In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx wrote: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.”
Brazil’s political tragedy reached one of its gravest expressions since the country’s transition to democracy in 1985 with the coup plot aimed at overturning the election results, which culminated in the violent attacks of January 8, 2023, against the headquarters of the three branches of government. The objective was to install Jair Bolsonaro in power by force.
Some years later, the Bolsonaro family once again found itself at the center of a crisis, this time following the defeat of Jair’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, in the recent elections. After his defeat, the senator fled Brazil for the United States, defying a Supreme Federal Court ruling that barred him from leaving the country. His departure came after his brother Eduardo publicly announced that leaving Brazil would allow him to evade the judicial investigations against him.
History does not repeat itself mechanically, just as farce is not an exact reproduction of tragedy. What makes Marx’s observation relevant is the possibility of recognizing, behind seemingly different events, political behaviors that acquire new meanings depending on their historical circumstances.
The structure of Bolsonarism
In the recent case, beyond Flávio Bolsonaro’s lamentable flight, a more important question arises: What lies ahead for Bolsonarism? Despite losing the presidency, the movement secured significant representation in the National Congress.
The events following the elections have created a new context for Lula’s next government, compared with the scenario that had emerged after the first round of voting. Right-wing and far-right groups secured majorities in both chambers of the National Congress, which would have made it easier to pass reforms had Flávio Bolsonaro won, while complicating Lula’s ability to govern if he were elected. However, following Flávio Bolsonaro’s flight, the opposition finds itself in a more vulnerable position and could lose some of its cohesion.
Bolsonarist representation in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate is divided into three clearly distinct groups, each competing for positions of power and influence within Congress. The first consists of young radical far-right influencers with little or no experience navigating the workings of the National Congress. Their institutional influence may be limited, but they command significant media attention and are likely to maintain a radical critique of Lula’s government.
A second group is represented by newly elected senator Michele Bolsonaro, Jair Bolsonaro’s wife. She is connected to the religious constituency associated with influential pastor Silas Malafaia and, through him, to the evangelical caucus in Congress. This sector is more cohesive around religious conservatism, while the former first lady has had public disagreements with her stepchildren.
The third group is the most pragmatic. It comprises lawmakers who aligned themselves with Flávio Bolsonaro to advance their own interests and who tend to seek agreements wherever they can preserve or expand their influence. They are close to the so-called fisiologistas parties, or the Centrão, a term used to describe legislators who negotiate political support in exchange for participation in government, budgetary resources, or public appointments.
Among the group’s leading political operators is the experienced Valdemar Costa Neto, president of the Liberal Party, who was imprisoned in connection with the mensalão corruption scandal. The current governor of São Paulo, Tarcísio de Freitas, who was reelected, could also be part of this camp. He may seek to sideline the Bolsonaro family and position himself as a presidential candidate for 2030.
Lula’s future
Lula, for his part, begins his new term from a more favorable position, as he may have greater room for negotiation. Nevertheless, he faces significant challenges, including the need to balance public finances. One advantage is his prerogative to appoint four new justices to the Supreme Federal Court (STF) during his term, although each appointment must be approved by the Senate. It is worth remembering that some sectors of Bolsonarism have advocated measures against members of the Supreme Federal Court, making relations between Congress and the judiciary one of the sensitive issues of the new legislature.
In this context, the more radical Bolsonarist agenda could encounter obstacles if the government manages to negotiate with one or more of the movement’s factions. Meanwhile, Flávio Bolsonaro is trying to adapt to his new role: he has proclaimed himself the legitimately elected president, then the leader of Brazil, then the leader of the opposition from the United States, and finally a victim of alleged political persecution.
History, as Marx warned, does not repeat itself identically. This time, the farce has played out through Flávio Bolsonaro’s grotesque flight following his electoral defeat and his attempt to exercise an authority that the ballot box did not grant him, while presenting himself to the world as a victim of political persecution.
Autor
Cientista Político. Profesor e investigador asociado de la Universidad Federal de Goiás (Brasil). Doctor en Sociología por la Univ. de Brasilia (UnB). Postdoctorado en la Univ. de LUISS (Italia). Especializado en estudios comparados sobre América Latina.
