Natural disasters are often measured by their magnitude, the number of victims, or the economic cost they leave in their wake. However, they can also be analyzed as a test of the State’s real capacity. An emergency reveals which risks were anticipated, what institutions existed before the crisis, and how prepared a government was to respond and manage the extraordinary resources for reconstruction effectively and transparently.
This leads to an essential question: how much of a natural disaster is actually “natural”? A government cannot prevent an earthquake, but it can decide where and how construction takes place, how much it invests in prevention, and what controls will be in place when millions of dollars in aid begin to be mobilized. The Sendai Framework, as the international document adopted by UN member states is known, is based on this premise by assigning the State a central role in understanding, governing, and reducing risk.
Ecuador, Mexico, Haiti, and Chile allow us to observe this relationship from different institutional realities. Their experiences show that disasters also test whether a government’s priorities and decisions correspond to the vulnerabilities of the country it governs.
Ecuador: Knowing the risk does not mean being prepared
The 7.8-magnitude earthquake that struck Ecuador in April 2016 left hundreds dead, thousands injured, tens of thousands displaced, and caused severe damage to educational and healthcare infrastructure. Subsequent assessments emphasized the need to strengthen building codes, reinforce vulnerable buildings, and assess critical infrastructure.
The reconstruction effort opened a second institutional test. Years later, Ecuadorian oversight bodies and the courts documented irregularities and criminal liability related to the management of resources earmarked for the reconstruction of Manabí. This case exposes two vulnerabilities: that of buildings in the face of an earthquake and that of institutions in the face of the resources intended to rebuild them.
Prevention does not end with engineering. A State that knows its exposure to risk must protect lives and infrastructure, but it must also prevent urgency from weakening controls over public spending.
Mexico: Learning from a disaster does work
The earthquakes of September 2017 affected thousands of homes, schools, and public facilities. However, subsequent studies showed that several reforms adopted after the 1985 earthquake—including building codes, civil protection institutions, drills, and public information—had increased the country’s resilience. Many of the buildings that collapsed in 2017 predated the construction standards introduced after 1985.
Mexico demonstrates that institutional memory matters. Turning a tragedy into permanent regulations, capacities, and practices can reduce the consequences of the next one. Physical preparedness, however, did not guarantee adequate traceability of resources. Subsequent audits identified shortcomings in the distribution of aid and the recording of international donations.
Haiti: When disaster meets pre-existing fragility
The 7.2-magnitude earthquake of August 2021 once again struck a country that had already suffered a devastating catastrophe in 2010. Thousands of people were killed or injured, and more than one hundred thousand homes were destroyed or damaged. A subsequent assessment found that the earthquake contingency plan dated back to 2013, that several simulation exercises had been postponed, and that there were insufficient supplies or rescue equipment pre-positioned in advance.
Haiti raises an uncomfortable question: when can a catastrophe no longer be described as entirely unexpected? Having a plan does not amount to being prepared if that plan is not updated, funded, tested, and implemented. Vulnerability also depends on the institutional capacity that exists before disaster strikes.
Chile: Incorporating risk into public policy
Chile offers a different experience. Its exposure to earthquakes has led the country to incorporate risk into its building codes, warning systems, public education, and evacuation protocols. The 7.6-magnitude Quellón earthquake in 2016 had a relatively limited impact compared with other events of similar intensity.
The scale of damage can never be attributed exclusively to government action: location, depth, and the characteristics of the event also matter. But Chile’s experience shows that high exposure can become a permanent variable in public planning. Risk ceases to be an exception and becomes part of the ordinary way of governing.
When prevention is also governance
A government’s capacity to respond to a disaster is built before the emergency. But prevention must also include integrity. Emergencies often involve expedited procedures, extraordinary contracting, and decisions made under pressure. As a result, the risks of fraud, favoritism, conflicts of interest, and diversion of funds increase. Preparedness means defining in advance how donations will be recorded, what controls will govern contracting, and who will oversee resources.
Government plans should begin with a vulnerability map and accompany it with an integrity-risk map. In earthquake-prone territories, this means enforced building codes, assessments of critical infrastructure, evacuation protocols, and rescue capacity, but also controls capable of withstanding the pressures of an emergency. However, the Regional Assessment Report 2024 by UNDRR warns that, in the Latin American countries analyzed, less than 35% of the spending studied was allocated to prospective and corrective risk-reduction measures.
If risks are already known, waiting for them to materialize before taking action is not simply a lack of foresight. It is also a government decision. The real question is not what the State will do after the next disaster, but why it decided not to do beforehand what it already knew was necessary.
Autor
Licenciada en relaciones internacionales y ciencia política de la Universidad San Francisco de Quito con Máster en derechos humanos y gobernanza de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
