Soccer is a global event of such magnitude that it transcends cultural differences like no other. Its geopolitics can be simplified by stating that Latin America, here too, provides raw material to European clubs paid by the Chinese who own the television rights and petrodollars of sheikhs who buy equipment as a hobby. But unlike commodities, in soccer there is revenge when Messi, Maradona or Ronaldinho stop playing for their clubs to play for their national teams,for their people. Long live sovereignty!

The relationship between a “soccer player” – the word amateur here is short -, the game and its players transcends the playful and rational, taking root in something deeper, almost atavistic, which explains the reactions to Maradona’s death. Now then, how is it that people who are infallible in judging the work by the author’s conduct fell into collective hysteria? People who, for example, never saw Woody Allen’s films again because of his daughter’s complaints against him, even though every time they hear Rhapsody in Blue they remember the general shot of Manhattan in black and white. Or colleagues at the university who joined in the “stamina”, like a “brave slash”, while refusing to participate, with good reason, in unparalleled events. It seems that this November 25 they left aside the commemoration of the international day of the elimination of the gender violence.

these apparent inconsistencies should not surprise us, since they are the evidence that Maradona stopped being a great soccer player and a person with chiaroscuro to become a myth.

Nevertheless, and this is my point, these apparent inconsistencies should not surprise us, since they are the evidence that Maradona stopped being a great soccer player and a person with chiaroscuro to become a myth. As such, he is attributed with qualities that he does not have in order to socially construct a wonderful narrative, outside of historical time, in which reality and fiction are mixed. That is why his parishioners do not judge him for his behavior, as Zeus was not judged for incestuous child eating. And not only that, like actions of mythological beings become epic and find their lyric, however irregular they may be, the anti-regulatory goal of 86 was divine and part of revenge for a lost war. Meanwhile, another goal scored by the hand of the mortal Henry, who classified France to the world-wide one, ended in apologies of the player and the president of the Republic.

Why was it mythicized? To be a great soccer player can be a necessary condition, but not enough, even when his memory has been strengthened with a selection of good moments on youtube capable of nourishing that epic narrative that has permeated even the under-30s, forced absentees from Mexico 86 and unlikely spectators from USA 94, his last world cup, the doping world cup, and the prelude to his retirement three years later. It also seems insufficient that he never really left Villa Fiorito or forgot about his people. To the non-Argentinean devotees this does not say much and could seem a very conservative vision in which the talent does not avoid the condemnation to remain down or fall into misfortune.  A great contribution comes from the legend of the rebel -the vicious- who skillfully reconverted to political commitment thanks to his detoxifications in Cuba, approaching the Olympus of rebellion presided by Castro, Chavez and Che. As legends are not judged, no one saw political inconsistency in his service to the misogynist dictatorships of the Gulf.

what best explains the creation of this new universal myth is that soccer is the last great redoubt of the patriarchy

But in my opinion, what best explains the creation of this new universal myth is that soccer is the last great redoubt of the patriarchy, which is a matter of men and women. In the game and its festivities, men can, without being judged, say that they love another man, hug each other, cry, show their sensitivity, and at the same time be brave, besides feeding the gregariousness of the tribe. The perfect summary of this mixture of feelings is Simeone thanking the mothers of his players because “they made them hatch with eggs this big”.

Maradona was one of the best in a sport that means these and many other things and for this he has a devout admiration. The difference with other good players is that he knew how to transmit emotions to his fans on and off the court, at all levels, helping men to release feelings and manifest passions. This happened to the atheist Spanish vice president who prayed for him a sacrilegious Our Father – the most patriarchal of prayers – in which, heaven was Cuba and God the Father, Maradona. Not even the leader of a party named after a woman can escape the patriarchy, although he surely wants to, and eventually the alpha male comes out, as he defined himself while fantasizing about whipping a lady until she bleeds.

Finally, and this is the important thing, let’s not forget that myths have always had a political function and, although it seems that they belong to the people, when it comes to legitimizing power relations, the high priests who claim them appear. In the wake of the Casa Rosada we could see who they are.

Elected with more than 55% of the votes in 2018 and on the basis of an anti-politics as usual platform, against the backdrop of the famous Lava Jato operation, Jair Bolsonaro came to power with undeniable political strength. After two years of government, his popularity remains above 30% approval, in spite of his poor management of the health crisis, as well as his actions openly contrary to democracy and the values of the 1988 Constitution. However, the year 2021 looks much more complicated for the former army captain.

Contrary to his predecessors, who had seen the number of mayoralties governed by their parties grow after his arrival at the Planalto Palace, Bolsonaro failed to take advantage of the recent municipal elections to reinforce his territorial structure. His inability to form a new coalition, after having left in 2019 the party that brought him to power (the Social Liberal Party, PSL), leaves him in a fragile position in the face of a mosaic of right-wing and center-right parties that imposed themselves in these last elections.

the results of this election show a loss of momentum in the anti-establishment discourse

Although the voters were mainly in favor of local issues, the results of this election show a loss of momentum in the anti-establishment discourse that has been progressively installed in Brazil from 2013 onwards. However, the main parties in Brazilian politics since the re-democratization – the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and the Workers’ Party (PT) – have yet to learn how to take advantage of the continuity of the 2020 electoral cycle.

Paradoxically, it’s the parties that splintered from the military dictatorship’s official party (the National Renewal Alliance, ARENA), the Democratic Party (DEM) and the Progressive Party (PP) that achieved most electoral gains. This allowed them, together with the Social Democratic Party (PSD), to be seen as the great winners of this election. And it is likely that two of their leaders – the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Rodrigo Maia, of the DEM, and the leader of the PP in the Chamber, Arthur Lira – will become the two main poles of power in the Chamber in view of the renewal of the presidency of the lower house in February 2021.

Such an election is always a thermometer of the political strength of the executive versus the legislative. In fact, it was following the election in 2015 of Eduardo Cunha (PMDB) as president of the House of Representatives that Dilma Rousseff began to progressively lose control of her political base in Congress. This led to her dismissal a year later.

Because of its political regime – coalition presidentialism, following political scientist Sergio Abranches – Brazil has always been a country difficult to govern. As of 2006, with the end of the so-called “verticalization of alliances”, which imposed a common coalition policy at the state and federal levels, the number of parties increased considerably, further fragmenting Congress and making it difficult to build majorities within it.

Bolsonaro has prevented Congress from approving the opening of an impeachment process by handing over several ministries to various center-right parties.

So far, Bolsonaro has prevented Congress from approving the opening of an impeachment process by handing over several ministries to various center-right parties. However, this support base is fragile.

The economic outlook for next year has deteriorated. The programmed end of the “emergency aid”, created during the month of April at the behest of the opposition in Congress, will cause a considerable loss in the income of the poorest families in the country, which will translate into an increase in unemployment. According to the Brazilian Institute of Statistics, between May and October, almost 4 million people declared themselves unemployed, so the unemployment rate was estimated at 14.1%, the highest since the statistical series exists.

This has consequences for the president’s popularity: if thanks to the “emergency aid” Bolsonaro achieved his best popularity rate of the year – 40% during the month of September according to the IBOPE institute – since then his approval has been falling, in parallel with the decrease in the value of the state subsidy. According to a survey published a few days ago, the disapproval rate went from 43% to 48%, becoming the majority again (the approval went from 45% to 42%).

It is probable that this tendency will continue if the government is unable to find a formula capable of giving continuity to “emergency aid”. In a context of the resurgence of the pandemic, – which has already cost the lives of more than 170,000 people – and of growing international isolation after the defeat in November of its main ally, Donald Trump, it is possible that the parties allied with the government in Congress will demand more dividends from Bolsonaro in the interest of maintaining his loyalty.

But with empty coffers, and without a defined political program, it will be much more complex to get around the clouds that are gathering over the economy, politics or health. And this time, it will be difficult to invoke the “danger of communism” to weather the coming storm.

^{*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli}

^{Photo by jeso.carneiro at Foter.com / CC BY-NC}

Co-author Belén Herrero

As major clinical trials come to a close, the World Health Organization estimates that 2 billion doses will be needed by 2021. Everything indicates that, once the first vaccines are available, the logic of the market will take precedence. Who goes first? 

Nine months into the pandemic, no action has been taken to declare these vaccines a global public good. It is estimated that wealthy nations – with only 13 percent of the world’s population – have already pre-acquired half of the world’s potential vaccine supply. In addition, the various laboratories involved in manufacturing continue to demand exclusivity and intellectual property protection. This prevents low- and middle-income countries from preparing more quickly to produce and export generic versions.

the debate on health sovereignty in Latin America takes on a central role.

Here the debate on health sovereignty in Latin America takes on a central role. On the one hand, there is the Covid-19 Global Access Fund for Vaccines (Covax initiative), a public-private initiative co-led by the Gavi Alliance for Vaccines (Gavi), the Coalition for the Promotion of Innovations in Epidemic Preparedness (CEPI) and the World Health Organization (WHO). COVAX aims to become a global mechanism for the purchase of vaccines. On the other hand, the coronavirus vaccine produced by Oxford University and AstraZeneca, will be available on a non-profit basis “in perpetuity” to low- and middle-income countries through the COVAX program.

While this may become a global mechanism for vaccine purchase, it does not guarantee sustained equitable access or its relationship to the challenged patent system. Here are two new facts that reposition Latin America in the debate on health sovereignty: one, Argentina and Mexico will be the countries in charge of manufacturing the Oxford-Astra-Zeneca vaccine in Latin America. Second, the President of Costa Rica, Carlos Alvarado, supported by 37 countries, has promoted a proposal within the World Health Assembly for a pool of voluntary licenses for drugs, vaccines and technologies to be freely shared.

At the most critical moment of regional integration, can Argentina and Mexico be pivots in building regional relationships around vaccines as a regional public good in order to address health challenges and their social, political and economic determinants? Can the region become a key player in this new phase of the pandemic in the search for mechanisms to ensure equitable access?

Covid-19 as a mirror of social and health debts in the region

The Covid-19 in Latin America reveals and deepens immediate health challenges in weak, or weakened, states with fragile health systems, as well as medium and long-term challenges related to combating poverty and socio-economic and gender inequality and inequities. It should be remembered that Covid-19 is in addition to epidemics such as dengue fever, the cases of which have exceeded 1.6 million so far this year, mostly in Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Argentina and Colombia. In addition, there are cases of Chikungunya, Zika and Malaria, with Venezuela leading the way since 2017.

Indeed, health crises exacerbate all forms of social injustice manifested in inequalities in access to health services, education, access to social protection, and gender justice. ECLAC has called for the reconstruction of a regional social pact that, at best, promotes a sustainable and inclusive development model, and at worst, mitigates the loss of progress in the fight against poverty and inequality. This is a healthy expression in a context where, until now, the priority has been to encourage individuals to leave in order to contain the expansion of the Covid in most countries.

Unlike in the past decade, there is no common engine but rather a retraction of regionalism associated with the loss of regional leadership.

In fact, the pandemic is breaking out in a region that shows a clear incongruence between, on the one hand, the increase in regional and border problems and, on the other, the decrease in concerted responses. Unlike in the past decade, there is no common engine but rather a retraction of regionalism associated with the loss of regional leadership. In addition, there is a minimalist agenda associated with trade, which explains the absence of solid regional responses to the crisis and, above all, to Covid-19.

There is also tension in political-ideological terms and significant differences among States on how to respond to the international geopolitical context. Even so, the race for a vaccine against Covid also accelerated the race for articulation and agreement in what would strictly be the reconstruction of health sovereignty.

Vaccine as an engine of integration? There is a legacy

A decade ago, UNASUR and Mercosur would have allowed for coordination and cooperation in the face of the health crisis, as well as a joint strategy for the purchase of medicines, including vaccines. It is sufficient to recall common actions in the framework of the H1N1 influenza pandemic, when the ministers of health met in Ecuador and agreed to undertake joint actions to establish mechanisms for the joint negotiation and purchase of the vaccine, aspects that would ensure equitable access, regional production capacity, antivirals and diagnostic kits.

In the area of access to medicines, for example, projects such as the Drug Price Bank were developed, and both UNASUR and MERCOSUR have been driving the joint negotiation of High-Cost Drug Prices. Even, at the global level, the countries of the region defended as a bloc at the World Health Assembly the intellectual property rights on access to medicines. In this context, they denounced the monopoly exercised by pharmaceutical companies, especially in the definition of prices.

Latin America has plenty of experiences and mechanisms to recreate health sovereignty through cooperation. A more effective articulation among regional integration mechanisms could allow for the expansion of the exchange of epidemiological and surveillance data, as well as the adoption of incentives for technological innovation. Strategies for the joint negotiation and purchase of vaccines and treatments for Covid-19 could also benefit greatly if the mechanisms could be developed in an articulated manner.

The vaccine does not erase what the physician and anthropologist Paul Farmer calls the pathologies of power, nor political-ideological differences that weakened regional structures as the basis of common strategies. Nor does it solve problems of trade diversion, much less is it an antidote for governments not to repeat the many discriminatory practices shown during the approach to the pandemic. As an example, policies that exclude refugees and undocumented migrants from access to health services and social protection systems.

The vaccine is a commercial incentive if you will. However, it can also be an incentive to energize a new regional social pact based on synergies between networks of laboratories and regional scientific communities, as well as an articulation of public and private efforts that privileges shared responsibility for universal and equitable access to vaccines as a regional public good, and to health as a universal right.

_{*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli}

_{Photo of the President of Peru in Foter.com / CC BY-NC-SA}

The recent constitutional plebiscite held in Chile showed three milestones. First, the option in favor of constitutional change was widely supported by the citizenry. Second, the results obtained by the Constituent Convention option confirm the distance that exists between the citizenry and the political institutions. Third, this election, despite the pandemic, had the highest levels of participation since the introduction of voluntary voting (2012).

participation was not homogeneous in the country.

However, participation was not homogeneous in the country. This is an antecedent to be considered in order to ensure that the constitutional discussion really involves a large part of the citizenry. When considering the regions of southern Chile, participation did not exceed 50 percent. This data contrasts with the results obtained in the northern regions and in the Metropolitan Region, which increased their participation levels in relation to the last election and some reached levels above 50%.

What would explain the lower participation in these southern regions? This is a relevant question for the upcoming process. In this column, I dare to put forward some hypotheses, analyzing what happened specifically in the Araucanía Region.

This is one of the poorest and most unequal regions of the country, presenting a long-lasting Chilean-Mapuche conflict as an identity element that has generated a series of symbolic and material consequences for its development. The presence of the State is low and it has a large rural population. In the last election, the participation reached 40.15%, a lower percentage than in the last presidential election. Only Temuco, the regional capital, obtained a similar percentage of participation to that election.

Three structural elements would explain this low participation. First, the networks and informal institutions act as the functional equivalent of the state. Therefore, informal participation mechanisms that promote a personalist and traditional logic predominate. These institutions include clientelism, nepotism and patronage. It is no coincidence that municipal elections show greater electoral participation in the region.

Since there were no candidates in this plebiscite, the possibilities of carrying out clientelism were nil.

Indeed, the municipality is perceived as a stable and protected workplace by the population, unlike the precarious characteristics of the labor market in Araucania. Therefore, the election of the local authority is not only important because of the ideological political aspects involved, but also because of the economic and labor opportunities. Since there were no candidates in this plebiscite, the possibilities of carrying out clientelism were nil.

Secondly, a conservative and passive civic culture has developed in the region. The Araucanía Regional Barometer recently applied in the region supports this idea since only 54% of those surveyed in the region stated that Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. 13% declare that they have participated in the last 5 years in passive demonstrations, despite the context of inequality and poverty that the region experiences. And with respect to the interest in regional and national politics this does not exceed 4 points on an ascending scale from 1 to 10. In terms of electoral results, the right generally performs better than the left.

Thirdly, together with other researchers, we propose that there is a multiplicity of latent conflicts in the region. The Chilean-Mapuche conflict is the most visible, but it is not the only one. In addition, the solutions that have been proposed lately promote police and control measures. Labor, legal, socioeconomic and environmental conflicts are also important. Concentrating only on manifest situations of conflict makes any structural political solutions that may be developed invisible, thus inhibiting participation in political decision-making and deliberation.

For these reasons, it is necessary to generate contextualized actions to promote participation in the Chilean constitutional process. This is a long-term process in which we must define our political institutionality and the essential rules that will govern us in the coming years.

The Constitution safeguards a certain vision of society and is legitimate when it reflects the values, principles and beliefs accepted by society as a whole. It also reflects power relations, since it distributes through different bodies the decision-making that will affect the entire country. Therefore, we are facing a task that requires that all of us be active participants in this important process and that high standards of transparency be safeguarded.

Transparency is fundamental to reverse the mistrust that citizens have towards political actors and institutions.

Transparency is fundamental to reverse the mistrust that citizens have towards political actors and institutions. The right to access public information is already enshrined in law, but this is not yet a right enshrined in the Constitution. Moreover, according to figures from the Council for Transparency, its use has been restricted to minority groups of the population with higher levels of education. This process opens up an opportunity for citizens to really take ownership of this right and exercise it without restriction.

Having access in clear and civic language to the declarations of heritage and interest of the conventional constituents, knowing who financed their campaigns, having access to the discussions on the contents of the constitution, knowing the objective of the meetings they will hold with interest groups, are practices that should be promoted to avoid this process losing legitimacy or being captured by a minority. In addition, transparency should be a founding principle of all institutions designed or transformed in this process.

It is not enough that information be available to safeguard the credibility of the constitutional discussion; the role that citizens can play in monitoring and follow-up is crucial.  In this context, participation should not be restricted to voting on or ratifying certain decisions; it is fundamental to assume and put into practice a complex concept of participation that includes different degrees of citizen involvement as well as contributing ideas to the constitutional discussion. 

It is vital that the citizenry adopt an active attitude about what is being discussed and where the constitution is headed, since the final text will have relevant consequences for our daily lives.

The role that institutions such as the Council for Transparency, pro-transparency organizations, regional universities and local radio stations can play becomes relevant, since in addition to promoting the principles of transparency and the right to access to information, they can develop instances of training so that citizens can take an active role in the debate that is opening.

_{*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli}

_{Foto de pslachevsky en Foter.com / CC BY-NC-SA}