The V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg has published the tenth edition of its Democracy Report, titled Unraveling the Democratic Era? The document, compiled using more than 32 million data points across 202 countries, offers one of the most comprehensive diagnoses available on the state of democracy worldwide. Its conclusion is as forceful as it is concerning: the level of democracy for the average citizen has fallen back to 1978 levels, effectively erasing nearly all the gains of the so-called “third wave of democratization,” which began with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974.
The report documents that the world today has 92 autocracies and only 87 democracies. The most alarming figure is not the number of countries, but the population proportions: 74% of humanity—around 6 billion people—currently lives under autocratic regimes. Only 7% of the global population resides in full liberal democracies, the lowest proportion in more than five decades.
The phenomenon the report calls the “third wave of autocratization” is not a temporary anomaly, but a structural trend that has been consolidating for 25 years and is accelerating. In 2025, 44 countries are undergoing active autocratization, a figure that contrasts sharply with the mere twelve in that condition in 2005. What is truly unprecedented, according to the authors, is that never before in modern history have so many countries been autocratizing simultaneously. This historic record places 41% of the global population (3.4 billion people) in countries experiencing regressive trajectories.
The report identifies three converging dynamics: democratic backsliding in traditionally stable democracies, the collapse of successful democratic transitions of the twentieth century, and the hardening of already autocratic regimes. This triple pressure constitutes what the authors call the Great Reversal, comparing the world of 2025 with that of 2000, when the direction of political change was exactly the opposite.
For those of us working in electoral integrity, the report offers a particularly revealing snapshot of the health of electoral processes globally. The comparison between 2000 and 2025 in specifically electoral indicators is devastating.
In the year 2000, 43 countries showed substantial improvements in the quality of their elections, compared to only 17 in decline. By 2025, that proportion has reversed dramatically: only seven countries are improving their electoral quality, while 22 are experiencing significant deterioration. In other words, in a quarter century we have moved from a world where elections improved at a ratio of 2.5 to 1, to one where they deteriorate at a ratio of more than 3 to 1.
The Clean Elections Index—which measures the freedom, fairness, and integrity of the electoral process as a whole—is in decline in more than twenty countries, with a worrying concentration of problems in the autonomy of electoral management bodies (EMBs). In 25 countries, these bodies show statistically significant losses of independence from the executive branch. Government intimidation during electoral processes now affects 21 countries, while voting irregularities are documented in at least eight.
This pattern is consistent with what specialists in contemporary autocratization call executive aggrandizement, that is, the erosion of democracy not through military coups, but through the progressive control of institutions that arbitrate political competition. Within this framework, the independent electoral body becomes the primary target to capture or neutralize.
Latin America presents, in the report, a panorama that combines encouraging signs with deeply concerning trends. The region is the second most democratic in the world in population-weighted terms, with 71% of its population living under some form of democracy. However, this aggregate conceals extraordinary heterogeneity.
On the positive side, the report records U-turns—reversals of autocratization—in Brazil, Guatemala, and Bolivia. In Brazil, the arrival of Lula da Silva to power in 2022 reversed the deterioration documented under the Bolsonaro administration, although the report warns that social polarization persists and that the 2026 elections will be decisive. Guatemala perhaps represents the most notable case: after years of restrictions on freedom of expression and civil society, the election of Bernardo Arévalo in 2023—achieved despite multiple attempts by displaced elites to annul the result—stands as an example of democratic resilience under extraordinary pressure. Botswana and Mauritius, although outside the region, also illustrate how an election can reverse an authoritarian trajectory.
However, six Latin American countries are undergoing active autocratization according to the study: Argentina, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. El Salvador is the paradigm of autocratization with an electoral façade: it holds multiparty elections, yet its scores on the Liberal Democracy Index place it among the lowest in the region. Under Bukele’s presidency, the country experienced such a sharp drop in the index between 2019 and 2021 that, according to the authors, it is comparable in speed only to military coups. In 2025, El Salvador’s Congress abolished presidential term limits, consolidating this process.
Mexico represents a case of particular relevance due to its size and regional influence. The report documents that since 2024 it has been classified as a “gray electoral autocracy,” as a result of accumulated institutional erosion under the Morena movement. This includes the controversial reform introducing popular elections for the judiciary—a practice unprecedented in consolidated democracies and flagged by international technical bodies as a threat to judicial independence. This is in addition to the recently failed electoral reform proposal presented by President Claudia Sheinbaum and the ongoing debate over the so-called Plan B. The effects of its approval (if it occurs) will be reflected in the next edition of the report.
The report confirms a trend that we observe on the ground: increasing pressure on electoral bodies to subordinate them to the preferences of the government in power, the obstruction and criminalization of electoral observers (especially domestic ones), and the weakening of mechanisms for resolving electoral disputes.
Another finding of the report is the correlation between the deterioration of freedom of expression and the degradation of electoral quality. Freedom of expression is the most affected indicator globally—44 countries recorded declines in 2025—and is, not coincidentally, the first to fall when a government begins a process of autocratization.
Genuinely competitive elections require a plural informational environment in which voters can form autonomous preferences. When governments censor media, restrict academic expression, or subject institutional communication to criteria of political loyalty, the conditions for electoral competition are compromised, even if the act of voting remains formally intact.
The V-Dem 2026 Report makes it clear that holding elections does not guarantee democracy. Indeed, non-democratic regimes are becoming increasingly sophisticated, holding elections without uncertainty, in which the outcome is known in advance. The trap of electoralism—reducing democracy to the act of voting—is precisely the favored mechanism of contemporary leaders who erode the system from within.
Strengthening the autonomy of electoral bodies, protecting freedom of the press and association, and preserving institutional checks and balances are not procedural luxuries. They are the conditions without which no electoral outcome can be considered genuinely legitimate.
Autor
Executive Director of Transparencia Electoral. Degree in International Relations from Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV). Candidate for a Master's Degree in Electoral Studies at Universidad Nacional de San Martín (UNSAM / Argentina).
