations, and a widespread sense that the country had moved several years backward in democratic terms. More than a week later, the country still has no definitive result, with the candidates Nasry Asfura of the National Party and Salvador Nasralla, running this time for the Liberal Party, alternating in the lead by minimal margins.
What could be interpreted as a technical dispute turned into a broader episode of political instability. Not because there is clear evidence of electoral manipulation, but because Honduras arrived at this election with a fragile and eroded institutional framework, lacking sufficient anchors of trust. In this context, any irregularity—real, potential, or simply imagined—activates the crisis reflexes the country has accumulated over the last decade.
A narrow result in a system without a runoff
The first report presented by the National Electoral Council (CNE), with only 57% of tally sheets processed, already foreshadowed a difficult night. Subsequent interruptions in data transmission, shifts in the vote count trends, and the absence of convincing explanations triggered a sense of déjà vu: for many Hondurans, the story of 2017 seemed to be repeating itself. In a simple plurality system, where a lead of half a percentage point is enough to declare a winner, legitimacy is always in dispute. And when there is no second round, narrow margins become fuel for distrust.
The CNE and the structural problem of trust
The failures in transmission were the visible face of the crisis, but not its origin. The CNE went into the election weakened after primary elections marred by delays, incomplete materials, and polling stations that never opened. Far from correcting those deficiencies, the agency entered the general election with heightened internal tensions: each of the three councilmembers answers directly to a political party, which slows technical decisions and feeds the perception of partiality.
The new transmission system—contracted late and without adequate guarantees—ended up deepening the sense of improvisation. In a context of total distrust, any problem—even a merely technical one—was interpreted as a deliberate operation. And the parties quickly moved to exploit that narrative.
Libre denounced irregularities even before election day and signaled it would not recognize a defeat. The National Party spoke of a pact between Libre and the Liberal Party to oust it. The Liberal Party hinted at hidden agreements between the National Party and Manuel Zelaya. In Honduras, losing is almost automatically equated with alleging fraud. This reaction is not just a product of the moment: it is a symptom of accumulated institutional deterioration and of a system in which no political force feels protected by the rules of the game.
Democratic deterioration that did not start at the ballot box
The electoral crisis cannot be understood without reviewing the 2022–2025 period. Xiomara Castro’s administration faced tensions from the outset, beginning with the conflict over the presidency of Congress. Added to this were the amnesty for political allies, accusations of nepotism, the extended state of exception, and the irregular appointment of an interim attorney general. Each of these episodes eroded the political capital Libre had initially enjoyed.
The climate grew even more tense with conflicts involving the media and the emergence of investigations linking figures close to the ruling party to criminal networks. The promise of “refoundation,” which defined the 2021 campaign, gave way to a perception of continuity. For many Hondurans, what had been offered as change ended up being more of the same.
U.S. interference: an uninvited guest
The electoral process was also not immune to external factors. Statements by President Donald Trump, who expressed explicit support for Nasry Asfura and issued warnings about “the consequences of choosing the wrong candidate,” added pressure and polarization. The pardon granted to Juan Orlando Hernández—two days before the vote—reinforced the idea that Washington was taking sides with Honduras’ old political order.
In a country with more than a million citizens living in the United States, these gestures have tangible effects on perceptions and on the already fragile legitimacy of the process.
The return of bipartisanship and a decisive Congress
While the presidential count advances slowly, Congress already shows a consolidated trend: bipartisanship not only survived, but returned with force. Nationalists and Liberals together hold more than 90 of the 128 seats, pushing Libre into third place.
This Congress will be pivotal. It must elect its executive board, debate urgent electoral reforms, consider possible impeachment processes, and redefine the relationship with an Executive Branch that—regardless of who wins—will begin its term weakened.
What now? Possible scenarios
Honduras is not facing, at least for now, an immediate institutional breakdown. But it is experiencing a deep legitimacy crisis, the product of accumulated political tensions, institutional failures, and a weary citizenry.
The central problem is not just the narrowness of the result. It is that the electoral system operates on a structure that no longer generates trust. Today, Honduras needs more than an official winner. It needs credible rules, impartial institutions, and political actors capable of reaching basic agreements. Otherwise, each electoral process will continue to be a test of endurance rather than a democratic exercise.
Autor
Professor in the Area of Political Science and Administration at the University of Burgos. PhD in Political Science, University of Salamanca, and researcher at the Iberoamerican Institute of the same University.
