The etymological dictionary traces the acronym “Very Important Person” (V.I.P.) back to the 1930s. It is believed that British Royal Air Force pilots popularized the term, using it to confuse the enemy when transporting high-ranking military personnel.

Today, V.I.P. is associated with individuals enjoying privileges granted by their social status, influence, or importance. Heads of state, tycoons, world-class athletes, and artists acquire this coveted distinction, setting them apart from the rest of humanity.

Extending this acronym from individuals to a region raises questions. Will Latin America be a V.I.P. zone in the global arena by 2050, or will it lose relevance compared to other regions? Will its importance stem from economic development, financial strength, or demographic weight?

Let’s examine this, letter by letter.

V.I.P. starts with V for ‘Vieja’ (Old)

Demographic transitions are aging Latin American societies. In 1950, out of 170 million inhabitants, 40% (70 million) were under 15 years old, and only 3% (just over 5 million) were adults over 65.

By 2025, those under 15 will account for 22% of a projected population of 668 million, while those over 65 will have tripled, representing 10%. The total number of young people peaked in 2000 at 168 million and has been declining ever since. Today, there are 148 million—20 million fewer.

Just around the corner, in about 20 years, the United Nations projects that adults over 65 and children under 15 will each number 125 million (around 17% of the total population). Even sooner, by 2040, the working-age population (15–65) is expected to begin contracting.

Latin America’s future is undeniably one of gray hair and wrinkles.

I for ‘Infecunda’ (Infertile)

The large families of our grandparents’ era, often with six or more children, are a thing of the past. Intergenerational lunches with sprawling tables for 20 people are now mostly memories or Netflix historical dramas.

World Bank data show that in 1960, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) was near or above six in all countries except Argentina, Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay, where it was slightly under five. Mothers of six children are now rare. Fertility rates plummeted in the 1970s and 1980s and continue to decline.

The “magic number” for TFR to maintain a stable population is two—that means to replace deceased with newborns. Since 2018, Latin America’s TFR has dipped below that threshold. Leading this decline are countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Uruguay. Major cities such as Bogotá, Buenos Aires, San José, and Santiago now exhibit what demographers call “ultra-low fertility rates” of 1.5 or less.

Latin America’s fertility future is uncertain but largely predictable. Globally, declining fertility correlates with decreased infant mortality rates, increased education for women, greater female workforce participation, contraceptive availability, family planning campaigns, and values emphasizing individual autonomy and secularization. The fundamental point here is that once fertility falls, it does not rebound to previous historical levels. 

Governments in Asia and Europe have struggled unsuccessfully to reverse low fertility trends. China, for instance, abandoned its one-child policy and now promotes pro-natalist measures to combat its population decline.

In Latin America, low fertility is here to stay, further contributing to an aging population. 

Latin America will hardly escape from the stability of fertility at low levels. The “I.” of infecundity in V.I.P. is not only here to stay, but is also the underlying cause of aging. If societies had more than two children (say three), these would not only replace those who die, but would naturally rejuvenate them (absent migratory flows).

However, it would be neither feasible nor desirable to revert to pre-1960 fertility levels. The socioeconomic advancements of women have been closely linked to smaller family sizes.

P for ‘Pobre’ (Poor)

In relative terms, Latin America has failed to close the economic gap. In 1950, its average per capita income was approximately $3,700—on par with the global average and half that of Western Europe. However, it was three times higher than East Asia’s and 2.5 times greater than Sub-Saharan Africa’s.

By 2022, the gap with wealthier regions remained unchanged. The ratio compared to Western Europe widened from two to three—we are relatively poorer than Europe. East Asia surpassed Latin America in 2010 and now enjoys a $7,000 per capita income advantage. Today, the world as a whole is wealthier than Latin America.

What Lies Ahead?

The outlook is grim. Economic growth relies heavily on productivity—the efficiency of resource use in producing goods and services. Latin America has never led globally in industrial or service productivity and has only occasionally dominated international markets for commodities like coffee, soybeans, copper, precious metals, or oil.

This commodity-based integration into the global economy has been fraught with boom-and-bust cycles, price volatility, asymmetric trade relations, and vulnerability to external shocks, indicating that this development strategy is hard to implement successfully in the long term. 

The alternative to that is to add more land, capital and labor to existing means of production. However, expanding production by increasing land, labor, and capital use faces limitations. Agricultural expansion has reached its limit, and conserving the Amazon is critical to avoiding further climate destabilization. The labor force, as argued above, will begin shrinking by 2040.

Finally, when it comes to increasing capital—technologically sophisticated and efficient machinery and equipment—the possibility will be constrained by the region’s decreasing capacity to save. As the region ages and morbidity and mortality become concentrated in degenerative diseases, which are more costly in terms of medical treatment and care, spending on health and social policy will only increase in the public and private sectors.

Meeting these rising expenses while maintaining infrastructure investments will likely require greater reliance on foreign savings. The V.I.P. future of Latin America—Vieja (old), Infecunda (infertile), and Pobre (poor)—does not appear especially enviable.

_{*Machine translation proofread by Ricardo Aceves.}