On September 11, Brazil and Latin America witnessed an unprecedented moment in their political history: the country’s highest court, the Federal Supreme Court (STF), declared Jair Messias Bolsonaro guilty for his attempted coup d’état between 2022 and 2023.
The event was celebrated as a turning point in a country with a long history of impunity regarding military interventions. In this sense, the contrast with what happened in some of its neighbors is striking. In Argentina, the dictatorship was followed by wide-ranging trials against military leaders responsible for human rights violations. In Uruguay, dictator Juan María Bordaberry was prosecuted, and in Chile, although trials were more limited, an extensive culture of memory was institutionalized through museums and historical reparation policies.
Brazil, on the other hand, regained democracy in 1985 after a prolonged negotiated transition that allowed members of the Armed Forces to avoid prosecution and maintain broad influence in politics and society.
This time, however, Bolsonaro’s conviction for planning a coup also included high-ranking members of the Armed Forces, among them the former Navy commander, as well as other important generals. At a time when the liberal democratic system seems threatened on multiple fronts, the Brazilian case offers valuable lessons worth analyzing, while also revealing limitations that should not be ignored.
Four lessons from the Brazilian case
The defense of Brazilian democracy was possible thanks to the action of various actors who, despite their differences and interests, committed to preserving an open system based on competitive elections and citizens’ rights.
First, the defense of the political system was made possible thanks to a political class willing to reach agreements. In 2022, Lula da Silva built a broad coalition that included as vice president Geraldo Alckmin, a historic leader of the “Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira” (PSDB) and former electoral rival.
That the main contenders of the 1990s and 2000s came together around the goal of preventing Bolsonaro’s reelection sent a key signal to centrist voters, many of them critical of Lula’s “Partido dos Trabalhadores” (PT) but fearful of another Bolsonaro term. Although Alckmin’s role in government has been more limited than some expected, his presence on the ticket was decisive in building credibility with that electorate.
Second, the Brazilian case has shown the importance of active media outlets. Brazil’s main media investigated and documented Bolsonaro’s management errors (such as during the pandemic) as well as his authoritarian gestures, and despite threats and clashes with the former president, they avoided complacency. This role is even more significant considering that, years earlier, the PT accused these same outlets of having been co-responsible for Dilma Rousseff’s downfall.
Third, it is impossible to imagine this outcome without an independent judiciary. In a regional context marked by personalist and populist leaders, Brazil’s judicial system proved capable of acting as a counterweight to the Executive. On multiple occasions, Bolsonaro tried to coerce it, even hinting at using the Armed Forces, and more recently, the Trump administration applied economic and institutional pressure mechanisms in an attempt to obtain a favorable outcome for its political ally. In this context, the Brazilian judiciary reaffirmed its autonomy, and the STF ruling confirms that an independent judiciary is the cornerstone of a true rule of law.
Finally, and no less importantly: Armed Forces committed to their institutional role. Bolsonaro sought military support to prevent the transfer of power but only found partial backing. The Navy commander showed willingness to cooperate and put his troops at Bolsonaro’s disposal, but both the Army and the Air Force opposed him. Despite their differences with Lula, the military’s refusal to break with the rule of law was decisive for democratic survival.
It is crucial to have depoliticized security forces. In the end, the fate of Brazilian democracy was decided in a handful of meetings, and the result could have been different. But this episode also shows that within the Armed Forces there is a genuine understanding of their institutional role.
Concerns for the future of democracy in Brazil
Bolsonaro’s conviction and disqualification from upcoming elections do not mean that Brazilian democracy is fully safe. At least three factors raise concern.
First, the dependence on the political climate. Although Brazil’s judicial institutions are clearly competent and professional, they have at times shown vulnerability to shifts in context. The famous “Lava Jato” case illustrates this: a decade ago, it was celebrated as a crusade against corruption, but in recent years many of its rulings were annulled due to a combination of procedural irregularities and political changes. This precedent shows that, in the future, today’s convictions could be overturned.
Second, the opportunism of most political parties. The institutional fragility of Brazil’s party system remains a risk for democracy. Some parties see weakness in the PT and Lula ahead of the next elections and seek to capture Bolsonaro’s electorate, even at the cost of making deals with sectors that threaten Brazilian institutionalism.
Eduardo Bolsonaro has declared that his father’s successor must commit to freeing him, even through coercion against the STF. Meanwhile, Tarcísio de Freitas, governor of São Paulo and frontrunner to challenge Lula, has radicalized his discourse: he is pushing for an amnesty bill in Congress and questioning the STF’s legitimacy. Although often portrayed as a more technical profile compared to the hard core of Bolsonarism, his current strategy prioritizes the presidential race over medium- and long-term political stability.
Finally, the persistence of social polarization. Bolsonaro’s base remains large and perceives the trial as a political rather than judicial process. Economic inequality, the limited capacity to address social demands, and the confrontational tone of politics fuel polarization and radicalization. Although dissent is normal in a democracy, the intensity of conflict in Brazil raises the challenge of channeling these energies into institutional paths that recognize voting as the only legitimate means of resolution.
The consolidation of democracy in the region has been a long and complex road that will likely never have a definitive endpoint. But in today’s context of global political instability, the Brazilian case sends a positive message and reinforces the idea that liberal democracy remains the only real alternative to violence and authoritarianism.
*Machine translation, proofread by Ricardo Aceves.
Autor
Sociologist from the Central University of Venezuela. Specialization in Public Policies for Equality by CLACSO. Master in Social Sciences from the Federal University of Santa Maria (Brazil).
