On January 6, 2025, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced his resignation as leader of the Liberal Party and, consequently, as Prime Minister of Canada. This decision marked the culmination of months of challenges within his coalition government. These challenges included a sharp rise in the cost of living post-COVID-19—particularly skyrocketing rent and real estate prices—and, most notably, the growing perception that the influx of temporary and permanent immigrants, once viewed as a solution to Canada’s territorial, demographic, and economic problems, had become a liability for the country.
Canada relies heavily on immigration to sustain and grow its population. With a fertility rate of just 1.33 children per woman—far below the replacement rate of 2.1—Canada’s 40 million residents are largely concentrated in a narrow corridor along the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes. In 2023, a staggering 97.3% of Canada’s population growth was attributed to international migration.
This reliance extends to the labor market, particularly in addressing chronic shortages in sectors like agriculture, construction, and caregiving. Many immigrants, predominantly from countries in the Global South, are drawn to Canada through temporary immigration programs. For instance, under the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), Mexicans and Jamaicans migrate seasonally to work on Canadian farms. Similarly, international students, who pay significantly higher tuition fees than Canadian citizens, are critical to the financial sustainability of the country’s universities.
Despite their contributions, these immigrants face precarious conditions. Temporary residence visas rarely guarantee long-term stay. Seasonal agricultural workers, for example, spend 4 to 6 months per year in Canada but are often sent back to their home countries if they become ill or injured. These visas also prevent their families from accompanying them during their stay. International students, on the other hand, are granted temporary permits such as the Post-Graduate Work Permit (PGWP), which allows them to remain in the country for the duration of their studies and work up to 20 hours a week—often under exploitative conditions. However, securing a permanent job offer is necessary for them to remain in Canada after graduation.
Historically, immigration has been a rare point of consensus among conservatives, liberals, and socialists in Canada. As opposition leader Pierre Poilievre recently noted, immigration generates significant revenue for the private sector through cheap labor and boosts public sector income. During his tenure, Justin Trudeau promised a gradual yet substantial increase in the issuance of permanent and temporary residence permits. Despite delays caused by the pandemic, his administration fulfilled this promise, admitting a record-breaking 471,000 permanent residents and 804,000 temporary migrants in 2023 alone.
However, Canadian public support for new immigrants has waned since the COVID-19 pandemic, fueled by right-wing politicians who stoked anti-immigrant sentiment and liberals who capitulated to xenophobic and racist demands.
The post-pandemic surge in living costs has exacerbated the housing crisis, particularly in major urban centers like Toronto. Even with near-full employment, wages often fail to meet basic living standards. Immigrants, particularly international students, have been scapegoated for inflating rental prices, with claims that they outnumber available housing. These narratives ignore the role of corporate concentration in the real estate market, where a few companies control most housing assets.
In September 2024, Canada announced a more restrictive immigration policy set to take effect in 2025. The number of new permanent residents would drop from 485,000 to 395,000, while temporary residents would decrease from 2.96 million to 2.52 million. Universities anticipate job losses due to the decline in international student enrollments. Meanwhile, the government estimates that 1.2 million temporary migrants will either leave the country or become undocumented, creating an unprecedented diaspora within Canada.
This shift in Canadian immigration policy is heavily influenced by its complex relationship with its most important ally, the United States. In recent years, the migration dynamic between the two countries has reached dramatic proportions. States like New York have chartered buses to send Latin American migrants to the northern border, and entire families have tragically frozen to death trying to enter Canada. U.S. pressure on Canada’s immigration policy has intensified, especially after Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election.
During the Republican primary race, candidates floated the idea of building a wall along the northern U.S. border, citing vulnerabilities to “terrorist” entry from Canada. Additionally, in December 2024, Trump threatened a 25% tariff on Canadian and Mexican goods unless both countries took stronger action on “immigration” and “drugs,” precipitating the political crisis that ultimately led to Justin Trudeau’s resignation.
Therefore, it is necessary to point out two issues. First, Canada—often idealized as a migration oasis—has, under a liberal government, effectively implemented a policy of forced undocumented migration. A mass exodus of the scale anticipated for 2025 is unlikely; most migrants losing their status will remain in Canada. However, as undocumented individuals, they will be vulnerable to labor exploitation, without access to healthcare or social security.
Second, phenomena long observed in Latin America—such as the U.S.’s externalization of its borders and interference in regional migration policies—are now being replicated in allies historically seen as peers. To understand contemporary Canada, one must now look to Latin America.
*Machine translation proofread by Ricardo Aceves.
Autor
Professor at the University of Brasilia. Doctor and master's degree in Social Anthropology from the Federal University of São Carlos. Member of the Wenner-Gren Foundation and former member of the Social Sciences Platform in Humanitarian Action at the University of Sussex. Founder and member of the coordination of the National Migrant Health Front (FENAMI).
