It offers some advantage to have delayed a little the analysis of the balance of the first year of President Milei’s government because it allows us, among other things, to observe the criticisms that have been made of this anniversary. Of course, the vast majority of these criticisms come from the ranks of progressivism, including the old and new left. But it is necessary to be selective in this regard. It is not so much the repeated invectives or the admonitions of the extreme left using the term fascism at will that are of interest, but those of that progressive sector that is already back from that optimistic idea that Milei’s first major cutback would provoke such mobilizations that would scare him out of the Casa Rosada. That more judicious progressivism is now anxiously looking forward to the 2025 elections, lest the outsider who a year ago became president without a party, without parliamentary support and without mayors wins them. Because if that were to happen, the “madman” would have conquered the State to a great extent and his project would be prolonged in time.
In any case, Milei has not missed the opportunity to celebrate his first year in office. In one quarter, he managed to turn the country’s worrisome fiscal deficit into a surplus and in one semester he turned the CPI from 25% per month to less than 3% in October; debt bonds rose, the level of credit risk dropped and investments rebounded. In addition, Milei is taking advantage of the revenues from the Vaca Muerta gas mega-reservoir. All this by applying “the most radical shock program in the history of mankind” (the chainsaw) without having to face a feared social protest and with a quite intact popularity (above 50%), while the opposition remains divided, with a subordinated traditional right wing (Macri’s) and a Peronism in full crisis. True, poverty has increased 11 points since the middle of the previous year, but this does not seem to be reflected in a corresponding decrease in his popularity.
The criticisms of this model by the most judicious progressivism present two solid elements: the aforementioned increase in poverty and the difficult sustainability of this radical economic program. A critical reading is also made in political terms. Two outstanding examples of this (Spanish-speaking) progressivism can be mentioned: the article by Pablo Stefanoni (“De Milei al Mileísmo”) published in the magazine Nueva Sociedad and the editorial of the Spanish newspaper El País (9/12/24) significantly entitled “El daño de Milei” (Milei’s damage).
Stefanoni’s balance pivots on the political crisis of the opposition. In fact, the approval of Milei’s ambitious Ley de Bases, at least partially, counted on the totality of Macrismo, as well as dissident Peronists and radicals. That is to say, the minoritarian government has not had great difficulties to approve the regulation that favors it, thus avoiding a train wreck between the Legislative and the Executive. That is why Stefanoni concludes: “Some, in the opposition, ask: What if it works out well?” And then he answers: “If it works out well, it would mean that the economic figures improve and that this translates into a victory in the mid-term elections of 2025 and an increase of representation in Congress”. But this shifts the axis of his analysis: the success no longer depends on how badly the opposition does, but on the Argentine society as a whole. And, unfortunately, Stefanoni avoids probing into the entrails of the citizenry and its political culture.
The case of the editorial in the newspaper El País has a different reference. His criticism is much more committed, because this newspaper has become the cultural and political support of the opposite model of governance: deified progressivism. In fact, the government of Pedro Sánchez fulfills all the assumptions that Milei likes to caricature: an expansive economy and taxation on credit, a political model based on opportunistic parliamentary majorities and a political culture convinced of its moral superiority.
Sánchez repeats that in a parliamentary system it is not whoever wins the elections who governs, but whoever manages to obtain the support of the majority in Congress. But that has its limits: obtaining the support of groups that are contrary to the electoral program that has been presented, forces to modify the contract acquired with the electorate. It is quite reminiscent of Groucho Marx’s idea: “I have my principles, but if you don’t like them I have others”. In other words, it is a fraudulent model of governance. Something that forces us to place ourselves in a perspective of permanent flight forward. The model needs to deepen in order to resist: more expansive, more Phoenician, more self-referential. “We are a world reference” said Sánchez at the recent PSOE congress.
That is why the criticism of the opposite model of the Madrid newspaper is absolute: Milei produces irreparable damage. And he may be right. But applying the same logic, it should be asked whether supporting a fraudulent model of governance does not also produce considerable damage. The El País editorial concludes: “Not everything goes in exchange for reducing inflation”. True, but neither is anything goes to stay in government.
In fact, that is the drama of this time: two radical models of governance, opposing but feeding back on each other. One is the consequent reaction of the other. Neither may be sustainable, but as long as they last they will provoke suffering and internal division in the countries.
*Machine translation proofread by Janaína da Silva.
Autor
Enrique Gomáriz Moraga has been researcher at FLACSO in Chile and other countries in the region. He was a consultant for international agencies (UNDP, IDRC, IDB). He studied Political Sociology at the Univ. of Leeds (England) wit R. Miliband.