Her victory once again shows how the role of first lady serves as an electoral springboard.
Former first lady Michelle Bolsonaro was elected senator for the Federal District on October 4 in her first foray into electoral politics, a decision she justified as “the mission my husband entrusted to me.” The statement fits a familiar explanation: that a wife runs for office at the behest of a former president, in this case Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2023). Our research on Latin American first ladies shows that this interpretation is incomplete and that they are part of the political elite. Although Michelle benefits from her family name, her victory offers an opportunity to examine her own political capital, which will enable her to shape Bolsonarism, particularly if her stepson Flávio wins the presidency in the presidential runoff on October 25, where he will face incumbent Lula da Silva (2003–2011, 2023–present).
Michelle is not alone. Between 1999 and 2026, 21 former Latin American first ladies ran 35 times for the presidency, vice presidency, or Congress, winning on 24 occasions. One notable finding is that they have won every time they ran in legislative elections: 15 times, including the most recent contests. This suggests that experience in the presidential palace provides an overwhelming electoral advantage, even for those who have never previously run for office.
Political legacy and an independent career
To explain these candidacies, the press and analysts often speak of wives who govern by proxy. And while delegation does occur in specific cases, it does not explain who runs for office or when they do so.
In a previous study, we analyzed the 90 former first ladies who were eligible to run for office in 18 Latin American countries between 1999 and 2016. We found that those with electoral experience before their husbands took office tend to use the role as a springboard to continue their careers. For these women, the probability of running for national office reaches 70% and rises to 86% in the first election after leaving government. By contrast, the popularity of the outgoing president does not explain when his wife decides to run. The data point to other variables, including their involvement in public policy.
Indeed, although Michelle arrived at the Palácio da Alvorada without electoral experience, she did participate in public policy from within the executive branch. She performed the role of first lady as an informal institution serving her husband’s political project, but carved out a space of her own within it. She made disability, rare diseases, and volunteerism her main causes and chaired Pátria Voluntária, a government program that brought together the state, social organizations, and the private sector to help vulnerable populations. This platform enabled her to gain visibility, build networks, and strengthen her ties with evangelical and women’s groups.
In our study, we also found that those who design or direct public programs are more likely to become candidates later on. This is not an exceptional activity: in our sample, three out of every four first ladies designed, directed, or administered public programs. This points to a democratic paradox. A position based on a romantic relationship, without an independent electoral mandate, often provides access to resources, visibility, and the ability to develop a political agenda of one’s own. And because the role of first lady generally has no formal institutional status, oversight of the programs in which they participate and their budgets is conspicuously absent.
When launching her Senate campaign, Michelle said that if she had already acted on behalf of Brazilians as first lady without having been elected, she could do even more with a mandate. In other words, she presented her time at the presidential palace as a credential for entering the Senate.
Her profile was also shaped by her relationship with Jair’s supporters. In populist governments, first ladies can act as what we call mediating amplifiers: they translate the leader’s message into an emotional, moral, and religious register. Michelle played this role, reinforcing ties with evangelical voters and seeking to broaden support among women. An analysis published in 2020 described how Michelle softened the government’s weak social agenda and served as a counterpoint to the outbursts of the president’s sons.
The struggle over the political legacy of bolsonarism
According to Michelle’s account in June, her stepson Flávio reprimanded her over the phone, saying she knew nothing about politics. The episode exposed a dispute over her place within the movement. She stepped down as president of PL Mulher, citing the need to care for her husband and daughter, although she later resumed her Senate candidacy. The language of caring for her loved ones enabled her to preserve her own political capital.
Political dynasties concentrate electoral opportunities within a handful of families, and this election demonstrated that clearly. Flávio advanced to the presidential runoff as the candidate with the most votes, Michelle, and her stepson Carlos won Senate seats, while her stepson Jair Renan and Renato, the former president’s brother, will take seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
The Bolsonaro family’s situation reflects that of the Fujimoris in Peru. Former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori’s (1990–2000) political capital subsequently fueled the careers of his ex-wife and legislator Susana Higuchi, as well as those of his children Kenji, a former congressman, and Keiko, a former first lady who has been president since July.
Although being an heir to Bolsonarism or Fujimorism opens doors to electoral politics, it also gives rise to struggles over leadership. With this election, Michelle Bolsonaro has crossed an important threshold. The recent result grants her an independent mandate for the first time, and if her stepson wins the presidency, no one will be better positioned than she is to exert influence over the president from within the legislature. That is no small achievement.
Autor
PhD in Political Science. Associate Researcher at the GIGA Institute for Latin American Studies in Germany and a member of the Network of Political Scientists.
Assistant Professor of Political Science at Carnegie Mellon University. Specialized in presidential behavior and the comparative study of political institutions in Latin America. More information at www.ignacioarana.org
