A classic political axiom holds that the best time to implement the measures most resisted by public opinion is as far as possible from the next election. It is unwise to waste time celebrating victories or boasting about electoral results. If the impact of those decisions is negative, there will be room to cushion voters’ discontent; if, on the contrary, the measures show positive effects in the medium term, the electorate will tend to reward the government at the next electoral contest. With the 2027 calendar on the horizon—the possibility of reelection and, above all, the need to keep the pillars of his libertarian program in force—Javier Milei is betting on beginning 2026 with, among other measures, the controversial labor reform already passed.
The year 2024 was a roller coaster for the Argentine government. It began with an auspicious outlook from analysts and campaign consultants: polls favored him and no major adversary appeared capable of threatening the result. The May elections in the City of Buenos Aires confirmed that scenario: Milei managed to defeat the local version of Kirchnerism by nearly three points and the ruling PRO by close to fifteen. However, the split elections in the Province of Buenos Aires (PBA) seemed to mark an abyss between Milei and the electorate, with an unexpected defeat of nearly fourteen points against the provincial ruling party. Many then projected that if Milei lost in the province where almost 40% of the electorate votes, the national result would follow similar tracks.
Those analyses, however, did not consider four key points: (1) voters may vote differently depending on the office, the district, and the moment; (2) Kirchnerism’s victory in the PBA was sufficient stimulus for Milei’s “soft voters”—who could have voted for him in September but did not—to turn out in October; (3) part of Kirchnerism assumed the October election was already won and relaxed electorally; and (4) the provincial result generated uncertainty in the “market,” causing volatility in the dollar. The electorate read that volatility not as a sign of Milei’s weakness, but as a preview of what could happen if Kirchnerism were strengthened.
With political skill, Milei consolidated two important alliances that shored up the October result and allowed him to surpass Kirchnerism by seven points in the national legislative elections. The first was with PRO, under the premise that their electorates are very similar and that, if they compete separately, they atomize the result. The second, his alliance with Donald Trump’s government, enabled him to contain the demand for dollars, typical of the uncertainty that precedes an election in Argentina.
Ultimately, the political synthesis of 2024 exposed the vulnerability of a government that, even while balancing on the edge of the abyss, seems to have come to stay and ends up projecting a possible reelection in 2027. It is a coin toss: nothing is assured, everything is possible.
In this climate of uncertainty, the government understands that part of its electoral fate in 2027 will depend on what it manages—or fails—to do in 2026. And that is linked to what it “came to do.” Controlling inflation was the electoral contract with which two out of three voters rejected the 2023 ruling party and sought hope in the opposition. According to polls, that expectation was met: Milei is credited with stabilizing inflation around 2–3%, to the point that it no longer tops the ranking of the public’s main concerns. Now, the new electoral contract in this second stage of the government—what polls identify as the principal concern—has to do with reactivating employment. Faced with that demand, the government is responding with a labor reform bill.
The text approved by the Senate and awaiting consideration in the Chamber of Deputies includes, among its main points: less costly severance payments for employers; lower contributions to the pension system; decriminalization of registering workers who are currently informal; creation of a “hours bank” that allows overtime to be compensated with rest time (agreed upon with the employer) instead of being paid as overtime; modifications to the vacation period; maintenance of “independent” status for platform workers, with companies obliged to provide them with insurance; the declaration of certain sectors as essential, which limits the possibility of full strikes; among others.
In communicational terms, it is a reform with which the government aims to send three messages. The first—and perhaps the most sought-after—is directed at foreign investors. Milei understands that, within his economic framework, the investment needed to reactivate the country will not come from the state nor from an increase in the fiscal deficit, but from the private sector. In particular, from external investors who see him and his political philosophy as an ally. However, the attention that the libertarian arouses among business leaders and magnates needs to be transformed into money that actually enters the country; in that sense, the reform seeks to guarantee more favorable rules of the game.
Second, the message is aimed at local business leaders who—under a more flexible regulatory framework—should, from the government’s perspective, energize the labor market. In addition, with nearly 60% of Senate votes backing the bill, Milei displays political muscle and sends a signal of strength and vitality, something unthinkable years ago.
Third, the message is directed at Argentines who have accumulated years of labor instability or unemployment and see in this reform a possibility for access to new opportunities. Only time will show whether this is a favorable or harmful reform for workers; what is certain is that, from the perspective of those who have suffered years of hardship—and without the tools to discern all the bill’s facets—continuing with the previous scheme does not seem to lead them anywhere better.
A recent focus group brought forth this idea: “I don’t know if the reform is good or bad; what I do know is that I’m doing badly. Something different has to be done, try something else; I don’t know what.” In other words, as occurred with the demand to lower inflation in 2023, Milei has a kind of “blank check” to resolve the labor problem: “I don’t know how, but solve it.” In line with this, a mid-February poll indicates that nearly 46% of Argentines support the reform (whatever they understand of it) and about 43% oppose it. The bill divides public opinion; there is a slight majority in favor, but an almost equivalent portion is opposed.
Just over a year before the elections that will determine who will be Argentina’s next president, the government is playing its first political round. The approval of the labor reform is presented as a response to the employment-related discontent the country faces, in a context in which Milei, in part and from the standpoint of public opinion, has stabilized the inflationary dynamic inherited from the previous government. It will be voters’ perceptions that determine whether this bill—once approved and its effects materialized—will function as an electoral catalyst for the president, or whether, on the contrary, it will become yet another element feeding his detractors.
Autor
Professor at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) and the University of Belgrano, Argentina, where he also conducts research on political and electoral behavior, political communication, and political psychology. He holds a Master's degree from FLACSO and is a political scientist and sociologist from the UBA.
