The political, social, and economic crisis in Venezuela has produced the largest displacement in Latin America’s recent history. Millions of people have left the country in the last 10 years in search of protection, work, and basic living conditions. In response, Latin American governments have adopted a wide range of migration regularization programs, often receiving international praise for their openness and solidarity. However, a closer look reveals important limitations and emerging risks in how these policies are being designed and implemented.
Research conducted by the CAMINAR Research Group shows that most regularization programs created in response to Venezuelan displacement rely on ad hoc arrangements, temporary measures designed specifically for this population and frequently disconnected from existing migration laws. These programs usually grant residence permits for limited periods, ranging from two to ten years, without guaranteeing long-term stability. As a result, many Venezuelans move repeatedly between regular and irregular status, reinforcing legal uncertainty rather than resolving it.
Another pathway that has been used for regularization is access to refugee status. In theory, this route offers stronger protection and long-term security. In practice, however, few countries in the region have applied the expanded definition of refugee established in the Cartagena Declaration to Venezuelans, despite widespread recognition of the serious human rights violations taking place in the country. In addition to the causes contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention, it contemplates ‘persons who have fled their countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order’.
Brazil stands out as an exception. In 2019, it adopted a simplified procedure to recognize Venezuelans as refugees. This decision was shaped by political factors, including Bolsonaro’s geopolitical opposition to Nicolás Maduro’s regime, as well as practical considerations: reducing a growing backlog of asylum claims and addressing documentation barriers that prevented many Venezuelans from accessing other forms of regularization. Importantly, this policy has continued even after diplomatic relations with Venezuela were partially restored, despite concerns that the expanded definition might be revoked.
Together with Operation Welcome (Operação Acolhida), a large-scale humanitarian response focused on reception and internal relocation, Brazil’s approach has been celebrated internationally and presented as a model for the region. Yet this positive image hides important contradictions. Refugee status has not become the main pathway for Venezuelans in Brazil – only around 20% all Venezuelans have obtained refugee status – and recent asylum practices increasingly clash with the country’s reputation as a leader in international protection.
In fact, Brazil has recently adopted a series of administrative measures that restrict access to the asylum system, particularly for non-Venezuelan nationalities. The death of Evans Osei Wusu (Ghanaian citizen) in 2024, after falling ill while awaiting authorization to enter Brazil at Guarulhos International Airport, exposed serious human rights concerns in these border spaces. Rather than strengthening protection mechanisms, the state has increasingly relied on visa requirements and other administrative barriers that prevent some people from even applying for asylum in the country.
These measures are often justified as tools to combat migrant smuggling or human trafficking, especially when Brazil is portrayed as a “transit country.” In practice, however, they tend to penalize the very people they claim to protect—those fleeing violence, poverty, or persecution. The impact has been dramatic: in 2025, asylum applications at Guarulhos Airport dropped by 94% compared to the previous year, largely due to these new barriers.
Another concerning trend is the requirement of private sponsorship for humanitarian visas. While initially praised as an innovative and humane policy, this mechanism increasingly shifts responsibility away from the state. People fleeing contexts of severe instability may now depend on sponsors to access protection, undermining the idea of asylum and humanitarian visas as rights rather than favors. This approach raises serious questions about Brazil’s commitment to consolidating a coherent National Policy on Migration, Refuge, and Statelessness.
These developments would already be troubling on their own, but they become even more alarming when placed in the broader regional and global context. Migration and asylum have become increasingly politicized, especially following Donald Trump’s return to power in the United States. Across the Americas, public debate and policy measures increasingly blur the distinction between migrants and refugees, framing human mobility as a threat or “invasion” and prioritizing containment and expulsion over protection. There is also a growing risk that Venezuelan displacement may be instrumentalized in upcoming elections, with migration narratives being mobilized to fuel fear, securitization agendas, and political polarization.
In this new scenario, the widespread use of temporary and extraordinary regularization schemes deserves critical scrutiny. Historically, such measures have often served as tools of migration control. Today, they also generate detailed digital information systems that can later be used for surveillance, exclusion, or deportation, as recent statements by Chile’s president-elect suggest. This is particularly dangerous in a context where respect for international law is being openly challenged.
When regularization programs are discretionary, temporary, and poorly anchored in the law, they offer little protection against sudden policy reversals. Anti-immigration discourse has grown more radical, targeting not only new arrivals but also people who have lived for years in destination countries, often from places where human rights violations are widely recognized.
CAMINAR’s research shows that extraordinary regularization schemes remain widespread across Latin America and that many migrants cycle in and out of legal status. Under current conditions, however, this instability takes on a new meaning. Expired permits or unilateral changes to regularization rules can quickly turn formerly “regular” migrants into deportable subjects, weakening the principle of non-refoulement and opening the door to forced returns. In this sense, Latin America appears to be reaching a critical turning point. Migration regularization, once framed as a tool for protection and integration, risks becoming a mechanism for identification, control, and eventual expulsion.
Against this backdrop, Brazil’s contradictions are especially disappointing. The country has a progressive political tradition, strong international credibility, and a long-standing commitment to human rights, asylum and the protection of displaced populations. Its policies and practices matter not only domestically but also as regional benchmarks at a time when the right to seek asylum is under growing pressure.
Brazilian authorities therefore face a historic responsibility: to ensure consistency between discourse and practice and to prevent refugees and other forcibly displaced persons from becoming yet another victim of the technofascist trend in international relations. In an increasingly hostile international environment, defending asylum is not only a legal obligation, but rather, it is a political choice with far-reaching consequences for the region’s future.
Autor
Director and Professor of the Human Sciences Center (CCH) at the Federal University of Roraima (UFRR). PhD in Social Sciences from the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo.
Professor at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) and member of the CAMINAR Research Group (Comparative Analysis on International Migration and Displacement in the Americas).
