The recent publication of the report The Cuban Regime’s Export of Communism, prepared by the U.S. Department of State, has once again placed Cuba at the center of the hemispheric debate. The document argues that, despite the profound economic deterioration facing the island, the regime continues to play an active role in promoting authoritarian political projects and in building networks of influence that extend beyond its borders. Beyond the various biases and uses—real or potential—of an openly anti-communist report, the question it raises deserves attention: to what extent does Cuba still retain a genuine capacity to project international influence?
A conventional reading would suggest that Cuba’s prolonged economic crisis has significantly reduced its room for maneuver abroad. Under this logic, the regime’s financial exhaustion should sooner or later translate into a loss of allies, diminished diplomatic capacity, and growing international isolation. However, developments over the past few months point to a considerably more complex reality.
This apparent contradiction makes it necessary to distinguish between material power and the capacity to exert influence. These two concepts, which often correspond to some degree, do not necessarily evolve in parallel. There are states whose international reach far exceeds their economic or military capabilities thanks to ideational resources, well-established political networks, or mechanisms of transnational legitimation, as we have argued elsewhere. The Cuban case appears to follow precisely this logic: while its economy faces a persistent crisis, its international support infrastructure continues to demonstrate a remarkable capacity for mobilization and adaptation.
A transnational infrastructure of influence
The most recent monitoring of Cuban sharp power, conducted by Gobierno y Análisis Político A.C. (GAPAC) for the May–June 2026 period, provides empirical evidence that allows us to qualify the notion of an internationally isolated regime. The monitoring documents dozens of verifiable actions carried out in Latin America, Europe, the Caribbean, and the United States, reflecting the activation of a broad network of governments, political parties, trade unions, solidarity organizations, residents’ associations, academic institutions, and cultural groups organized around political and symbolic support for Havana.
Far from retreating in the face of the hardening of U.S. policy, the regime responded by strengthening these mechanisms of international coordination. Various organizations across different countries promoted public solidarity campaigns, issued institutional statements, organized mobilizations, expanded cooperation initiatives, and reinforced international support for the regime. The monitoring identifies a capacity for adaptation that enables Cuba to respond to adverse circumstances through a combination of state and non-state actors.
A particularly relevant aspect is that this influence does not rest exclusively on official diplomacy. While Cuban embassies continue to play an important coordinating role, the regime’s international projection increasingly depends on a constellation of organizations operating across different national spheres. Trade unions, solidarity movements, friendship associations, universities, cultural organizations, and even cooperation platforms carry out relatively autonomous activities that, while not forming part of the Cuban state apparatus, reproduce converging narratives and amplify the island’s international presence.
This diversification represents a considerable advantage, since support networks retain the capacity to act even when national administrations change or bilateral relations deteriorate. Cuban influence, consequently, is sustained not only through agreements between states, but through a much broader and more resilient transnational infrastructure.
Diplomacy and solidarity networks
Within this architecture, Mexico continues to occupy a particularly important position. During the period analyzed, public support from the government of Claudia Sheinbaum for the continuation of bilateral cooperation coincided with the rapid mobilization of the Mexican Movement of Solidarity with Cuba in response to the new U.S. sanctions, parliamentary activities, academic meetings, and the XXX National Meeting of Solidarity with Cuba in Aguascalientes, which brought together hundreds of delegates from different parts of the country.
These developments suggest that Mexico constitutes much more than a diplomatic ally of Havana. The country concentrates a particularly dense political infrastructure in which government institutions, political parties, social organizations, and academic spaces converge, capable of organizing support initiatives quickly and continuously. This combination makes it one of the main regional nodes from which solidarity campaigns, political exchanges, and cooperation mechanisms favorable to the Cuban regime are projected.
Similar dynamics can be observed in other Latin American countries. In Argentina and Colombia, the monitoring identifies an interesting evolution of traditional solidarity networks. Alongside symbolic expressions of support, initiatives aimed at providing material assistance are beginning to carry greater weight through fundraising campaigns, the shipment of humanitarian aid, and projects related to energy supplies. This shift is significant because international networks are no longer producing only political legitimacy; they are also beginning to help mitigate some of the consequences of the economic crisis facing the island.
Europe is another arena where this infrastructure maintains a significant presence, with national days of solidarity, campaigns launched from the Basque Country to finance solar energy systems, activities organized by French trade unions, and Italian networks of support. These initiatives take place in established democracies, demonstrating that the regime’s international projection does not depend exclusively on ideologically aligned governments, but also on social organizations capable of mobilizing resources, generating public visibility, and influencing certain areas of political debate.
An influence that defies expectations
All of this requires us to reconsider a widely held assumption: that a state’s capacity for international influence depends almost exclusively on its economic, demographic, and military strength. The Cuban case demonstrates that the relationship can be considerably more complex. Although the economic crisis severely limits the regime’s material capabilities, it has not prevented it from retaining important spaces of legitimacy and political coordination beyond its borders.
This does not mean that Cuba retains the capacity to project influence on the same terms as during the Cold War. The international context has changed profoundly, as have the instruments through which the regime engages with the outside world. Today, its influence rests less on revolutionary exportation or the backing of a great power, and much more on the existence of a diversified network of political allies, solidarity organizations, academic platforms, and social actors capable of reproducing favorable narratives, organizing international campaigns, and keeping the island’s political presence alive across different arenas.
Perhaps this is where the main singularity of the Cuban case lies. Not in the economic success of a model that exhausted its promises long ago, but in the capacity of a state with limited material resources to retain an international influence considerably greater than its relative weight in the global system. Understanding this phenomenon requires looking beyond traditional indicators of hard power and observing the complex web of political, institutional, and social relationships that the regime continues to activate.
In this sense, the Department of State report may be subject to debate because of its hypothetical implications for the Trumpist agenda regarding U.S. domestic politics, but it is correct in pointing to a fundamental aspect: the Cuban state’s international authoritarian projection remains a relevant factor for understanding the dynamics of political and ideological competition that run through the Western Hemisphere. And on this point—which entails violations of the rights of the Cuban people and threats to the democratic stability of neighboring nations—the sympathies of a large part of the left and the prolonged silence of other actors have helped create the conditions for the right to monopolize the denunciation of Cuba’s long-standing autocracy.
Autor
PhD. in History and Regional Studies, Universidad Veracruzana (Mexico). Master in Political Science, University of Havana. Specialized in autocratic processes and regimes in Latin America and Russia.
Researcher at the Expediente Abierto center (www.expedienteabierto.org). Specialized in the authoritarian influence of China and Russia in Latin America. Author of the book Old Ideas. New Challenges? A theoretical study of the rise of illiberalism (Traveler, 2023).
