The recent statements of Mexican businessman Ricardo Salinas Pliego, one of the country’s richest men, about a possible presidential run in 2030 are not just another piece of political news. They represent a dangerous regional pattern that Latin America has experienced in recent decades: the seduction of businessmen recast as political saviors. Their promise to do “whatever it takes” for Mexico recalls other tycoons who claimed they would manage countries like successful companies, only to demonstrate that democracy does not work according to market rules.
The mirage of business efficiency
The crisis of political representation in Latin America has provided fertile ground for seductive narratives: if these men built business empires, surely they can “fix” entire countries. This logic ignores a fundamental difference between running a corporation and governing a democracy. In a company, decisions are vertical and objectives are clearly defined by profit. In a democracy, power must be shared, negotiated, and exercised in pursuit of the common good, not profit maximization.
Regional experience has shown that this difference is not merely theoretical. It is the dividing line between democratic success and authoritarian failure.
Ecuador: the unfulfilled promise of the youngest president
Daniel Noboa represents the most recent case of this regional phenomenon. The son of a banana magnate, he came to power in 2023 at the age of 35 as the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, with academic credentials from Harvard and NYU and the promise of solving the country’s security crisis.
His response to the crisis has been predominantly militarized: declaration of an “internal armed conflict,” more than 120,000 joint police-army operations in the first six months, and nearly 35,000 arrests. But while implementing these “iron fist” measures, health investment fell by 8% and education spending stagnated during his first year in office.
The Ecuadorian case reveals a fundamental paradox: the capacity for swift executive decision-making clashes with the complexity of structural problems that require comprehensive solutions. Ecuador’s security crisis is not merely a policing problem but the symptom of deep economic inequalities, weakened institutions, and lack of opportunities for millions of young people—problems that cannot be solved with the business logic of efficiency and immediate results.
Argentina: when gradualism becomes stagnation
The case of Mauricio Macri in Argentina is perhaps the clearest lesson in why businessmen are not necessarily better state administrators. He came to power in 2015 with impeccable credentials: he had successfully led Boca Juniors and served as mayor of Buenos Aires. His proposal was simple and appealing: apply business efficiency to solve Argentina’s chronic problems.
Four years later, Argentina was worse off than when Macri took office. Inflation had skyrocketed, poverty had increased, and the country had fallen into a deep recession. His “revolution of joy” ended in a resounding electoral defeat. A project presented as lasting “20 years” collapsed in less than one presidential term.
Chile: prosperity without legitimacy
Sebastián Piñera, Chile’s richest businessman, had two chances to prove that tycoons could govern better. His first term showed some positive economic indicators, but his second revealed the deep cracks of a model that prioritized growth over social equity.
The social uprising of October 2019 was no accident. It was the explosion of decades of accumulated discontent under a model that generated wealth but concentrated it in few hands. Piñera, with a fortune of $2.9 billion, embodied exactly what Chileans were protesting against: extreme inequality disguised as economic success.
Brazil: when “entrepreneurialism” embraces authoritarianism
The case of Jair Bolsonaro illustrates where governments that prioritize business logic over democratic logic can lead. Although technically not a businessman, his government operated exclusively to benefit the private sector, implementing policies that favored corporations while violence, poverty, and social polarization worsened.
Bolsonaro’s administration demonstrated the most extreme consequences of applying business thinking to the state: concentration of power, contempt for democratic institutions, and systematic subordination of the public interest to corporate interests.
The structural risks of tycoons in power
Academic research on this phenomenon has identified consistent patterns. First, “state capture” is inevitable when those with specific economic interests directly access political power. Second, businessmen lack the democratic culture required to govern, coming instead from hierarchical structures where decision-making is unilateral. Third, when the richest businessmen access political power, it produces a dangerous concentration that threatens democratic foundations.
Latin America already faces extreme levels of inequality, with just 106 people amassing more than $565 billion. This concentration of wealth, combined with direct access to political power, creates an oligarchy where the rule becomes “one dollar, one vote” instead of “one person, one vote.”
The Salinas Pliego case: Mexico at a crossroads
Ricardo Salinas Pliego embodies all these structural risks. His open confrontation with Mexico’s tax authorities, his use of media as personal political tools, and his flirtation with global far-right movements position him as a Mexican version of authoritarian businessmen who have failed spectacularly in other countries in the region.
His populist rhetoric of portraying himself as the victim of “political persecution” while evading multimillion-dollar tax obligations shows the same hypocrisy that has characterized other tycoons turned politicians. His promise to do “whatever it takes” for Mexico sounds dangerously similar to the messianic speeches of other outsiders who ended up deeply harming their countries.
The regional lesson
Latin America’s 21st-century experience has provided overwhelming evidence that businessmen are not better state administrators than professional politicians. Mexico has the opportunity to learn from these experiences. Democracy does not need tycoons to run it like private companies; it needs strong institutions, politicians with democratic experience, and a genuine commitment to pluralism and the common good.
The message must be clear: Latin America does not need more experiments with authoritarian businessmen disguised as democratic reformers. The region must strengthen its democratic institutions, not hand them over to those who see countries as business opportunities.
*Machine translation, proofread by Ricardo Aceves.
Autor
Economist. Deputy Director of research of markets and sustainable investments at Dow Jones. Post-graduate degree in Economics and International Business from the Faculty of Economics of the Hochschule Schmalkalden (Germany).
