Since his first presidency, Trump has promoted an agenda characterized by unilateral decisions, the recurrent use of tariffs as an instrument of political pressure, and an ideological reading of international relations that displaced technical, multilateral, and long-term economic planning criteria. This pattern has intensified in his second term, with standoffs involving European and Latin American governments that have responded more to explicit ideological differences than to technical evaluations of economic or trade policy.
In Latin America, this logic translated into migration and financial restrictions against politically distant governments, as well as direct confrontations with leaders such as Lula da Silva or Gustavo Petro. However, other countries facing comparable structural problems — including the expansion of drug trafficking — were spared due to their alignment with Washington. Ecuador is an illustrative case: despite the deterioration of internal security, the advance of organized crime, and its emergence as one of the world’s main cocaine export hubs, it has not faced significant reprisals.
Yet this confrontational logic has not been confined to U.S. foreign policy. In Latin America, this type of approach has begun to shape the conduct of economic and foreign policy in countries such as Argentina and Ecuador. In the Ecuadorian case, the recent diplomatic and trade impasse with Colombia is particularly illustrative of this dynamic.
In this context, Noboa’s government illustrates how a strategy guided by short-term political calculations can reproduce patterns already observed in U.S. foreign policy under Donald Trump, with greater risks when applied to institutionally more fragile and economically dependent contexts.
The “Ecuadorian Trump” and the politics of confrontation
Since the beginning of his term, Daniel Noboa has displayed traits of political management analogous to Donald Trump’s style. One of them is the systematic search for external or institutional culprits in the face of governance problems and the execution of public policies. On several occasions, the Executive has attributed the lack of progress in security and key reforms to the National Court of Justice and other state bodies, publicly pointing to judges and officials.
This pattern is not new. During his first term, Ecuador was involved in one of the most delicate episodes in international law in its recent history: the raid on the Mexican embassy in Quito to arrest former Vice President Jorge Glas. Beyond the judicial controversies surrounding Glas, the incident constituted a violation of the principles of the Vienna Convention and led to a significant deterioration in bilateral relations with Mexico. Subsequently, the Ecuadorian government announced trade and tariff measures that deepened the diplomatic rift and generated avoidable costs.
This style resurfaced recently in relations with Colombia. On January 20, President Gustavo Petro stated that Glas should be released for humanitarian and health reasons — a statement perceived as interference in internal affairs — and the Noboa government’s response was to announce a 30% tariff increase on Colombian imports. The measure was justified by the alleged lack of cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, the impact of illicit activities along the border, and a persistent bilateral trade deficit. However, the temporal coincidence between these justifications and the diplomatic impasse suggests a political reaction rather than a comprehensive technical evaluation.
The decision is particularly delicate considering that Colombia is one of Ecuador’s main trading partners and a strategic supplier of electricity. Over the past two years, electricity imports from Colombia have been crucial in mitigating Ecuador’s energy crisis, amid adverse climatic conditions and limited investment in new generation sources. Despite this interdependence, the conflict escalated rapidly: on January 22, Colombia announced reciprocal tariffs and the suspension or review of energy sales to Ecuador — a measure that, if implemented, would have immediate effects on productive activity, business costs, and household welfare.
All of this occurs in a context of mixed results from Noboa’s administration. On the economic front, there have been advances such as a reduction in country risk — the lowest level in a decade — growth in non-oil exports, signs of recovery in construction, and improved GDP growth prospects. However, these results contrast with clearly unfavorable performances in security. Preliminary homicide figures for 2025 suggest a new deterioration, with an estimated rate between 49 and 51 per 100,000 inhabitants, the highest level in its recent history, reflecting the deepening of organized crime and drug trafficking.
The comparison between Donald Trump’s United States and Daniel Noboa’s Ecuador reveals a common pattern: when ideology replaces economic policy and confrontation replaces cooperation, the costs ultimately become economic, institutional, and social. In the U.S. case, the size of its economy allows it to absorb part of these costs and, eventually, to have greater room to correct course. In small and dependent economies such as Ecuador’s, by contrast, margins for error are much narrower and the consequences more immediate.
Replicating a logic of power, pressure, and ideological alignments in a region historically treated as a “backyard” does not strengthen sovereignty or economic security. On the contrary, it weakens regional cooperation, increases external vulnerability, and jeopardizes recent achievements.
Beyond confrontational leadership styles, Ecuador — and Latin America as a whole — requires foreign and economic policy strategies based on pragmatism, planning, and integration, even in the presence of ideological differences, as demonstrated by the European process of economic and political integration.
Autor
Economist. Professor and researcher at the Univ. of the Americas (Ecuador). PhD in Economics and Business from Autonomous Univ, of Madrid and Master in International Econ. from the same university. Specialized in macroeconomics and international economy.
