Is it something new for a state’s vice president to declare himself an opponent of the very government of which he is a part? How far can a vice president go in his capacity to erode or destabilize a democratically elected government? These questions have gained relevance following the recent statement by Bolivia’s Vice President, Edmundo Lara, who recently declared himself an opponent of the government led by Rodrigo Paz and of its policies. In particular, Lara has questioned Decree 5503, which eliminates fuel subsidies and opens the country to foreign investment. Reactions to Lara’s stance were swift, to the point that initiatives have emerged to remove him from office, as former Magistracy Councilor Porfirio Machicado attempted through a bill in November 2025.
These strong tensions between the vice president and the president have two historical precedents in the country—the presidencies of René Barrientos and Jaime Paz—which are worth revisiting in order to understand perhaps better why Vice President Lara is acting this way.
It was the year 1964, and Víctor Paz Estenssoro was seeking his third term as president. While the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) agreed on his candidacy, they could not reach a consensus on the name of his running mate. Finally, and after several altercations, Paz decided to nominate General René Barrientos Ortuño for the vice presidency, because this military officer had contacts with peasant sectors that were vital to Paz. Barrientos, already in the midst of the electoral campaign, used to state that his mission as vice president was to “accompany and help Víctor Paz so that mistakes are not made,” which clearly reflected the degree of tension and distrust prevailing between the two politicians.
What followed was the chronicle of a foretold betrayal. The general elections took place on May 31, 1964; the MNR ticket was reelected with nearly 98% of the vote, and the party retained its broad majority in Congress. However, a few months later, on November 2, Vice President Barrientos carried out a coup d’état against Paz, forcing him to leave Bolivia for Lima.
Almost six decades later, something similar occurred. After a turbulent political process, on October 10, 1982, Hernán Siles Zuazo of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MNRI) and Jaime Paz Zamora of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) were sworn in as president and vice president of Bolivia. The country’s context was one of economic disaster, whose most evident expression was runaway inflation, with the consequent rise in prices. Surprisingly, and after twelve weeks in power, the MIR withdrew from Siles’s government, leaving Vice President Jaime Paz as part of an administration in which he no longer played an active role and with which he no longer agreed politically. Thus, Paz became an opponent of Siles.
Today we have a different political and economic context, but the same pattern: a vice president who feels uncomfortable with the government of which he is a part. Lara suffers from the same ailment as Barrientos and Paz: his political ambitions exceed the state power they believe they should wield.
In 1964, Barrientos believed he possessed the power of the peasant masses and the backing of the United States embassy, and therefore was certain he deserved more power than Víctor Paz granted him. Jaime Paz, for his part, believed that the ministries awarded by Siles did not correspond to the political base he had (or believed he had). Lara, meanwhile, declares himself an opponent of the government because he believes that the distribution of power does not correspond to his electoral contribution to Rodrigo Paz’s victory.
However, the differences are also notable: Lara, unlike Barrientos and Jaime Paz, lacks organic bases within his political movement, to the point that many of the laristas in the legislative branch appear to have abandoned him. Even so, he leads an opposition trend in the country and has raised the banner of resistance to Decree 5503, denouncing its unconstitutionality and its harmful impact on the poorest.
Thus, the difference between Lara and Barrientos and Paz is evident: he could not attempt a coup d’état supported by the police forces because he lacks influence within the police elite, and even less does he enjoy military backing. Nor can he weaken the government by removing his ministers or by leaving the administration himself, because he has no presence in the cabinet.
Nevertheless, Lara is far from being an irrelevant actor: his power does not lie in a political party, but in a vast network of interests that feel affected by the new administration and that he articulates through his internet networks—an instrument that in several countries has already proven to be an effective mechanism for mobilization and social pressure. Lara does not have power, but he has the algorithm.
Autor
Political scientist. Professor and researcher at San Francisco Xavier University (Sucre, Bolivia). PhD in Social Sciences with mention in Political Studies from FLACSO-Ecuador.
