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One region, all voices

Liquid autonomy: L.A. and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Bernabé Malacalza
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Liquid autonomy: L.A. and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Co-author Esteban Actis

The consecration for the first time in history of an American as president of the IDB represents a historic break in the post-war architecture of inter-American governance. The advance of Washington into the bank, and also into the OAS, leaves in sight the weaknesses and fractures of Latin America, unable to find a position of consensus in the face of such arbitrariness. Is there any autonomy left? This is the question that many people are asking.

Contrary to what a conventional view implies, autonomy is not isolation. In relational terms, it refers to the willingness of a country to act independently and in cooperation with others, in a competent, committed and responsible manner, as Roberto Russell and Juan Tokatlian point out. For Latin America, the notion of power has not been centered on influence, but on autonomy. As Benjamin Cohen points out, the first is “power over” others; the second is “power to” implement policies and resist external pressures. The powers that be are asking how to achieve the former, the countries of the region are asking how to increase the latter.

Far from the unwavering strength of the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, autonomy today is still possible, but it is more liquid and fragile.

Far from the unwavering strength of the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, autonomy today is still possible, but it is more liquid and fragile. To paraphrase Zygmunt Bauman in Liquid Modernity, the conditions in which countries operate can change before the ways of acting become consolidated into determined behaviors. For this, appropriate and dynamic diagnoses of the world and the region are needed, weighing both threats and opportunities. It is a matter of enabling strategic thinking on different prospective scenarios and foreign policy options. Without foresight, there is only reaction.

Today’s world is one of quicksand. Pandemics, technological wars, cyberterrorist attacks or climate catastrophes increase global risk. The process that explains global politics is not order, but entropy, as Randall Schweller rightly points out. In turn, this uncertainty is crossed by a hegemonic transition with no end in sight. The United States, a giant with feet of clay that abdicates its vocation as a world leader, versus China, whose unstoppable rise consolidates its transition from wealth to power. The pandemic accelerates everything, but it also makes it more tangible and denser.

The salient note of the region today is its lesser systemic relevance. Relative shrinkage, self-absorption and unusual fragmentation explain this disarray. Neither scenarios of balance of power nor of regional hegemony are to be expected anymore. The regional gaps are occupied by extra-regional powers. The United States is strengthening its coercive diplomacy and military ties with Colombia and Brazil. The non-resolution of the Venezuelan crisis has as protagonists China and Russia. Norway is the only hope for peaceful mediation. In the Amazon, it is France that tries to stop Bolsonaro’s unrest. Regional crises are not resolved, they are frozen.

While the US military presence remains unchallenged, the pandemic continues to deepen the region’s economic, commercial and financial dependence on China.

While the US military presence remains unchallenged, the pandemic continues to deepen the region’s economic, commercial and financial dependence on China. Non-alignment” or “neutrality” as an alternative to automatic subordination, whether to Beijing or Washington, appears today in the retina of politicians and academics. The normative prescription of maintaining an equidistant position in the face of that great dispute is correct, but insufficient for a world and a region that have changed.

Faced with the game of growing rivalry between two economically imbricated powers, the countries of the region that seek to preserve room for maneuver must think less of the “spirit of Bandung” and more of the “spirit of ABACC”. The nuclear control agency between Argentina and Brazil, created in the 1990s, is an example that endures in a terrain dominated by nuclear powers. Also the alliance between Mexico and Argentina to produce the vaccine against the coronavirus or the Argentine-Brazilian center of biotechnology are examples of the potential of niche agendas. Faced with the impossibility of desirable multilateralism, the option is viable minilateralism.

In order to improve the negotiating capacity with the United States and China, it will be necessary to play intelligently with the deficient existing regional institutions, but in a complementary manner to forge ad hoc coalitions on issues such as health, gender, reduction of social inequalities, environmental crisis, infrastructure, technology regulation, protection of natural resources, and external financing, among others. Enclaves of autonomy” should be selected and prioritized through niche diplomacy. Not only central, but also provincial and local governments, civil society actors, scientists, entrepreneurs, and citizens can contribute to a renewed multidimensional, multi-stakeholder, and multi-level “3M diplomacy”.

In an entropic world, preserving room for maneuver depends more on anticipation and adaptation than on rigidity. The foreign policy debate seems to have left behind the dilemma between autonomy or acquiescence, to revolve around a constant transaction between the two logics in the face of a complexation of actors, agendas and external dynamics. Liquid autonomy” implies proactivity, variation and flexibility. Also, pragmatism to offer concessions on specific issues that will be functional to gain margins of maneuver and results in other battles. Today it is not a question of “autonomy in resistance”, but of “autonomy in resilience”. Sometimes you have to know how to choose what toads to swallow and where.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

A New Constitution for Chile

Rossana Castiglioni
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A New Constitution for Chile

A truly historic election was held this Sunday. Chileans decided, in a convincing way, through a plebiscite, that the country will have a new Constitution. The new adjective should not be taken lightly. We are not facing a constitutional reform, but the possibility of writing a text from scratch, from a blank page. The election also had the purpose of defining the mechanism in charge of drafting the new Constitution, that is, through a constitutional convention made up of 155 members who will be elected by direct vote on 11 April 2021.

The constitutional convention have equal gender membership and will contemplate special quotas for members of indigenous communities. This deliberative body will draft the new Constitution within a period of 9 months, which may be extended for up to 3 more months. The text must be approved by at least 2/3 of its members and subsequently ratified by an exit plebiscite. If within the established period of time there’s no agreement, the current Constitution approved in 1980 will remain in force.    

the country’s main political forces agreed to an “Agreement for Social Peace” whose central axis contemplated a constitutional plebiscite.

This plebiscite is extraordinary because of the context in which it originated. In October 2019, Chile experienced a wave of mass protests, mostly peaceful but occasionally violent, that lasted for more than two months. In the midst of a social outburst of biblical proportions, which according to President Sebastián Piñera, the government did not see coming, and clearly did not know how to deactivate, the country’s main political forces agreed to an “Agreement for Social Peace” whose central axis contemplated a constitutional plebiscite. Thus, the new Constitution became a political strategy to dismantle a social conflict that otherwise did not foresee an auspicious outcome.

But was the demand for a new Constitution the main demand of the mobilized citizenry? Certainly not. The mobilized citizens did not articulate themselves around a leader, group or movement, nor did they clamor for a concrete reform. On the contrary, during the social explosion the public space was flooded with multiple demands and heterogeneous claims such as improved access to health, decent wages, quality education, the end of pension insurance companies and the reduction of inequalities around socio-structural categories such as class, gender and ethnicity, among others.  

However, for a large part of the citizenry and the political elites, the 1980 Constitution had become a real thorn in the side of both the symbolic and the instrumental.  Symbolically, the current Constitution was written in the midst of the dictatorship and without citizen participation, something that has led many to consider it a text with an original sin. Given that the country faces a profound crisis of legitimacy, expressed in low levels of party identification, confidence in the institutions and political participation, having a democratic Constitution, the product of deliberation, seems both timely and necessary. Instrumentally, the Constitution was designed to maintain the status quo, through various rules that hinder change, and not to institutionally process accumulated demands and discontent. For this reason, some consider that in order to emerge from the crisis it is essential to have a new Constitution that does not operate as a brake on change.

What remains to be seen is whether a new constitution will resolve the deep crisis of legitimacy in which Chile finds itself.

What remains to be seen is whether a new constitution will resolve the deep crisis of legitimacy in which Chile finds itself. There is no doubt that political crises often offer opportunities to reflect on what kind of country citizens want to build and to adopt necessary transformations that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. We also know that when people perceive decision-making processes as legitimate, they are more likely to accept their results, even when they are adverse. These, in and of themselves, are powerful reasons to hope for a new Constitution.

However, this process presents enormous challenges in managing rising expectations. A good part of the citizenry could be waiting for a new constitution to bring a solution to many of the problems and demands that were manifested after the social explosion. The availability of medicines, socioeconomic inequality, gender discrimination, abuses by private companies and employment levels will not be resolved immediately or expeditiously if a new constitutional text is approved.

The context does not help either. COVID-19 hit Chile hard, with over 500,000 cases already accumulated. The economy has also suffered the effects of the pandemic, with unemployment levels around 13% and a projection of -6.3% for this year, according to the World Bank. Opinion polls show that widespread discontent still prevails.

It is undeniable that having a new Constitution is a necessary step to solve the crisis of legitimacy in which the country is immersed. However, this will not be enough. If the political class does not rise to the occasion, if the management of citizen expectations is deficient and if broad transversal socio-political agreements are not built around a common project, it will be difficult to look to the future with optimism.  

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Opening or closing? South American immigration policies in the post-pandemic era

Stéphanie López Villamil
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Opening or closing? South American immigration policies in the post-pandemic era

The Covid-19 outbreak led to the total closure of borders in South America and, in some cases, their militarization to contain the pandemic, leaving thousands of migrants stranded trying to return to their home countries. The health crisis is compounded by an economic crisis whose dimensions are still being estimated and that has exponentially affected migrants: evictions, loss of daily sustenance, food insecurity and increased xenophobia in some countries.

In addition, the humanitarian crisis that has generated an exodus of more than five million people from Venezuela, mainly to Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile, has been accompanied by regulatory changes: creation of temporary permits, imposition of visas and, in some countries, proposals to reform migration laws leading to more restrictive policies.

the reactionary movement in immigration policies is increasingly latent. 

Although in the last two decades, and with the turn to the left in the region, avant-garde immigration laws in terms of guaranteeing rights and citizenship had been proposed, such as the Ecuadorian or Uruguayan laws, the reactionary movement in immigration policies is increasingly latent. 

In this context, Chile and Colombia are debating their migration bills. On the one hand, in Chile, the enforcement of a Pinochet-era immigration law (1975), coupled with diverse migratory flows in the last two decades (Haiti, Colombia, Venezuela), suggests a necessary and urgent change in the law, especially when the possibility of a new constitutional process is being considered. Civil society and academia have expressed their views on the project, pointing out, among other shortcomings, that it does not introduce permanent regularization mechanisms.

On the other hand, in Colombia, a country that has traditionally produced migrants with 10% of its population living abroad and now is a receiving country with more than 1.7 million Venezuelans and more than 500,000 Colombian returnees, the creation of a migration law that includes all the desegregated norms is more than necessary. Colombia cannot continue multiplying decrees and must move towards an inclusive policy that guarantees rights. The new migration law cannot be a simple compilation of norms.

In addition to these two projects, several bills on the subject of migration have recently been presented to the Peruvian Congress, including Bill 5349 of 2020. In this bill, it is intended that Peru withdraws from the United Nations’ Global Compact for Migration signed in December 2018 and creates the crime of irregular entry, criminalizing immigrants, contrary to international standards in this regard.

Now, with these reforms, what are the scenarios at the regional level in a post-pandemic era? Are we facing a generalized restrictive scenario? Although it is still early to answer these questions, in principle South American countries have two paths.

The first is to close the borders definitively, a scenario that is not very viable since it has been seen that, even with the closure, the population continues to move across porous borders and sometimes with the help of traffickers. The case of migration from Venezuela is the most evident: at the beginning of the pandemic the population began to return and currently the walkers are already wandering on the roads of Colombia going south.

The second is to continue strengthening some regional spaces for dialogue such as the Quito Process, which, although not binding, puts regional migration policy on the table. While this process has focused on denouncing the Maduro dictatorship, the member countries not only face the great challenge of regularizing the Venezuelan population, but also its socioeconomic inclusion. It is clear that this population came to Colombia to stay, although some governments refuse to accept it, creating temporary measures rather than long-term ones.

regional migration policy cannot focus exclusively on Venezuelan migratory flows.

But not everything is black and white. First, regional migration policy cannot focus exclusively on Venezuelan migratory flows. On the route to Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia there are thousands of migrants in transit who require international protection. What are governments doing about this? So far, they seem to be doing nothing.

Second, the possible reopening of Colombia’s border with Venezuela next month will bring more migration movement to the region. It is expected to lead to thousands more migrants leaving Venezuela. Given this situation, what possibilities will the governments of the region give migrants to regularize themselves permanently? In a context of growing xenophobia, where half of the more than 5 million people who have migrated lack the necessary documentation for a regular stay in these countries, the post-pandemic scenario is of concern.

In times of crisis (humanitarian or health), it seems that more restrictive migration policies are the solution, and some measures adopted to contain migratory flows in the region suggest this. Now it seems that South American countries have left behind all vestiges of moving towards a South American citizenship, as was proposed at some point in the extinct UNASUR. Some government responses do not seem to correspond with this vision of free mobility once promoted in regional integration spaces.

The idea of a South American citizenship is still utopian. For now, South American governments will have no choice but to continue confronting intraregional migration in the midst of an economic and health crisis. The question is how? Let us hope that it will be with welcoming responses that appeal to solidarity, hospitality, but above all, that they will be guarantors of the rights of migrants and their families.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by Andrés Gómez Tarazona in Foter.com / CC BY-NC-ND

Parliamentary elections and the advent of a new hegemonic political system in Venezuela

Xavier Rodríguez-Franco
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Parliamentary elections and the advent of a new hegemonic political system in Venezuela

Parliamentary elections in Venezuela have been held every five years since the first legislature of the National Assembly (NA) in 2000. However, in order to understand the political context of the 2020 election, it is necessary to examine the dictatorial turn of the Nicolás Maduro regime after the defeat of Chavism in the 2015 legislative elections.

As of December 2015, the government, together with the Judiciary and the state security forces, began an unprecedented offensive against the opposition. This systematic siege on parliamentary autonomy accelerated the deterioration of electoral conditions that were already questionable back then.

Shortly after the results of the parliamentary election, with the largest electoral turnout in history, giving a qualified majority of 2/3 of the seats to the opposition, the presidential counterattack began. The Supreme Court of Justice would be the main battering ram of this site that persists to this day with 141 sentences that seek as a whole to annul the constitutional powers of this parliamentary majority.

One of the first rulings was challenged for insufficient burden of proof, negating the right to defense, and the lack of a final ruling regarding the deputies of the state of Amazonas. In this way, in addition to curtailing the territory of parliamentary representation, the consolidation of the qualified majority was prevented, and with it the constitutional powers that this type of majority has in terms of political control. This attack would mark the rest of the rulings and actions against the NA. The swearing in of those deputies was the alibi for declaring the parliament in contempt and with it, nullifying all decisions and the full exercise of its institutional powers.

For 2016, the petition for a recall referendum by the opposition mobilized in the elections was scorned by the National Electoral Council with unfounded accusations of fraud in the collection of signatures. This, in addition to once again fueling the crisis of governance, renewed distrust in the electoral process among citizens and among leaders of the MUD, a coalition of parties already disbanded.

The forging of a tailor-made electoral system became state policy to the point of allowing for an unconstitutional call for eletions, as was the election of the National Constituent Assembly in 2017, which was aimed at drafting a new constitution. In practice, however, only a parallel parliament was imposed on the NA. This practice employed by Chavismo, when some electoral result had been adverse to it, ended up emptying the vote of civic sense as a means of political expression and institutional change.

With this new imposition, the persecution of the deputies and the bloody repression of the more than 6,700 social protests registered in 2017 would continue, while the opposition continued to be divided regarding its strategies for political change. For the regional elections of 2017, the electoral demobilization would be undeniable and the internal division between abstentionists and electoralists would deepen. This reached its maximum expression with the 2018 presidential convocation, which was full of vices.

The blind street of abstentionism

The current opposition abstentionism began to take shape at the end of 2016 and grew with the lack of knowledge of the 2018 presidential elections and the irruption of the interim government of Juan Guaidó in January 2019.

The expectations of a democratic transition and the request for the cessation of the functions of a government catalogued as usurper by that questioned election, was a new strategic framework to pressure a political change supported by more than 50 democracies. With the establishment of a diplomatic and financial siege on the Maduro regime, the opposition leadership considered that sooner rather than later an internal breakdown would occur, especially among the security forces.

But the strategy did not work, nor did the subsequent attempts at negotiation with the regime. On the contrary, this miscalculation served Chavismo to purge its ranks of defectors and succeeded in dismantling the opposition from the only scenario in which it has been successful: the electoral arena.

After the military expulsion of the deputies from the Federal Legislative Palace in January 2020 and the establishment of a new board of directors, Chavism disregarded the powers of the current legislature and imposed new electoral authorities, new regulations, new boards of directors in the majority of the parties, and unconstitutionally expanded the number of seats in the National Assembly. These actions occur while the accelerated impoverishment of the population continues, massive forced migration continues, and vulnerability increases in the face of the expansion of the COVID19 in a country with an almost non-existent health system.

It should be noted that Venezuela has a bitter precedent on issues of abstention. The withdrawal of the opposition from the 2005 parliamentary elections brought about disastrous political, economic and legal results, the effects of which are still felt today. During the 2005-2010 legislature, the current anti-democratic legal architecture was built and all parliamentary mechanisms for budgetary control were handed over, which allowed the consequent expansion of plundering and Chavista corruption.

Despite this precedent, the opposition has reiterated its lack of knowledge about the legislative elections of 2020

Despite this precedent, the opposition has reiterated its lack of knowledge about the legislative elections of 2020 and has proposed instead new mobilizations and even a popular consultation. However, abstaining will not lead to a strengthening of unity, nor will it help to maintain international support once the constitutional mandate of the parliamentary opposition ends in January 2021.

While current electoral conditions could not be worse, abstention would end up being a blind alley with no strategic value for the future. For even in the face of defeat, the organizational effort involved in any election could allow the opposition to rebuild the strategic unity lost, renew its leadership and progressively recover the social support of a new demographic reality. In this way, it could recalculate its strategies in the face of a geopolitics that is increasingly disjointed and erratic about the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis.

For now, these controversial legislative elections could end up consolidating the transition to a much more restrictive regime. A new political system in which all public powers are hegemonically controlled and the new opposition is kept under guardianship, imprisoned, disqualified, exiled and divided. All this in the face of the humanitarian suffering resulting from a political collapse that today seems far from being resolved.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by Carlos Adampol at Foter.com / CC BY-SA

U.S. Politics resembles third world countries ‘ones

Carlos de la Torre
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U.S. Politics resembles third world countries ‘ones

When Donald Trump surprised pollsters and analysts by winning the 2016 election, South African comedian Trevor Noah said the United States finally had an African president and I would add a Latin American one too. Trump lives up to former Ecuadorian President Abdullah Bucaram in his vulgarity and machismo. While Bucaram claimed that his rivals had watery semen, Trump bragged about grabbing any woman he wanted. Like Latin American politicians who don’t separate the office of president from their business, the New York Times reported how Trump’s hotel and club businesses benefited during his presidency. Similar to other populists who deny the possibility that people will not vote for them, Trump has said that if he loses it will be by fraud and has not committed to accepting the election results.

What happened to American democracy? How did it get to the point where a president and about half the population would seem willing to ignore the elections results if they don’t win? Unlike when the Democratic and Republican parties competed for the average voter and had similar proposals, these parties have become polarized. The culture wars marked two camps that now have different lifestyles.

The Republicans are majoritarian white, Christian, anti-sate intervetionist party that seeks to reverse policies of cultural recognition

The Democrats are more secular and progressive, including feminists, non-white groups, and LGBT communities. The Republicans are majoritarian white, Christian, anti-sate intervetionist party that seeks to reverse policies of cultural recognition for non-whites, women, lesbians, and gays.

Primary elections that sought to democratize political parties have allowed radicalized groups to manage their agendas. While right-wing activists took over the Republican party, Democratic party elites contained left-wing groups. The parties acted with the logic of social movements. The left politicized socioeconomic differences between 99 percent and 1 percent. The right rebelled against changes in racial, generational, and gender power, seeking to return to a mythical past in which women, non-whites, and homosexuals were in place.

When Trump announced his candidacy by stating that Mexicans are criminals, the ground was prepared for a politician who would give voice to xenophobic, racist sectors and those who sought to impose their faith over all of society. Trump was the spearhead of a movement of whites who felt crushed by “political correctness”. They found Trump’s words liberating. Christian fundamentalists and Catholics supported him as he promised to put in place conservative judges to end abortion rights, gay marriage, and state meddling in health policy.

After four years, Trump has maintained the support of conservative groups, the fundamentalist churches are mobilizing the faithful in his favor, and he has resurrected anti-communism and fear of change. His big advantage is that his followers will go out and vote and probably support him if he says there was electoral fraud. The Democrats are benefiting from Trump’s inability to control Covid, the economic crisis, and polarization fatigue. However, it is less certain that Democrats will go out and vote, mainly because many Bernie Sanders supporters do not feel represented by Joe Biden nor Kamala Harris.

Populism is legitimized at the ballot box, when elections do not decide populisms mutate into dictatorships.

Populism is legitimized at the ballot box, when elections do not decide populisms mutate into dictatorships. 2020 could be the year of the pandemic, of the strongest economic crisis since the 1930s and the year in which American democracy died. Or, alternatively, the year in which democracy survived despite all adversities.

Trump is more a symptom of a political system and a society in need of reform than its cause. The United States is a deeply unequal country, where police kill ethnic minorities with impunity and where the bonds of solidarity among citizens have been cut. It is a polarized society in which politics cannot be discussed at family gatherings and in which wearing a mask in an epidemic is a political act. If Trump is unmindful of Biden’s triumph, he could be inviting confrontations in the streets and for the military to decide who is the future president, as happened in so many so-called third world countries where the armed forces are still the arbiters of democracy.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by Alek S. at Foter.com / CC BY

The return of MAS (and Evo Morales)

José Orlando Peralta
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The return of MAS (and Evo Morales)

The short summer of the anti-MAS bloc in Bolivia lasted almost a year, as the newly elected president, Luis Arce Catacora (MAS), will have to be sworn in November or December of this year. The possible return of Evo Morales generates joy to some and discomfort to others, but the triumph of his candidate (dolphin) is evidence that his political scent is highly developed. For their part, the defeated candidates, Carlos Mesa and Luis Fernando Camacho, will have to assume the role of the opposition – a fragmented minority – with the burden on their shoulders of having repeated the same political errors of the past: not recognizing that the national-popular logic is predominant in popular sectors and indigenous groups (the majority) that live on the peripheries of the capital cities of La Paz and Santa Cruz.

How do you explain the new political scenario in Bolivia?

Preliminary results have corroborated the idea that in much of the Bolivian social imaginary Luis Arce has the best profile to lead the country’s economy. His condition as ex-finance minister during the time of economic prosperity, when many people came out of extreme poverty and the middle class expanded, has been his best presentation card at a critical moment: when the pandemic left many families unemployed and dragged them back into poverty, even worse, with the poor management in the economic and public health areas and the acts of corruption in the administration of interim president Jeanine Añez.

On the other hand, the campaign of candidate Carlos Mesa was weak and without impact. His political discourse said nothing new; in fact, it was deployed under the discursive parameters of the MAS in relation to the administration of strategic state enterprises. A pragmatic position if we consider that the role of the State in the management of the economy and generation of sources of employment has a high level of acceptance among the citizenry. In summary, Mesa was a candidate for television and video in social networks, not on the street. Social distance (his age a risk factor during the pandemic) was taken very seriously during the campaign, but its cost was quite high. 

In the case of Luis Fernando Camacho, his discursive strategy was based on the fact that he was a candidate who represented the renewal of the Bolivian political class, a man devotedl to the religious faith (Catholic and Christian) and the new political leader that the eastern region of Bolivia (mainly the department of Santa Cruz) needed. His background: having confronted Evo Morales in 2019 and then provoked his resignation -when there was supposedly fraud- generated his credentials to run for president. However, it was a failure. The region-youth symbiosis had an effect on only 14.1% of the voters – according to the Jubilee quick count (an institution with high credibility in the development of surveys of voting intentions) – and marked a social polarization with the East versus West divide.

What are the challenges of the new president-elect?

Although for a large part of the population (voters) Luis Arce has the necessary credits to manage the State’s finances in the context of a pandemic that has economically affected the most vulnerable population, he also has the great challenge of strengthening democratic institutions. If the majority in the new Plurinational Assembly (parliament) is represented by his party (MAS) – as is planned – then he will have a free hand to set the agenda for various pending issues and problems. However, if the agenda of issues of the minority is made unfeasible in its entirety, not much progress will have been made. If the officialdom neutralizes the opposition politically and the opposition remains fragmented and disoriented, we will have a new administration characterized by the cacophony of the opposition and the onslaught of the opposition. Nothing new under the stars in Bolivia.

It is necessary to emphasize that, in the international context, the triumph of MAS has been a half-court goal by the Latin American progressive left. Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel touted: “Congratulations to MAS, which has recovered at the polls the power that was usurped by the oligarchy, with the complicity of the OAS and imperial guidance.  For his part, the former Ecuadorian president, Rafael Correa, wrote: Jallalla Bolivia! A hug to the brothers Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca. With their leadership, together with Evo and Alvaro, our beloved Bolivia returns to its people, returns also to the Great Homeland”.

a great doubt that remains in the air is the independence-dependence and closeness-leaving between Arce and Morales.

Now then, a great doubt that remains in the air is the independence-dependence and closeness-leaving between Arce and Morales. Will Luis Arce have his own style of governing? Or will Morales be the one to pull the strings of power? Only time will tell. For now, the truth is that he has won an election with his own merits and will have as his running mate the former foreign minister David Choquehuanca – he is considered to be “the last Inca” – who was elected by various indigenous and popular organizations, mainly from the west of the country, to be the vice-presidential candidate. Here another question arises: to what extent are their respective visions and agendas on the state, economy and society of Arce and Choquehuanca coincident?

This will be the fourth time that MAS reaches the national government with broad electoral support and a new pair with different profiles from their predecessors: a president with the image of a technocrat and a vice president with the face of an indigenous person. The return of MAS to the government and of Evo Morales to the country are two political events that transmit, in parallel, anger for some and hope for others. “We are going to govern for all Bolivians, we are going to build a government of national unity,” was one of Arce’s messages as president-elect. Let’s hope that these words are not carried away by the wind and that the new president shows that he will do everything possible to put them into practice, because there is a lot of need.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Foto por Casa de América en Foter.com / CC BY-NC-ND

The challenges of Latin America in the face of economic recovery

Gustavo Cuesta Rugel
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The challenges of Latin America in the face of economic recovery

The COVID-19 pandemic will bring the worst socio-economic crisis in the last 100 years in Latin America. According to the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2020, the region’s economy will contract by 9.1%, per capita income will fall to 2010 levels, unemployment will reach on average 13.5% and the poverty rate will reach 37.3%. Additionally, the magnitude of the current crisis and the already fragile state of the region’s economy before the pandemic foresee a slow recovery that would imply the shrinking of the middle class and a lost decade in the social sphere.

In view of this unprecedented and complex scenario, the region will have to face a series of challenges in order to move towards an economic recovery.

The first challenge is to deal with the uncertainty brought about by COVID-19. The countries in the region, like the rest of the world, don’t have the certainty about the pandemic’s duration, the intensity of possible outbreaks, timely access to a vaccine, the magnitude of the socio-economic deterioration, the costs of the crisis and its eventual financing.

In addition, political and social tensions over the pandemic’s management already exist in several countries, which are also headed for polarized electoral processes in the coming months. These facts will not likely allow to build an agenda with minimum consensus to solve the current problems and to move towards the reactivation of economic activity. 

prospects for the region were not the most optimistic even  before the pandemic.

On the economic front, prospects for the region were not the most optimistic even  before the pandemic. In its Economic Study for 2019, ECLAC warned about  stagnation and deceleration of Latinamerica’s growth. In order to offset the unexpected health crisis and its first economic and social consequences, countries have resorted to conventional and non-conventional macroeconomic policies (direct financing from central banks to the government coffers) and to a significant increase in public debt. These measures, together with the effects that confinement had on variables, including employment, production and demand, have worsened pre-existing macroeconomic imbalances.

In this scenario, the second challenge for countries is to recover and maintain macroeconomic balances while implementing short- and medium-term policies to provide liquidity to the economy, protect employment, reactivate output and boost aggregate demand. Doing all this together, would imply national agreements and economic reforms, in many cases structural, in all sectors of the economy.

The challenge (and opportunity), is that these reforms allow redirecting the region’s production model towards a sustainable development and growth, with higher productivity and innovation, and less dependence on the primary sector. In the area of labor, it is essential to generate policies that, among other things, reduce wage gaps due to gender and ethnic differences, informality and youth unemployment. At the fiscal level, progress must be made towards building progressive tax systems that improve income distribution in the region and allow for greater sustainability in public finances.

Before the health crisis, debt levels in the continent had increased.

Before the health crisis, debt levels in the continent had increased. The challenge now is to avoid over-indebtedness, ensure liabilities’ sustainability and that future financing has favorable conditions. In the monetary and financial sector, the challenge is to keep exchange rate systems stable and provide liquidity to the economy.

The third challenge for Latin America lies in the social sphere. The pandemic and its effects have highlighted the weakness and fragility of the region’s social protection systems, especially in rural and marginal urban areas. In these areas, characterized by high levels of poverty and inequity, the lack of access to essential public services, such as drinking water and sewage, and the difficulties in accessing the public health system have increased the vulnerability of the population to the virus and aggravated their living conditions. Additionally, there are problems for children and young people to continue their education in virtual or partially face-to-face modalities due to the lack of equipment and technological infrastructure in several areas of the region.

Faced with this problem, it is an urgent call for the region to implement policies that strengthen social protection, access to essential public services and guarantee food security. This would not only reduce the vulnerability of the population, but also avoid a further fall in aggregate demand.

The crisis has also shown the weak and ineffective regional integration. Joint initiatives to address the problems caused by the pandemic have been scarce, both at the beginning of the pandemic and at the moment of writing this article. Deepening Latin American integration in this context is an additional challenge that could allow, for example, the construction of a regional agenda to reactivate production and socio-economic development, promote regional trade and joint access to potential vaccines against COVID-19 at lower cost.

The challenges posed pose a difficult and complex panorama for Latin America in the short and long term. However, the production reactivation policies promoted by the countries must be more than an instrument for overcoming the health and economic crisis. They must also be an opportunity to build a more integrated Latin America, with less social polarization, more solid economies and greater social justice.

*Translation from Spanish by Ricardo Aceves

Photo of Santiago Sito in Foter.com / CC BY-NC-ND

Let’s Tear Down All Statues!

Juan Francisco Camino
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Let’s Tear Down All Statues!

Every year, with the arrival of October 12th, in most of the Hispanic American countries, opposing positions emerge around the Spanish colonization, which began in 1492 and ended in the first half of the 19th century with the processes of independence. Ecuador is not an exception: while for some the existence of a so-called “black legend” has generated an imaginary of revenge, repudiation and hatred towards what was the Spanish Empire, for others it is a date that recalls more than 500 years of resistance by the native peoples, who have had to endure the plundering, suffering and submission to colonial and republican authority. 

On the occasion of the date, statues of different characters from the colonial era have been torn down or vandalized in different cities in Latin America and the United States. In the case of Ecuador, some groups of indigenous protesters and others calling themselves “Hispanists” found in the statue of Isabel the Catholic the ideal space to express their positions regarding the colonial period and introduce into public discussion the old debate about the Spanish presence in America.

But in a country like Ecuador, where throughout its history imaginaries of charismatic leaders have been created, based on supposed divine mandates or messianic inspirations, and whose authority is articulated around the figure of the “enlightened one”, the existence of monuments that recall those leaders is, without a doubt, harmful. A history plagued by the Schmittian distinction of “friend and enemy,” which reinforces the accounts of the goodness and sins of different leaders, distorts what has happened around these political processes and underscores the importance of understanding these processes as mechanisms for the search for power; as means to achieve specific ends.

The existence of a historical memory, which focuses on individuals and not on processes, prevents us from seeing that behind these idealized figures there were always other actors without whom their success would have been impossible. Such is the case of African Americans who, in the process of emancipation of the American republics, changed their lives for the possibility of leaving slavery. There are also the Indians, who with their work and despite the opposition of the landowning elites, helped build roads that allowed greater internal trade in the period known as “Garcianism” (1859-1875). Or the participation of a coastal elite in the expansion, with liberal ideas, which had its culmination in the revolution of June 5, 1895.

feeding the myths related to the country’s heroes does nothing more than reproduce the existence of omnipresent figures in history, perpetuating the logic of “beatification” or “demonization”.

In societies where politics is articulated around the cult of personality, and where populism is part of a political culture that is opposed to the institutions of liberal democracy, feeding the myths related to the country’s heroes does nothing more than reproduce the existence of omnipresent figures in history, perpetuating the logic of “beatification” or “demonization”. So much so that it is not surprising that the definition of the indigenous people as an “abject and miserable class” in the 1830 Constitution is still ignored (despite the fact that they have already “freed us from Iberian oppression”), or that 145 years after his death, Gabriel García Moreno is still considered a “martyr president”. Among other similar cases, some still consider that Eloy Alfaro Delgado (leader of the liberal revolution of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries) was the only builder of the railroad that linked the coast with the mountains (a work that began in 1873), and what is worse, that in the middle of the twenty-first century, former president Rafael Correa is considered the “successor” of the Alfaro’s liberal project.

If we want to revise history, let it be by deconstructing our “messiahs” and not by “whitewashing” violent processes of domination, as some groups are currently advocating, especially through social networks. Continuing to remember the leaders through a narrative that puts them above the rest of the mortals, will not change that imaginary that seeks the return of a “chosen one”, that “will save the country”. A democracy with strong institutions is needed, and to achieve it, it is not enough with an institutional design that allows its operation, but a political culture that favors it.

And, perhaps, one of the main challenges for Ecuadorian society is precisely to build that political culture that allows for a real understanding of the meaning of democracy. A democracy that recognizes the pluralism of worldviews, historical constructions and political positions, so necessary for a political balance that guarantees the full exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms. A political culture that favors political participation far from threats, violence and disrespect between opposing positions; that allows for greater inclusion and competition of historically excluded sectors, and thus, to move away from the authoritarian and totalitarian ghosts, which also feed on the warlords. That is why, not only should the statues of colonizers, colonized or of those who have governed us be pulled down; they should all be pulled down!

*Translation from Spanish by Ricardo Aceves

Photo by C. Matges at Foter.com / CC BY

Argentina: Peronisms of all colors

Fabián Bosoer
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Argentina: Peronisms of all colors

So much has been written and said about October 17, 1945 in Argentina. A founding myth, a historical hinge and watershed, an iconic date that is identified with the birth of Peronism. A living component of the historical-political narrative that began 75 years ago and endures to these days. And a “kaleidoscopic artifact”: depending on how it turns, it places the pieces of what happened that day when Perón was first acclaimed in the Plaza de Mayo. Was it a spontaneous mobilization? Meaning, “the people fighting a direct battle with the oligarchy and triumphing as a consequence of a mass policy,” as John William Cooke defined it. Or an orchestrated staging made by the power?, as described by other authors. Did it mean a revolution “from below” or “from above”? A social revolution or a restorative replacement to prevent such revolutionary change? 

On that day, for the first time, people demonstrating on the streets twisted the arm of a military dictatorship. It then consecrated the former strongman of that same dictatorship as the new popular leader, at the head of a mass political movement identified with the cause of the workers and the banner of social justice. 

a revolutionary phenomenon, because it came to change the prevailing status quo. But also conservative, because it will aspire to restore a social balance that it considers threatened or altered by exogenous or “distorting” factors

Were the masses of workers, who were bursting in as the main actor, weighing more, the pronouncements of the trade union organizations or the palace intrigues and political-military movements in the circles of power? As we pointed out in several works with Santiago Senén González, Peronism´s birth certificate will carry that contradictory and multifaceted characteristic that will mark its course. It will be a revolutionary phenomenon, because it came to change the prevailing status quo. But also conservative, because it will aspire to restore a social balance that it considers threatened or altered by exogenous or “distorting” factors (“the anti-people,” “the oligarchy,” “the class struggle,” “neoliberalism,” and so on and so forth…).

A fact whose significance was changing and contradictory also for foreign observers. Not only because of the importance it had for international public opinion, foreign relations and especially relations between the United States and Latin America. But also because of the high incidence that this external view had on the evolution of events and on the behavior of the main actors. 

Between mid-1945 and early 1946, in barely four months, the main source of concern that Argentina represented for the United States took a drastic change of course: the blinking beacon of the “Nazi threat” in South America was turned off on the maps of the State Department and the Pentagon; instead, the warning lights were turned on to the “communist danger” in the south of the continent. 

Perón, whose leadership was wrapped up in the Prussian militarism and anti-liberal populism that ruffled the feathers of the majority of Western diplomats and observers of the 1940s, managed to build a strategy and a doctrine -the Third Position- that would allow him to accumulate and maintain domestic power against the left and right and adapt to a new geopolitical hibernation, from neutrality during the Second War to the Third Position during the Cold War. Decades later, the scene will be repeated, represented by another colonel who admired one of the first versions of Perón and who was at the helm of his own revolution in Venezuela, with aspirations to export it to the rest of Latin America in his anti-imperialist crusade against Washington: Commander Hugo Chávez,

It was also in this interaction, between the domestic and external dimensions of politics, that Peronism was forged with multiple facets,  striking a balance between antagonisms, but also including those antagonisms in its own midst. With the dramatic consequences that this brought about throughout its history. On the one hand, its remarkable capacity for adaptation and durability. 

regimes that went from the “neo-liberal populism” of Carlos Menem to the “progressive populism” of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner. 

Peronism was installed in the nation during the leader’s first 29 years until his death, the first ten in power, the next 17 from exile and outlawing, and the last ten, already old, with the installation of the last dictatorship. And since the recovery of democracy, in 1983, 25 years in government and 12 in opposition, with regimes that went from the “neo-liberal populism” of Carlos Menem to the “progressive populism” of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner. 

That same versatility of Peronism to go along with the changes of time, containing the extremes of the political spectrum and maintaining the conflict by marking the diffuse and dividing line between “friends” and “enemies,” will also be its own limitation and problem. At the moment when the political cycles are exhausted or its internal contradictions and the disputes for the vacant or diminishing leadership explode. 

Argentina’s current political moment maintains the dynamic of that historical process and the crises that derive from it: a leadership, that of Cristina Kirchner, which persists in the government at the cost of staying in the background as vice president, as ” the power in the shadows”. And a government, that of President Alberto Fernández, which is struggling with a real power that restricts his maneuvering capacity to gain his own strength, and transcend the “charismatic moment” of the one who designated him as a candidate. Variants of the same phenomenon, typical of a particular country. But as Alain Rouquié pointed out in “The Century of Perón. An Essay on Hegemonic Democracies”, does not belong only to the past nor is it exclusive to a particular country in South America. 

Copyright Clarín, 2020.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by hernanpba on Foter.com / CC BY-SA

Constitution and pandemic times in Chile

Isabel Castillo
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Constitution and pandemic times in Chile

On October 25, Chile will face its most important election since 1988, when a plebiscite began the transition to democracy. In 2020, again through a plebiscite, the citizenry will be able to decide whether to initiate a process to replace the constitution inherited from the Pinochet regime (“approval” or “rejection” options) and the type of convention that will have to draft it (“mixed convention” composed of half of practicing parliamentarians and half newly elected officials, or the “constitutional convention” with 100% elected members for that purpose). This process, the result of a cross-cutting political agreement, seeks to institutionally channel the crisis that broke out in October 2019, in which the bases of the development model were called into question in a context of extensive, prolonged and heavily repressed protests.

Both the protests and the election process were frozen in mid-March with the arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic. The plebiscite, initially scheduled for April, had to be postponed as political discussion shifted to healthcare and the social and economic effects of the pandemic. Beyond the postponement, the pandemic has had effects on two different arenas of discussion.

On the one hand, as in other countries, the pandemic has had uneven consequences. The possibility of effective quarantine is reduced given the poor conditions of habitability, unemployment and informality that afflict important sectors of the population. The pandemic has also revealed the little progress made in gender equality, particularly in the area of care and how fragile the incorporation of women into the labor market has been. These issues become relevant considering that, among the mobilized actors, feminist organizations have played a leading role.

Once infected, the lethality of the virus is also heterogeneous. Recently, the testimony of a former official of the Ministry of Health indicates that people infected with the virus who have public health insurance are 86% more likely to die than those with private insurance, which is supported by preliminary analyses regarding the territorial distribution of the dead. These debates kept on the agenda the fundamental criticism of the multiple and deep inequalities and segregations existing in the country that the constitutional debate seeks to address.

the pandemic, left aside the electoral discussion on how to carry out the plebiscite

On the other hand, the pandemic, left aside the electoral discussion on how to carry out the plebiscite. Until the end of July, when it was approved to allow the withdrawal of 10% of individual pension funds as a measure to alleviate the crisis, the political and legislative discussion was centered on the (late and insufficient) initiatives of the government to address the effects of unemployment and decreased income of an important part of the population. And implicitly, uncertainty persisted as to whether the health situation would allow for the holding of the plebiscite or whether it should be postponed again, avoiding any advance measures regarding the electoral process. Thus, it was only in August that special measures to carry out the plebiscite began to be discussed, when it was already very late.

Because of this postponement of the debate, it was finally determined that people infected with coronavirus (with a PCR+ test) will not be able to vote, depriving around 15,000 people of their right to vote. Alternatives such as home voting were briefly discussed, but there was not enough time for a legal change.

Moreover, there is the additional difficulty of creating a census in advance, since the list of infected persons varies on a daily basis, so this solution would probably be partial. Hopefully, the issue can be resolved well in advance of next year’s election processes, when we will likely still be in a pandemic. And the discussion put on the table the reality of other populations that are de facto unable to exercise their right to vote, such as people deprived of liberty who have not been accused of a crime that deserves full affliction.

Among the special measures that were adopted in order to achieve a safe plebiscite are the delivery of health kits to those who serve as table spokespersons, the incorporation of facilitators to ensure that the distance between people is respected, the extension of voting hours, the increase in the number of voting places to avoid crowding, and the establishment of a preferential schedule for the voting of older adults.

Chile has a voluntary vote and no minimum level of participation in the plebiscite is required

Chile has a voluntary vote and no minimum level of participation in the plebiscite is required. However, the level of participation is certainly linked to the legitimacy of the process and more than the result itself – there seems little doubt that the option will win – the big question is how many people will vote. This is despite the fact that comparative evidence shows that the pandemic has not significantly diminished the number of voters. In Chile, in the last presidential election, only 46 percent of the electorate voted. The polls predict between 60-70% participation, figures that show the process of politicization that has taken place in the last year. In any case, a halo of uncertainty remains.

In addition to the fear of contagion, there are other factors that can impact participation derived from the pandemic, but also from the lack of clarity of the authorities, late decisions and insufficient information. Campaign activities have been severely reduced, with no possibility of mass events, affecting the election climate to some extent. It is a question whether the adjustments made to the process – such as local voting changes or the extension of the hours – will be incorporated by the citizens. And with two weeks to go before the election, no free or discounted transportation alternatives have been announced.

The constituent process is rejected by minority but strong voices. Certainly, questioning and sabotage attempts will continue throughout the process, including when the convention must determine its rules of operation and when substantive debates are entered. Right-wing sectors will seek to keep the new constitution as close to the status quo as possible. Sectors of the extreme left, for their part, will be able to question the process if they do not meet its maximalist demands. Consequently, beginning the process with significant levels of participation, even more so in the midst of a pandemic, is the main argument for silencing the voices that question the legitimacy of constitutional change.

Foto de pslachevsky en Foter.com / CC BY-NC-SA

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