The new year begins with the so-called second phase —or “second floor”— of Mexico’s Fourth Transformation (4T), bringing fresh challenges for Claudia Sheinbaum. These challenges surpass those faced during AMLO’s presidency and will test the structural viability of the redistributive agenda, the ability to curb criminal violence ravaging large parts of the country, and efforts to reduce the polarization that has become a hallmark of the administration.

All these efforts are essential to present a united front as Donald Trump returns to the global stage with his threats—actions that, if realized, could strain the government’s ability to maintain public policies supporting vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors, policies that carry significant fiscal costs.

Claudia Sheinbaum assumed the presidency of Mexico with an undisputed electoral legitimacy, having garnered 36 million of the 60 million votes cast in last summer’s elections. 

However, this comfortable electoral victory did not translate into a similar advantage in the composition of the Mexican Congress, where her coalition lacked the qualified majority required for constitutional reforms.

Although the ruling coalition secured 53% of the votes, a controversial interpretation of Article 54 of the Constitution by electoral authorities granted Morena a qualified majority in both chambers of Congress. This majority was further consolidated through the co-option of opposition members, creating a supermajority that does not align with the votes cast but was nonetheless achieved.

This congressional composition enabled reforms that have effectively altered the country’s political regime. Autonomous institutions emblematic of the legislative agreements that transitioned Mexico from PRI authoritarianism to representative democracy have been dismantled.

Now, a new project is underway. One that, if it continues on its current trajectory, could usher in not just a party system with a token opposition but a process of democratic regression. This shift is weakening Mexico’s standing in the democratic world and bringing it closer to the authoritarian experiences seen in other Latin American nations.

This trend is reinforced by the control that the executive and legislative branches are set to exert over the judiciary. Until recently, the judiciary served as the final institutional counterbalance to an overwhelming majority. Starting in September 2025, judges, magistrates, and Supreme Court justices will be selected through a random lottery—a process designed to yield a new generation of judicial authorities whose political allegiances and tailored laws align with the governing group rather than the citizenry.

The parallels with the long PRI authoritarian era are striking, differing only in nuance. This shift has exacerbated social and political polarization, particularly among the thousands of judicial officials and employees who will leave their posts next summer.

While this turnover may seem like a foreseeable side effect of a regime change—where there always are winners and losers—it raises a significant issue, which is legal certainty.

These developments have already triggered adverse reactions from international organizations, media outlets, and credit rating agencies, casting a shadow over Mexico’s growth prospects for 2025. The peso has depreciated by 25% against the dollar in the first two months of Sheinbaum’s administration.

Despite these negative trends, the 4T government remains steadfast in its approach, with some observers noting a more radical stance. This has created tension with foreign investors, peso-based savers—as attractive interest rates are declining—and national and international business leaders who may adopt cautious, even fearful financial strategies amid this adverse climate. Adding to the uncertainty is Donald Trump’s return to the presidency of the United States, accompanied by his hardline policies.

What would happen if Trump carries out his threats of mass deportations or imposes a 25% tariff increase on Mexican exports? What if Mexico refuses to intensify its efforts against drug trafficking, fentanyl production, or border control to curb migration to the U.S.?

President Sheinbaum has downplayed the aforementioned possibilities, arguing that the two nations are mutually dependent. However, the upcoming administration of Donald Trump is in fact signaling a tougher stance, highlighted by the appointment of Ron Johnson, a former CIA agent, as the U.S. ambassador to Mexico. Johnson will assume his post in January, reinforcing a bilateral agenda dominated by hardliners.

In response, Mexico has already taken preliminary steps, though it remains uncertain whether these will satisfy Trump and his conservative administration. For example, Sheinbaum has pledged to “assist migrants along their journey to prevent them from reaching the northern border” and announced the seizure of over a ton of fentanyl in Sinaloa—a region embroiled in violent conflict between two factions of the Sinaloa Cartel, which has resulted in hundreds of deaths, forced disappearances, and significant economic damage to the region.

In short, the regime change, while celebrated within the Obradorist elite and its allies, has introduced an uncertainty not seen since the nationalist government of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940). 

Unlike Cárdenas, who had widespread popular support that enabled landmark initiatives like the nationalization of PEMEX, Sheinbaum faces a deeply polarized society—a divide inherited from and managed under López Obrador, now retired in southeastern Mexico.

_{*Machine translation proofread by Ricardo Aceves.}