In a recent interview, former Uruguayan president José Mujica emphasized the concept of “development” as central to his vision for the future. According to Mujica, “our current idea of national liberation is to push for this country’s development within the market economy while trying to mitigate a range of negative distributional issues.” This statement merits attention as it could signal a significant shift in economic and political strategies for both Uruguay and Latin America.
The updated notion of “development” is particularly relevant in shaping debates on the future direction of Latin American societies and their integration into the global economy and geopolitics. Historically, the concept has evolved through emblematic institutions. One precursor was Chile’s Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Corfo), established in 1938. However, the idea gained wider traction following the creation of the United Nations (UN) and its various agencies. Particularly influential in Latin America was the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), founded in 1948. This movement saw decisive involvement from Latin American governments through their development agencies, including Brazil’s Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) in 1952 and Uruguay’s Comisión de Inversiones y Desarrollo Económico (CIDE) in 1960.
Starting in the 1950s, development became a national ideology, evolving into what was known as “developmentalism” during the 1960s. This approach emphasized promoting industrialization to add value to production systems and assigning a central role to the state in structuring long-term planning for the economy and society. It also prioritized fostering regional integration to create platforms with greater economies of scale and shared control of value chains. Notably, environmental considerations began to emerge as well. For example, Argentina’s government-funded Bariloche Foundation proposed a model addressing resource depletion, the negative impact of consumerism in central economies, hunger, and the developmental needs of peripheral countries.
During the era of developmentalist governments, several Latin American nations achieved significant poverty reduction, substantial progress in political and social inclusion, and increased industrialization under regional agreements like the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC, 1961). Politically, developmentalism followed two paths: one democratic, represented by Chilean Christian Democrats and national-popular movements in Argentina and Brazil (under Arturo Frondizi and João Goulart); and another non-democratic, exemplified by Brazil’s 1964 dictatorship and Peru’s government from 1968.
Democratic developmentalism faced two major adversaries. On one side, neoliberalism championed free trade, privatization, and reduced state intervention. On the other, dependency theory, with its Marxist-inspired perspective, rejected the concept of development altogether. Advocates of dependency theory proposed disengagement from the global market system, emulating Cuba’s model while dismissing “bourgeois democracy.” This was the ideological stance once championed by Mujica.
While authoritarian developmentalism is no longer politically viable in Latin America, democratic developmentalism has also struggled to gain traction. In contrast, neoliberalism remains influential, as evidenced by Argentina’s President Javier Milei and his calls to shrink or eliminate the state. Dependency theory, though adapted to contemporary anti-systemic perspectives, still holds sway among anti-capitalist governments, social movements, and certain academic circles. These new iterations reject “development” in favor of subsistence agriculture, degrowth, and consumption limits, citing environmental concerns and socio-economic asymmetries. They also advocate for decentralization and community self-determination, effectively fragmenting the state and disengaging from global, regional, and national markets.
Although Latin America has yet to fully embrace democratic developmentalism, Southeast Asia has implemented similar strategies with notable success. These efforts began even before World War II and culminated in what is known as the “developmentalist state.” Unlike Latin America, Asian nations avoided both neoliberal and dependency-based approaches.
Asian developmentalist states initially emerged under authoritarian regimes, some of which, like China, remain so today. Others, such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, transitioned into democratic developmentalist states. Starting from poverty levels below those of many Latin American countries in the early 1960s, these nations transformed into high-value economies, outpacing Western powers in global markets. They achieved this while steadily improving living standards and prioritizing education—a hallmark of their “comprehensive development” approach linked to long-term national objectives.
The path suggested by Mujica is not new to Latin America or the world. However, the region must first learn from its own history. It should look outward for inspiration while avoiding imitation. Its unique characteristics and historical experiences must serve as a foundation to prevent recurring mistakes. Strategies must adapt to the demands of the current era, prioritizing inclusion, equality, environmental sustainability, and democracy. National platforms must also enhance the region’s position in the global system.
Integration and development geopolitics are central to this vision. Building institutions to foster regional synergies and jointly manage natural resources—while connecting these efforts to social policies and productive growth—is essential. This must go hand-in-hand with cultural initiatives that promote solidarity and understanding among nations. The goal is to connect local, national, and territorial projections, generating the necessary potential to achieve geopolitical autonomy, or as Mujica calls it, “national liberation.”
Others have succeeded. Latin America can too. The question for the region’s future leaders is whether they will merely manage the status quo of underdevelopment or become transformative forces driving comprehensive and sustainable development, overcoming subordination to help build a global home that addresses humanity’s most pressing challenges.
*Machine translation proofread by Ricardo Aceves.
Autor
Economic historian and senior lecturer in Latin American Studies at the Nordic Institute of Latin American Studies at Stockholm University. Researches geopolitics and development issues.
