There is a great deal at stake in Brazil’s elections on Sunday, October 25: democracy, basic rights, the future of the Amazon, and national sovereignty, to mention just a few issues. However, one less widely debated but crucial issue is the future of a just energy transition in the region.
Flavio Bolsonaro’s platform already announces: “we are going to help the world carry out the energy transition,” while also stating that “we are going to allow the exploitation of unconventional gas (fracking).” These statements reflect the views on the energy transition held not only by Bolsonaro but also by far-right leaders who have come to power in the latest electoral cycle. In the event of a victory, Bolsonaro will have a free hand to implement his vision of the energy transition in the region.
What does the energy transition mean for the Latin American far right?
All far-right government platforms, including those of the radical right, such as Kast and de la Espriella, and the hardline conservative right, such as Fujimori and Noboa, contain a specific section on energy, with the exception of Milei’s.
As Pablo Bertinat and Jorge Chemes point out, the energy transition is a contested concept. The Santa Marta Declaration of April 2026 defines the global just energy transition as a process of moving away from fossil fuels that leaves no one behind and respects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The far right appears to be proposing a vision of the energy transition closer to what some environmental activists have called an “energy transaction.”
This project entails not abandoning fossil fuels but, on the contrary, continuing and, in many cases, expanding their production. Like Donald Trump, both Milei and de la Espriella have backed fracking as an economic driver, a promise also embraced by Bolsonaro. This, combined with proposals to loosen environmental legislation under the guise of “cutting red tape” or fast-tracking strategic projects, as well as reducing the state’s enforcement capacity, poses a serious environmental threat. Indeed, Argentina’s Vaca Muerta region is already suffering the consequences of these decisions.
Some far-right leaders portray the transition—which involves moving away from fossil fuels—in a negative light, pointing to increased energy insecurity, a loss of competitiveness in the market, and adverse effects on their countries’ economic growth. They therefore prefer to emphasize the idea of energy diversification. In this regard, they continue to stress the importance of expanding fossil fuel extraction and avoiding what they call “a leap into the void,” which they equate with abandoning these fuels.
These actors present the promotion of renewable energy as a comparative advantage for attracting international investment. Rather than pursuing a transition, their aim is to expand energy supply to attract energy-intensive industries that want to appear sustainable.
Most of these platforms, including Bolsonaro’s, place natural resources—including rare earths, critical minerals, and clean energy—at the service of these international industries. They promote clean energy, no longer framed as an alternative, as a commodity to be exported, either directly, as in the case of biofuels or green hydrogen, or indirectly, by powering the decarbonization of global extractive industries or through data centers. The consequences include a deepening of the economies’ reliance on primary commodity production, increased international dependence, and a retreat from efforts to address the climate crisis.
Energy decarbonization
Latin America is one of the pioneering regions in renewable energy production, according to the Latin American and Caribbean Energy Organization (OLACDE). Nevertheless, most renewable electricity generation is linked to hydropower. This source of energy is affected by the intensification of droughts associated with climate change, as demonstrated by Ecuador’s power outage crisis in 2024. Increasing renewable energy production is therefore necessary to ensure energy security for the region’s citizens and combat energy poverty, particularly in areas that are not connected to the grid.
This increase is also necessary to decarbonize the region’s primary energy mix, which supplies the electricity sector, transportation, industry, and other sectors. Despite ongoing efforts, the share of renewables in the region’s total primary energy supply reached only 34.53% in 2024, according to OLACDE. In other words, decarbonizing the transportation and industrial sectors, including agribusiness, remains an outstanding challenge for which renewable energy is essential. Expanding energy use by attracting energy-intensive sectors such as data centers directly affects national decarbonization plans.
Energy, including renewable energy, depends on limited resources such as land and water, and its production is not free from negative social and environmental impacts. Therefore, making diversification a goal without rethinking how energy is used and without adopting clearer social and environmental criteria positions the region as a site of green colonialism and extractivism, with no consideration for climate justice.
In Brazil, on the other side of the political spectrum, Lula da Silva’s energy policy may be one of the weaker points in his environmental agenda, particularly because of his ambivalence toward oil extraction. Nevertheless, his commitment to the climate agenda and democracy, along with his willingness to promote citizen participation, make his government more likely to be receptive to civil society’s demands for a just transition. They also position him as a counterweight to energy transaction projects in the region.
Autor
PhD in Sociology from PUCP (Peru) and is a Professor of Political Science at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) – Brazil. She coordinates the Laboratory for Political Studies on Climate Action (LEPAC).
