The current state of Latin American regionalism can no longer be adequately interpreted in terms of “crisis.” This concept implies at least two elements: a temporary character and a situation of urgency. Neither of these conditions appears to describe the current state of regionalism in Latin America. What we are witnessing is no longer an exceptional or transitory critical episode, but rather a more prolonged condition of limited capacity to respond to internal crises and political fragmentation.
The limited and adaptive forms of regionalism that have managed to consolidate in the region do not disregard the valuable, albeit modest, efforts to sustain regional cooperation in specific areas, such as those promoted through the Brasília Consensus. However, we believe that the current debate requires shifting the analytical focus away from the notion of “crisis” and toward other dilemmas, such as the tension between resilience and inertia. These two concepts are often confused, yet they refer to different phenomena. Inertia implies mere passive persistence, continuity without meaningful transformation, and institutional survival with little potential to generate substantive outcomes. Resilience, by contrast, entails the capacity to adapt through institutional adjustment mechanisms in the face of adverse contexts. It is more than simple survival.
What is emerging is an essentially adaptive regionalism. The term may not be grandiose, but it captures a central feature of the current moment: organizations seeking to preserve minimum levels of political coordination and institutional functionality amid growing trends of ideological fragmentation and unilateralism, shaped by external geopolitical alignments.
The case of the Central American Integration System (SICA) is illustrative. The reform of the “Regulation on Integration, Quorum, and Decision-Making Procedures of SICA’s Regional Bodies and Institutions,” approved in April 2026 without Nicaragua’s participation, was presented as a measure aimed at overcoming the institutional paralysis caused by Managua’s persistent veto regarding the appointment of the secretary-general. The position has remained vacant since 2023 due to several countries’ rejection of candidates nominated by Nicaragua, who were closely linked to the regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo.
Nicaragua temporarily withdrew from SICA in 2024 because of the dispute over the secretary-generalship. Nevertheless, SICA has continued to function through technical cooperation mechanisms in areas such as health, agriculture, digitalization, and risk management, demonstrating that even in contexts of intense political fragmentation, functional spaces for regional cooperation can remain relatively operational.
The reform, which relaxes quorum and voting requirements, represents a significant innovation in a region historically attached to consensus and unanimity. Yet it reflects a paradox: it can be seen as a sign of institutional resilience by preventing permanent deadlock and limiting paralyzing vetoes, although it does not respond to a logic of deeper supranational integration. Rather, it is an adaptation to the inability of traditional mechanisms to process persistent political conflicts.
The Andean situation reveals another critical dimension of the problem: even frameworks considered relatively institutionalized face difficulties in disciplining state behavior. The Andean Community (CAN) recently ordered Ecuador and Colombia to dismantle the tariffs and reciprocal trade restrictions they had implemented since December 2025. However, both governments appealed the Andean rulings, thereby prolonging the dispute. The CAN General Secretariat is currently processing the challenges arising from the conflict over tariffs and bilateral trade restrictions adopted by the two countries.
Although CAN formally intervened to enforce Andean regulations, the conflict tested the limits of that institutional framework. Ecuador and Colombia prioritized national agendas and personal disputes that reflect broader regional alignments. The decision by both countries first to hinder bilateral trade through restrictive measures and then to appeal the Andean rulings highlights the difficulties regional organizations face in ensuring effective compliance with their decisions, even in the area of intraregional free trade.
Moreover, Colombian President Gustavo Petro went so far as to suggest the possibility of withdrawing from CAN and redirecting Colombia’s strategic priorities toward other regional forums, particularly MERCOSUR. Although the statement clearly contains a short-term political component, it is revealing that even within one of the region’s historically most institutionalized frameworks, the exercise of collective authority depends on the existence and coordination of common interests and is hindered by ideological fractures.
Latin American regionalism today appears to operate in a context less oriented toward grand projects of deep integration and more focused on strengthening capacities for political management, conflict resolution, and the preservation of spaces for regional coordination. Within this framework, the SICA reform can be interpreted as an example of institutional adaptation to prolonged scenarios of decision-making deadlock. The relaxation of the rules could help overcome a paralysis that threatens the organization’s functioning, paving the way for the election of a new secretary-general.
Similarly, CAN’s intervention in the tariff dispute between Ecuador and Colombia demonstrates that regional mechanisms still retain a certain capacity for mediation in interstate disputes. Nevertheless, the difficulties in securing compliance with Andean rulings also show that this capacity remains limited and highly dependent on the political will of the governments involved.
The closeness of governments such as those of Nayib Bukele, Daniel Noboa, Laura Fernández, or José Raúl Mulino to the second Trump administration, together with increasingly visible tensions with leaders of opposing political orientations—such as the confrontation between Noboa and Petro—suggests that these ideological preferences are also projected onto Latin American regionalism. More than a simple difference in political outlooks, this tends to deepen regional fragmentation and encourage forms of cooperation increasingly shaped by external geopolitical alignments.
Ultimately, both the SICA reform and CAN’s actions suggest that contemporary Latin American regionalism cannot be understood in terms of crisis. Although the region appears to have moved away—at least for now—from ambitious horizons of deep integration, regionalism continues to demonstrate capacities for adaptation and resilience. These frameworks seem to be reconfiguring themselves toward more flexible and pragmatic forms of cooperation, aimed at preserving regional governance in fragmented and polarized political contexts. The central question, therefore, is not whether these institutions will survive, but whether this adaptive resilience can eventually become the foundation for rebuilding more robust and effective forms of regional governance.
Autor
Professor and researcher at the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations of the National University of Rosario (Argentina). Director of the Study Group on the European Union at the UNR.
