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Political parties: between love and hate

José Orlando Peralta
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Political parties: between love and hate

Political parties are necessary for democracy but at the same time they can provoke antipathy in the citizenry. For the famous political scientists Levitsky & Ziblatt (2018) they are the guardians of U.S. democracy, however, in Latin America the confidence in them reaches only 13% (Latinobarómetro 2018). This feeling of the citizens of the south of the continent towards political parties is worrying because of their importance for the conservation of representative democracy.

What does the academic literature say? For Santano, Barbosa and Kozicki (2015), “it is a fact that such organizations generate a duality of perceptions. It seems that, if there is politics, there are parties, since their existence is necessary for any democratic regime. However, they are also directly linked to the more nebulous side of public institutions, holding perhaps the most uncomfortable position within the public arena”. For political scientist Manuel Alcantara (2019), “For a century now, political parties have been a central element in democratic operations”.

parties are necessary for representative democracy because someone has to be elected through a political organization in order to govern.

Undoubtedly, parties are necessary for representative democracy because someone has to be elected through a political organization in order to govern. For example, in the year 2018 the Law of Political Organizations was approved in Bolivia – at the time of its application it was considered hasty and favorable to officialdom (MAS) – to regulate the activity of political groups. This is a necessary and relevant institutional design when the political personality is imposed on the party organization and the militants do not have much chance to decide.

Gender equity, internal democracy, financing and primary elections are aspects that contain the norm for improving the Bolivian party system. However, for now, the tactical pragmatism of the political actors continues to prevail: the internal democracy of the political organizations is subordinated to what is popularly known as “dedazo” (imposition of candidates from the top to the bases), therefore, they only serve as instruments that seek to win elections to administer the State and to grant public positions to its militancy.

According to Latinobarómetro 2018, the country with the greatest confidence in Latin America is Uruguay with 21%, while support in Venezuela is at 14%. This difference, of barely seven points, is very worrying due to the great differences in qualitative terms between the two countries. While in Uruguay, alternation in government works as a symptom of respect for the rules of the game, in Venezuela, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) wins all elections due to institutional manipulation.

This distrust towards the parties is a constant that, for the time being, seems to remain in place since corruption, corporatism, inequality and the absence of new narratives in a context of political polarization will remain in the medium term.

The parties are necessary to access the government. They are the ideal instrument of certain leaderships and personalities who are influential in the public sphere to obtain the legitimacy of the popular vote and, thus, to constitute themselves as representatives of an electoral majority that, when the public institutions and the parties are weak, decide on public matters according to their personal passions and the interests of the factions they lead.

In Latin America it is not strange that the president elected by popular vote is more important and decisive than the party

In Latin America it is not strange that the president elected by popular vote is more important and decisive than the party (now its instrument) in the political processes. For example, Jair Bolsonaro, Nicolás Maduro, and at one time Evo Morales, are political actors who represent a certain political-ideological current and embody presidentialism as gravitating political personalities who have often been above the law and respect for common sense.

They are personalities that reach power thanks to the popular vote as an effect of their sympathy with the demands of certain sectors of society. The other side of the coin is the institutional anemia of the political parties and the citizens’ distrust of their role as intermediaries and representatives. In Gramscian terms, its condition as the first cell in which the germs of the collective will that tend to become universal are synthesized no longer applies. They are simply useful as legal instruments that serve as ladders, but not as legitimate structures that generate identities, stories and commitments.

Being with and against political parties seems an oxymoron, but it is part of the Latin American socio-political reality. Moreover, parties have been suffering from a gap in social transformations as an effect of the development of communication technologies, and have not provided serious attention and forceful responses to climate change, among other problems. However, they are the guardians of democracy despite their weak institutionalism and high citizen distrust. 

Political parties are, without a doubt, the tools for accessing the exercise of government for charismatic leaders who strive to be heard, loved and voted for. But their condition as structures of democracy has expired. Nevertheless, these old vehicles still function as representative democracy has withstood the test of time. However, they have been reduced in space because they no longer express the collective will.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Foto de Globovisión en Foter.com / CC BY-NC

Vaccination (election) campaign in Brazil

Juan Vicente Bachiller
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Vaccination (election) campaign in Brazil

If there is one thing that cannot be blamed on Bolsonaro it is his lack of consistency in dealing with the health crisis unleashed by the coronavirus. If, since the beginning of the pandemic, he integrated, together with Trump, Johnson, or López Obrador, the group of country leaders who denied the need for social distancing, today, with the first one at the end of his mandate and the others adhering with the faith of the convert to different vaccination programs, the Brazilian president is the only one who continues to question the recommendations of the international scientific community.

Being consistent, however, is not the same as being consistent. Regardless of the terrible cost in human lives that this attitude is imposing on Brazil, the fact that the president is opposed to leading the fight against the pandemic in his country, a central issue in the global political agenda, may be a wrong strategy in order to maximize his chances of being re-elected in 2022. Denial may serve to entrench the most radicalized voters, but they are clearly insufficient to repeat the results of 2018.

when those who should be taking the lead give up their responsibility, alternative candidates immediately emerge to take their place.

Bolsonaro’s refusal to take a strong stand against the pandemic, first by avoiding social distancing measures and later by refusing to lead a vaccination campaign, has left a huge political hole. In the public sphere, however, these gaps are rapidly filling. Thus, when those who should be taking the lead give up their responsibility, alternative candidates immediately emerge to take their place.

The so-called rally ‘round the flag effect could be defined as “the phenomenon of rallying behind the flag” under exceptional circumstances such as a war or a crisis of great magnitude. This effect has been seen during the coronavirus crisis where one can see how citizens often give massive support to the government.

However, since Bolsonaro, instead of taking a statesman’s attitude and leading the nation, has dedicated himself once again to his culture wars, blaming sometimes the scientific community, sometimes China and sometimes governors and mayors, the flag of the fight against the pandemic, which was on the ground and trampled on, ended up being raised by others. The opportunity began to be taken advantage of  already during the months of confinement by different governors who had to take charge of the situation. The most prominent is João Doria in the state of São Paulo.

if Bolsonaro intended to slip away from his responsibility and transfer it to the lower levels of government, the fact is that the move did not end up going the way he had hoped.

But if Bolsonaro intended to slip away from his responsibility and transfer it to the lower levels of government, the fact is that the move did not end up going the way he had hoped. Doria, the governor of the largest state in the country, immediately took over a large media space to present himself as the ruler who would lead the fight against the pandemic.

The media projection of Doria, from the State of São Paulo to the rest of the country, started to happen once, after the launching of the different vaccines, the exit from the crisis started to be seen in the horizon. However, its success will be consolidated as long as the population is massively immunized.

On the other hand, Bolsonaro, besides ignoring the measures of social isolation, dealt with the issue of vaccine provision in an ideological way. He refused to guarantee the supply of those coming from China, while negligently being unable to guarantee the priority in the supply of those developed in Europe and the United States. 

Taking advantage of the opportunity, the state of São Paulo has guaranteed, through the Butantan Institute, a research center dependent on the São Paulo government, the production of the Chinese vaccine developed by Coronavac. In this way, Governor Doria is currently able to implement a vaccination campaign not only for his state, but for the whole country.

If Doria’s expectations are met, he would become the authority to lead the way out of the health crisis, in the face of the obstructionist attitude of a president who by voluntary neglect, incapacity, or both, has been more of a problem than a solution in this crisis.

In this way, the vaccination campaign, besides being an extraordinary effort to restore public health conditions in the country, becomes the first episode of the 2022 elections. For this reason, the Bolsonaro government is trying to stop the aspirations of Doria’s plan to vaccinate the entire Brazilian population, which would make him a leader at the national level. Either by trying to jump on the bandwagon of the campaign and trying to centralize it, or by discrediting the effectiveness of the vaccines and discouraging their use by the population.

However, the fact that Doria may, on his own merit and due to presidential ineptitude, momentarily become the flag bearer of the national vaccination does not guarantee him, by any means, an advantageous starting position in the next elections. Given that there are still two years to go before the election, which is an eternity in Brazilian politics, at this moment the only thing that can be said is that Doria has presented his credentials.

To become a candidate to be considered, first of all, the axis of the confrontation must leave the “Lula vs. Bolsonaro” dynamic in which the President is currently quite comfortable. This would require the more than unlikely resignation by the Partido dos Trabalhadores to present a strong candidate in 2022. In turn, the center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party, to which Doria belongs, should improve its electoral penetration throughout the territory, currently limited to the southeast, specifically the state of São Paulo.

Bolsonaro decided to bet on the denialist position

Be that as it may, what is clear is that in the present circumstances, the fundamental factor in explaining the rise or fall of the various political leaderships throughout the world is the way in which the pandemic has been dealt with. Bolsonaro decided to bet on the denialist position and, true to his style, to opt for confrontation against imaginary enemies instead of trying to manage the crisis.

Although it is too early to assess whether this strategy could cause him to lose his mandate in 2022, what is clear is that with his mistakes he has allowed the emergence of alternative candidates in the right-wing camp. It seems, therefore, that in the next elections there will be new contenders, and that the “petismo-antipetismo axis” will not be the only relevant one. In these circumstances, João Doria will be able to present himself as the candidate who led the fight against the pandemic.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by Senado Federal on Foter.com / CC BY

Presidential Instability and the “Survival” of Sebastian Piñera

Christopher Martínez
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Presidential Instability and the “Survival” of Sebastian Piñera

Since October 18, 2019, Chile has gone from being one of the most stable countries – “a true oasis in a convulsed Latin America” in the words of President Sebastián Piñera (Oct. 9, 2019) – to one whose government periodically struggles to stay afloat. Since 1990, none of Chile’s presidents had experienced a scenario in which there was any doubt as to whether they would be able to complete their presidential term or not.

Not even the massive street protests of 2011 came to destabilize Sebastián Piñera (first administration, 2010-2014) to such an extent. Demonstrations demanding profound reforms to the education system had a serious impact on Piñera’s popularity. But at no point was there a widespread call for his resignation. Nor had a constitutional indictment (impeachment) been attempted in Congress against a president in the post-Pinochet era.

Growing Presidential Instability

However, that pattern changed dramatically after W18, as discussion and requests for early termination of the Piñera administration became frequent. Massive protests – especially during October-December 2019 – against the political class and the president, demanding his resignation, have been commonplace. In addition, in December 2019, there were attempts to bring constitutional charges against Piñera, an initiative that, however, failed. This request for a constitutional indictment was the second against a sitting president in the history of Chile (the first president to be indicted constitutionally was Carlos Ibañez in 1956, although that initiative was not successful).

For Piñera, the risk of being forced out of office was much greater at the end of 2019. His public interventions declaring that Chile was in “war” against a “powerful enemy” were at odds with the need to offer a political solution to the crisis. The brutal use of police repression that left hundreds of people with temporary and permanent eye damage illustrated how the Piñera administration did not have much to offer in terms of a way out of the crisis.

Fortunately, as is often the case in countries with relatively strong parties with a medium to long term vision, on November 25, 2019 sectors of the ruling party along with those of the center-left and left opposition agreed to sign an agreement that set in motion a process to decide whether to change the 1980 Constitution. This temporary solution to the crisis gave Piñera a breathing space.

Early elections: A solution to the crisis?

Several analysts have indicated that Piñera’s government ended on October 18, because from that moment on he only had to administer the country in a situation of socio-political crisis and, now, of public health. The reforms of Piñera’s program, if any, will not be implemented. To the calls from the “street” to leave office (although from increasingly reduced groups), one must add the recent proposal of some leftist deputies to bring forward the elections for president and Congress.

There are several problems associated with the current president not finishing his constitutional term. First, the request of the deputies does not make much sense, since they are asking to hold presidential and legislative elections in April 2021, even though general elections are scheduled for November of the same year. In other words, the advance is -in the best of cases- symbolic, benefiting mainly those who request it because of the media’s protagonism, and not the country.

Second, the crisis that Chile is experiencing would be solved by Piñera’s early departure if only its origins depended on the presidential administration itself. In Latin America, several presidential crises have been solved by removing the president when they has either been directly involved in corruption scandals or has tried to subvert the constitutional order. Undoubtedly, President Piñera’s performance has been poor. But Chile is not living a crisis of government, but of politics, caused by years of disconnection of the parties from the citizenry, while maintaining an unhealthy relationship with the large economic groups. Removing the president does not solve the problem.

Third, the premature end of Piñera’s government does not in itself mean a way out of the crisis. It would only be if there was a sufficiently organized coalition with strong electoral support. Unfortunately for the country, although fortunately for Piñera, this does not exist. What most characterizes Chilean politics today is a growing anarchy. There is a vacuum of power in the political leadership in the hands of the executive and a growing indiscipline, radicalism, short-termism and personalism in Congress. On the other hand, there are no leaderships with broad popular support that can replace Piñera, since only a couple of politicians surpass the 10% of voting intention as president in the polls.

The busy 2021 electoral calendar may help Sebastián Piñera to finish his term as he will focus the attention of the citizenry and the energy of the parties. That doesn’t mean the president will escape the political responsibilities of his administration. It is perfectly possible that the opposition will consider it prudent to allow him to complete his presidential term, and then seek to indict him constitutionally once he leaves office, similar to what happened to former Presidents Carlos Ibañez in 1931 and Arturo Alessandri in 1939.

Better times after Pinera?

On the other hand, Chile must be alert to the emergence of potential personalist and anti-party leaderships from the power vacuum evidenced by Piñera. But optimistically, there is still time for coalitions and parties to organize for the 2021 elections. Moreover, these same parties demonstrated pragmatism and long-term vision when they signed the agreement for a new Constitution in November 2019.

Finally, the recent primaries, the November 2021 presidential and legislative elections, as well as the April 2021 elections for mayors and councilors at the municipal level, governors and councilors at the regional level, and those who will make up the Constitutional Convention, should allow the parties to organize and think more strategically. This is an opportunity to reconnect with their militants and try to charm again a citizenry that wants to be heard.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by Vocería de Gobierno on Foter.com / CC BY-SA

Chile and State Repression

Tokichen Tricot
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Chile and State Repression

Last week again a person suffered the loss of an eye during a protest in Santiago de Chile. A photojournalist, who was keeping records of the demonstrations, joins the shameful list of hundreds of eye victims since the beginning of the October 2019 revolt. This happens shortly after the return of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrés Allamand, who walked through different countries in Europe trying to clean up the international image left by the government of Sebastián Piñera. Praise for the constituent process, the inevitability of social upheavals in countries that “progress” and the positive image of the country abroad were part of the discursive battery deployed by the Foreign Minister. Needless to say, the four reports of human rights violations that occurred in the country in the last year were not a central part of his journey.

Currently, thanks to popular mobilization, the country has become involved in a Constituent process of unprecedented characteristics. There are and will continue to be, as is to be expected, discussions that hegemonize public debate such as who will be able to participate in the process; how the constituents will be elected; the implementation of parity, quotas reserved for indigenous people, the election of candidates, the formation of coalitions and alliances, among many other topics. 

it is not without significance that in the 21st century the distinctive characteristics of the State’s response are the use of violence and human rights violations.

However, despite this democratizing transit that seeks to change the Constitution, it seems not only necessary, but imperative, to learn from our recent past. That the right wing, heir to Pinochetism, denies, trivializes or makes invisible human rights violations is not new. But it is not without significance that in the 21st century the distinctive characteristics of the State’s response are the use of violence and human rights violations.

The extensive use of repressive practices was believed to be a thing of the past. At least for the common people who considered that the police actions that left a sad toll of death, torture, mutilation, and massive repression had been eradicated and were incongruent with democracy. This is true for the majority, since the Mapuche communities and organizations that are politically active have been denouncing the harassment, militarization, criminalization, and racism that the Carabineros systematically suffer.

In the imaginary war against the internal enemy, also imaginary, that President Piñera declared on October 21, 2019, no resources have been spared in vehemently and violently protecting the status quo, resorting to the Armed Forces, the Investigative Police, but mainly the Carabineros as the institution at the head of the repression. The ethically reprehensible or directly criminal action of the police, however, is not new and has resulted in a progressive and lapidary discrediting of the citizenry.

Nor are the concepts and ideological practices of war and the internal enemy already used by the dictatorship, which resulted in a myriad of killings, disappearances and torture, new.

Despite this, in the transition that was agreed upon with the dictatorship, there was little justice. Many of the human rights violations perpetrated by the security agencies remained unpunished and usefully forgotten, leaving phrases such as “justice insofar as possible” of former President Patricio Aylwin for transitional memory. Or the warnings about the impossibility of investigating torture that occurred during the dictatorship, as the then Minister José Miguel Insulza stated.

However, thanks to the persistent work and dedication of organizations that were part of the then strong human rights movement, the state was pressured to make two important contributions to the country’s historical memory. The report of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig Report) which addressed executions, disappearances and political violence after the military coup. And the report of the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (Valech Report) which addressed the abject torture and degrading treatment carried out by agents of the dictatorship during its 17 years.

Both reports were relevant because they exposed many of the falsehoods built up since the dictatorship to justify the horrors committed. However, neither report provided data on the perpetrators of the violations, despite the numerous testimonies collected. There was partial truth, but no justice. There was memory, but not justice. 

It is vitally necessary to intervene with the Carabineros

In a country that for decades has shown itself to be an epitome of democratic quality, the repetition of denialist discourse about human rights violations and the omnipresent possibility of impunity for the crimes committed is not acceptable. It is vitally necessary to intervene with the Carabineros, an institution that according to the CEP survey has gone from having relatively high levels of institutional confidence (57% in 2015), to being one of the institutions that produces the most mistrust (17% in December 2019). 

This is due to the media exposure of the million-dollar corruption case involving high ranking officers of the institution, where a group of special forces tried to hide the murder of a Mapuche community member in 2018 and the frame-up of eight imprisoned Mapuche leaders with false evidence, in 2017. This added to the actions of the institution in the framework of the protests unleashed since October, in which for 88% of Chilean Carabineros human rights were violated.

This leads us to ask ourselves at what point these situations stop being “just isolated cases”, as argued by the government, and are only representative of a systemic evil? Or, to put it another way, shouldn’t the Carabineros be urgently intervened by the civil power or be directly refounded? Possibly this would be the only way for the institution, or another that succeeds it, to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.

On Wednesday, December 14, a journalist surprised President Piñera by asking him: how can you continue to govern with 7% approval? Beyond the iterative common places of his answer, one might ask if it is not the bullets, the gas and the repression of the Carabineros. All of which are unacceptable in a real democracy.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by abacq.org on Foter.com / CC BY-NC-ND

The Feminization of Politics

Esteban Caballero
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The Feminization of Politics

Two processes are taking place today that refer us to important flags of the feminist and women’s movement. We refer to the constitutional process in Chile and the bill for free and voluntary abortion in Argentina. The Chilean constituent will be the first constituent in the world that will have total gender parity, and the bill in Argentina responds to the commitment expressed by Alberto Fernandez to refer to the legislature an initiative that includes the demands of the movement for free, free and safe abortion. 

President Alberto Fernandez’s initiative, which has already received half a vote of support from the legislature, is probably the most delicate because it deals with an issue that triggers a polarization of public opinion and opposition from the Churches and anti-rights movements (self-styled “pro-life”). Both with great influence in society. Gender parity as a concept has not generated that level of polarization, but the regulations designed for the Chilean constituent have an unprecedented character, which is surprising.

Both processes would qualify as examples of a “feminization” of Latin American politics. For this reason, we would like to say the following: there is an emergence of political positions that include issues mobilized by the feminist and women’s movement. These positions are not easy to come by in electoral and transition situations.

Unless they are political parties or movements with a clear institutional positioning in favor of the feminist narrative, the choices made by parties and movements that are more electioneering, catch-all or center, center-left, are often tinged with cost-benefit calculations that depend on the direction that public sentiment on these issues is taking.

The ability to affect those calculations and choices has always been one of the challenges of feminist pragmatics. Even President Fernandez, who seems to us to have a genuine commitment to the above-mentioned initiative, had to be pushed by the social movement. Peronism, being a very plural and varied political movement, cannot be considered a political actor that would certainly be allied with feminism, but there is currently a certain shift.

The Chilean initiative also reflects the strength of the feminist and women’s movement. Its protagonism in social demonstrations and protests was particularly noteworthy. Chilean politics, beset by a phenomenon that questioned its own representative function, moved towards this parity armor as a result of pressure from the social movement.

The question we ask ourselves is whether these two processes are a harbinger of what could happen in the new electoral cycle that is approaching, with elections in Ecuador, Peru, and Chile in 2021 and others in 2022. There are countries in which it is clearly unlikely that a feminization of politics, in the sense we are giving it, will emerge with any force.

Paraguay, perhaps one of the most conservative countries in the region, will certainly not build those bridges with the women’s movement. The Peruvian elections will be a new Pandora’s box, but one can expect new young actors to enter the scene carrying that flag. If the last municipal elections in Brazil are any indication, Bolsonaro’s misogynist and neo-fascist tone is likely to decline, but a centrism without major innovations in the area of gender policies will remain.

the palette of options brought about by the feminization of politics is quite broad.

Nevertheless, the palette of options brought about by the feminization of politics is quite broad. The 2017-2019 electoral cycle saw a shift to the right in the region, but still several important issues were well established and represented consensus along the political arc. 

The generic concept of gender equality and the need to end violence against women were factors that virtually no one disputed. Equal pay and opportunities that give women a greater role in decision-making at all levels, as well as co-responsibility with men in domestic work and family care, were relatively stable parameters.

A breakdown in consensus occurred around issues related to sexual and reproductive rights, voluntary termination of pregnancy, and social and collective empowerment of the feminist movement. The famous “performance” of LasTesis about the “rapist in your way” and the accusing finger pointing at the State and systemic factors, are manifestations of autonomy and assertiveness that hurt the concessionary and patriarchal tone that the leaderships assume with respect to certain demands of women.

The more structural inequalities also caused significant opposition. For example, the whole debate on care and domestic work. The call for gender co-responsibility in domestic work as a private matter, resolved within the household, was one thing, but the valuation of unpaid domestic work and its inclusion in national accounts was another.

Feminism affects masculinity and views of it, the deeper aspects that clash with traditional patriarchal cultures

Culture and values are other decisive factors. Feminism affects masculinity and views of it, the deeper aspects that clash with traditional patriarchal cultures, or the practices of organized crime groups that somehow organize violent masculinity to exercise their dominance in certain territories.

Based on this experience, we will have to observe during the next electoral cycle if political positions shift to the right or the left of the palette of options brought about by the feminization of politics.  Obviously, this process will depend a lot on the strength of the social movement and its ability to articulate a series of other demands and positions that demand equality and inclusion.

Although these are not defining aspects, we have no doubt that the engine of the movement will be significantly boosted if the Senate approves the initiative of the Alberto Fernandez government and if the performance of the Chilean constituent process demonstrates that gender parity adds value.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Colombia’s multiple wars

Jerónimo Ríos Sierra
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Colombia’s multiple wars

It has just been four years since the Peace Agreement was signed between the FARC-EP guerrillas and the Colombian government. An agreement that was signed, not without difficulties, after four years of dialogue in Havana, one day before the death of Fidel Castro, and as a corollary of a long 20th century, farewelling Eric Hobsbawm. The Colombian conflict, besides being the longest lasting one in Latin America, is also the last remnant of the guerrilla experience that, since the 1950s, took place in the continent.

The signing of a Peace Accord does not imply a reduction in the levels of violence per se.

The signing of a Peace Accord does not imply a reduction in the levels of violence per se. Central America or the coffee producing country itself invite us, with its violent realities, to reflect on this. Nor does an Agreement necessarily imply, as the renowned political scientist Pippa Norris shows us, a positive advance in the quality of democracy. Likewise, in general, in the years following an armed confrontation, the well-known peace dividend does not end up arriving, by which, the expenses associated with a conflict, when it disappears, allows the reinvestment of public spending in other areas and needs of society.

To the contrary, the dynamics of spending on security and defense remain stable – as is the case in Colombia – and the processes of reincorporation into civilian life are never full, and far from lacking in dissidence or new mobilizations toward violence. In this regard, recent experiences tell us how natural it is for new criminal structures to form, at least, between 8% and 14%, of the total number of old members of an armed structure.

A Peace Agreement is only the beginning of a process of structural, territorial and institutional transformations of a once violent scenario, and is almost always as imperfect as it is complex. In the case of Colombia there are no exceptions, and it is necessary to start from these premises, even though the Agreement signed with the FARC-EP may well be the most ambitious and complete in recent decades. However, with the one and only extraordinary exception that it is the Government, unlike any other comparative experience, the main saboteur and the one most responsible for the breaches so far noted.

Be that as it may, the violence associated with the internal armed conflict and the illicit sources of financing associated with it – drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, etc. – today is substantially higher than it was during the last eight years. Although the country has a rate of violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants that is lower than 25 homicides, representing the best record of the last 25 years, this figure is also more than double in previous scenarios with greater violence associated with the conflict.

Furthermore, since the signing of the Accord, not only have more than 700 social leaders and 250 former guerrillas of the FARC-EP been murdered, but the old geography of violence, mostly peripheral, has intensified, as a result of an increase in the territorial dispute of the criminal actors. Among others, the National Liberation Army, the poorly named dissidents of the FARC-EP – since they are mostly made up of new recluses – or the criminal groups of Los Pelusos or the Gulf Clan, are the protagonists of a dispute for hegemony in which there are dozens of armed structures and a total of more than 7,000 members in dispute.

The disarmament of the FARC-EP, the lack of occupation of the territory by the military forces – in a country traditionally with more territory than sovereignty – and an enormous disposition of illicit resources – such as the more than 150,000 coca-cultivated hectares  – have fed a variable geometry of violence. This in a space where alliances and confrontations between all these criminal actors have been subsumed into a changing and opportunistic logic, in continuous transformation.

In the first place, it is possible to identify around 30 armed groups that consider themselves to be the continuation, in one way or another, of the extinct FARC-EP. Although this guerrilla group had a presence that exceeded 240 municipalities at the end of 2012, the current continuity of the violence is present, according to the Fundación Ideas para la Paz, in at least half of these municipalities.

Some historical fronts, such as Front 1 or Front 7, from the first steps of the implementation of the Accord, disassociated themselves from the process and raised the continuity of the extinct guerrilla, dissatisfied with the scenario of exchanges and concessions that had been signed with the government. This is how the groups commanded by “Gentil Duarte” or “Iván Mordisco” stand out.

Against these, the names of the two main commanders of the FARC-EP at the head of the peace dialogue in Havana, “Iván Márquez” and “Jesús Santrich”, make up the criminal structure “Segunda Marquetalia”. This structure was established as a continuation of the FARC-EP, once they abandoned the process of reincorporation into civilian life, in August 2019.

Initially, the leaders assumed that the natural step of armed reorganization should lead to a process of convergence, at least, with the structures of “Gentil Duarte” or “Iván Mordisco”, closer to the guerrilla essence. Nothing could be further from a reality characterized by confrontation in the control of territory and resources, especially in eastern Colombia. All of these groups are present there, as well as others no less important, with greater roots in the northeast (Arauca and Norte de Santander), as is the case with Los Pelusos and, principally, with the ELN with nearly 4,000 troops.

On the other hand, the Caribbean region is dominated by post-paramilitary groups, among which the Gulf Clan, with 1,800 members, stands out, and to which must be added the distribution and confrontation with ELN structures and other FARC-EP dissidents with special roots on the Pacific coast – Chocó, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Nariño – or in the southern departments of the country, such as Caquetá or Putumayo.

There, the armed structures that are the heirs or continuators of the FARC-EP act with a more flexible and clientelist character, subject to the correlation of forces and the particularities of the local environment. Although the structures of “Duarte” and “Mordisco” tried to coordinate a good part of the criminal groups in the Pacific region, they were not successful in their attempt. On the contrary, the result has been a war of all against all, partly motivated by the autonomous nature of some of the most powerful structures, such as the redefined “Óliver Sinisterra” front.

a much more fractured, complex and changing conflict than the one that existed when the FARC-EP operated.

The result of all of the above, therefore, is a much more fractured, complex and changing conflict than the one that existed when the FARC-EP operated. With the objective of local hegemony, three enclaves have emerged that are particularly violent today. First, southern Cauca, where the ELN and the “Carlos Patiño” Front are in dispute; then, southern Putumayo, where a “Duarte” structure faces the Mafia Sinaloa group; and finally, Nariño, where there are more than ten armed actors fighting each other. In all three, the common factor is also the absence of the State. And this is because other complexes such as Catatumbo -in Norte de Santander- or Chocó are not taken into consideration.

In conclusion, we find ourselves faced with multiple wars at the local level that are leading and blurring a violence that is increasingly difficult to characterize, although with an unaltered explanatory pattern, which has proved unresolved over the years. All of this violence continues to take place in forgotten, peripheral and coca-growing Colombia, where the Peace Accord and any hint of implementation remain today a mere chimera.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by Globovision on Foter.com / CC BY-NC

Latin America and Health Diplomacy at the Crossroads of Covid-19

Paulo M. Buss
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Latin America and Health Diplomacy at the Crossroads of Covid-19

Since November, a growing trend in the number of new daily cases and deaths from Covid-19 has been confirmed in the Americas, which are now the epicenter of the global pandemic. The lethal course continues in the region, holding more than half of the world’s cases and deaths, with the U.S. and Brazil leading sadly this statistic. About 30 million cases and 800,000 deaths were recorded from the beginning of the pandemic until Dec. 12. These figures include 14 million cases and 500,000 deaths recorded in Latin America. Brazil is close to 200,000 deaths and 8 million cases. However, all these numbers, hemispheric, sub-regional and national, are surely higher, because the access to testing is poor and many deaths have yet to be confirmed.

Why has Latin America been so intensely buffeted by the pandemic? Firstly, because of the severe poverty in which a large part of the population lives in. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimates that people in poverty, which has been rising since 2017, surged from 185.5 million in 2019 to 230.9 million in 2020, an increase of 45.4 million people (Figure 1). This means that today, 37.3% of Latin America’s population lives in poverty.

Figure 1. Population in poverty, Latin America (18 countries), in %

2019-2020

Furthermore, ECLAC projects that the Gini coefficient would increase between 1% and 8% in the same period, with the region’s largest economies showing the worst results.

In addition to income inequality, the Covid-19 pandemic has opened up other dimensions of inequality in Latin America: The poorest populations, Blacks, indigenous people, residents of the peripheries, slums, quilombos, and villages are the ones most affected by the disease. It is very clear that the population’s vulnerability also grows astonishingly with poverty and inequality: the poorer the populations, the more susceptible to get sick from Covid-19 are and the greater the fatality, i.e., deaths per case.

The countries’ health authorities (and national leaders) are astonished and often lost and they are failing to act efficiently to mitigate or attenuate the social,  economic and health consequences caused by the pandemic. In Brazil and Mexico, the situation is even more chaotic, given their presidents’ negative stance toward the overall situation and incompetence of their respective ministries of health.

Nevertheless, a number of heterogeneous proposals are being formulated to face this calamitous situation, both at national and regional levels, and with the sub-regional arrangements of countries.

Regional health diplomacy in multilateral and plurilateral responses

The hemispheric arm of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which, on 10 December, gathered all health ministers of the Americas, discussed ways to make vaccine distribution in the region equitable, including the mechanism of the Revolving Fund for Vaccine Procurement, which has existed for many years with great efficiency in the Organization.

Amid growing concern about the rising number of contagions in the region, ECLAC and PAHO together published in July, the document Health and the economy: A convergence needed to address COVID-19 and retake the path of sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since then, both institutions have pointed out that if the contagion curve isn’t controlled, it won’t be possible to reactivate the economies of countries and of the region as a whole. It also indicated that both, pandemic control and economic reopening require leadership and an effective and dynamic rectorate of states, through national strategies that integrate economic, social and health policies. The document advocates for an increase in fiscal spending to control the pandemic and buttress reactivation and reconstruction, in addition to being more effective, efficient and equitable, so that public spending for health would reach at least 6% of GDP.

Other proposals conveyed by ECLAC in the economic and social field include the paper presented to member states at the 38th session: ECLAC Session, Building a new future: a transformational recovery with equality and sustainability.

ECLAC, under Mexico’s presidency, has sought to place the Covid-19 topic on the agenda of the Latin American debate without much success. Brazil, on the other hand, a historical regional player, has renounced all demands for leadership on the pandemic at a regional level and has shown no willingness to actively participate in shaping the world after the pandemic. In fact, Brazil and even Mexico have not been the best examples in their approach to the epidemic in their own territories.

In an article published in L21, Detlef Nolte makes an appropriate analysis of the Covid-19 side effects on Latin America’s integration. He points out that “the Covid-19 crisis ruthlessly exposed the structural deficits of Latin American regionalism. A crisis can also be an opportunity. But this requires leadership and a common agenda.” For the author, unlike the European Union, there is not strong enough leadership in Latin America –whether singular or shared– that can promote regional projects or end the paralysis that some regional organizations are suffering.

In Mercosur, Presidents Bolsonaro and Fernández met in early December, seeking to resume ties weakened by political-ideological issues and prioritize issues of common interest to both countries. At the same time, the LXVII Meeting of Ministers of Health of the Mercosur took place on 3 December, resulting in four statements: 1) on the importance of ensuring environmental and worker health within the context of the pandemic; 2) on food assistance to vulnerable populations in the scope of Covid-19; 3) on tobacco control and Covid-19; and 4) on the WHO COVAX mechanism.

It also encourages support to the WHO COVAX mechanism to ensure that countries’ ability to pay doesn’t become an entry barrier to obtain Covid-19 vaccines, a situation that would leave a number of Latin American countries unprotected and would lead to this pandemic lasting longer than necessary. It also proposes a representation of Mercosur countries in the governance bodies of that mechanism. Uruguay then passed the pro-tempore presidency of the Council to Argentina. 

PROSUR –the industrial property cooperation system in Latin America and the Caribbean– created five Working Tables to make all commitments established by the presidents operational: Migration and Borders; Joint Procurement; Access to International Credits; Epidemiology and Availability of Data; and Transit of Goods, which are in a preliminary phase of action.

ECLAC believes that in order to face the health crisis and its serious social and economic effects, “political and social pacts are needed to be built by a wide variety of actors to achieve universal social and health protection, redirecting development on the basis of equality and fiscal, industrial and environmental policies towards sustainability.

After all, it is a proposal of “a welfare state that assures universal access to health, redistributive taxation, increased productivity, better provision of public goods and services, sustainable management of natural resources and increase and diversification of public and private investments”. To this end, “regional and international solidarity should contribute to building on common values and shared responsibilities for progress for all.

As exposed above, all multilateral and plurilateral organizations in Latin America have established agreements that could be assessed to be integral to fight Covid-19. This is good news. With this arsenal of statements and resolutions, the necessary political basis is given. Public authorities now have responsibilities that they cannot transfer. Only transformed states, with committed governments, adequate governance and civil society’s mobilization, will be able to transcend the rhetoric of these demonstrations and find the national and subregional mechanisms to put them into practice, as well as the financing of indispensable and impossible social, political and health measures.

*Translation from Spanish by Ricardo Aceves

“Deconstructing Diego”

Francisco Sánchez
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“Deconstructing Diego”

Soccer is a global event of such magnitude that it transcends cultural differences like no other. Its geopolitics can be simplified by stating that Latin America, here too, provides raw material to European clubs paid by the Chinese who own the television rights and petrodollars of sheikhs who buy equipment as a hobby. But unlike commodities, in soccer there is revenge when Messi, Maradona or Ronaldinho stop playing for their clubs to play for their national teams,for their people. Long live sovereignty!

The relationship between a “soccer player” – the word amateur here is short -, the game and its players transcends the playful and rational, taking root in something deeper, almost atavistic, which explains the reactions to Maradona’s death. Now then, how is it that people who are infallible in judging the work by the author’s conduct fell into collective hysteria? People who, for example, never saw Woody Allen’s films again because of his daughter’s complaints against him, even though every time they hear Rhapsody in Blue they remember the general shot of Manhattan in black and white. Or colleagues at the university who joined in the “stamina”, like a “brave slash”, while refusing to participate, with good reason, in unparalleled events. It seems that this November 25 they left aside the commemoration of the international day of the elimination of the gender violence.

these apparent inconsistencies should not surprise us, since they are the evidence that Maradona stopped being a great soccer player and a person with chiaroscuro to become a myth.

Nevertheless, and this is my point, these apparent inconsistencies should not surprise us, since they are the evidence that Maradona stopped being a great soccer player and a person with chiaroscuro to become a myth. As such, he is attributed with qualities that he does not have in order to socially construct a wonderful narrative, outside of historical time, in which reality and fiction are mixed. That is why his parishioners do not judge him for his behavior, as Zeus was not judged for incestuous child eating. And not only that, like actions of mythological beings become epic and find their lyric, however irregular they may be, the anti-regulatory goal of 86 was divine and part of revenge for a lost war. Meanwhile, another goal scored by the hand of the mortal Henry, who classified France to the world-wide one, ended in apologies of the player and the president of the Republic.

Why was it mythicized? To be a great soccer player can be a necessary condition, but not enough, even when his memory has been strengthened with a selection of good moments on youtube capable of nourishing that epic narrative that has permeated even the under-30s, forced absentees from Mexico 86 and unlikely spectators from USA 94, his last world cup, the doping world cup, and the prelude to his retirement three years later. It also seems insufficient that he never really left Villa Fiorito or forgot about his people. To the non-Argentinean devotees this does not say much and could seem a very conservative vision in which the talent does not avoid the condemnation to remain down or fall into misfortune.  A great contribution comes from the legend of the rebel -the vicious- who skillfully reconverted to political commitment thanks to his detoxifications in Cuba, approaching the Olympus of rebellion presided by Castro, Chavez and Che. As legends are not judged, no one saw political inconsistency in his service to the misogynist dictatorships of the Gulf.

what best explains the creation of this new universal myth is that soccer is the last great redoubt of the patriarchy

But in my opinion, what best explains the creation of this new universal myth is that soccer is the last great redoubt of the patriarchy, which is a matter of men and women. In the game and its festivities, men can, without being judged, say that they love another man, hug each other, cry, show their sensitivity, and at the same time be brave, besides feeding the gregariousness of the tribe. The perfect summary of this mixture of feelings is Simeone thanking the mothers of his players because “they made them hatch with eggs this big”.

Maradona was one of the best in a sport that means these and many other things and for this he has a devout admiration. The difference with other good players is that he knew how to transmit emotions to his fans on and off the court, at all levels, helping men to release feelings and manifest passions. This happened to the atheist Spanish vice president who prayed for him a sacrilegious Our Father – the most patriarchal of prayers – in which, heaven was Cuba and God the Father, Maradona. Not even the leader of a party named after a woman can escape the patriarchy, although he surely wants to, and eventually the alpha male comes out, as he defined himself while fantasizing about whipping a lady until she bleeds.

Finally, and this is the important thing, let’s not forget that myths have always had a political function and, although it seems that they belong to the people, when it comes to legitimizing power relations, the high priests who claim them appear. In the wake of the Casa Rosada we could see who they are.

The Budget that unleashed rage in Guatemala

Kevin Parthenay
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The Budget that unleashed rage in Guatemala

Saturday, December 12 was the third consecutive protest in Guatemala. A thousand people gathered in front of the Presidential Palace to demand the resignation of President Alejandro Giammatei and a profound reform of the country’s political system. A few days before (on December 9), civil groups and indigenous and social organizations blocked roads in different areas of the country against “acts and resolutions of the Executive and Legislative Branches, which are trampling on the people of Guatemala.

The protests began on November 21 (#21N) and were directed at Congress after the vote on the national budget. And although this was suspended a few days later by the president himself, the citizen rage had been ignited.

The Budget of the Republic presented the priorities of the government of Alejandro Giammatei for the year 2021. In the context of a health crisis and an accumulation of social frustration, the protesters denounced both the significant increase in the budget (and the prospect of greater state indebtedness) and the government’s weak commitment to health (despite the health crisis), human rights and education.

Furthermore, the budget consolidated state interventions towards sectors affected by high suspicions of corruption, in particular the works and infrastructure sector.

what has happened since #21N is not only a question of “budget”.

However, what has happened since #21N is not only a question of “budget”. The Guatemalan indignation, which was expressed violently by the burning of part of Congress, deeply questions the political system as a whole.

Nonetheless, the wave of #21N has a fundamental background for understanding what is at stake. That déja-vu refers to the “Guatemalan spring” of April 2015, a social protest unprecedented since the October 1944 revolution, which was unleashed against President Otto Pérez Molina and his Vice President, Roxana Baldetti, in reaction to their links to a transnational corruption network. The case, better known as La Línea, concerned a network that operated through the detour of customs fees.

From April to September 2015, thousands of Guatemalans of all ages and social sectors took to the streets. For the first time, citizens were demonstrating massively against a system of corruption that directly touched the very top of the state. The evidence published by the Public Ministry and the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) that unleashed social rage precipitated the resignation of President Otto Pérez Molina in September 2015.

That “Primevera” was a first act of resistance against a structural and long-term trend of capture of the Guatemalan State by the country’s political and/or economic elite. Banners such as “they made the wrong generation”, “out criminals disguised as rulers”, “we are fed up with their lies”, “Guatemalans, let’s break the culture of silence” attested to this. This response, promoted by the movement #JusticeYa, brought together very diverse sectors of society under the same priority: to end a political system articulated around corruption. This precedent created fissures in the culture of impunity consolidated around the State. 

The consecutive elections of Jimmy Morales (2015) and Alejandro Giammatei (2019) can be understood as attempts at transitions by the state by focusing attention on the regular functioning of electoral contests to lower social pressure. However, the Guatemalan problem is far from electoral democracy. Without hiding new cases and a high level of social protest during the Morales administration (2015-2019), an attempt was made to normalize political-institutional life on inhospitable terrain.

the new “Guatemalan awakening” is the product of a historical process of accumulation of social frustration and exclusion

Beyond the budgetary issue, the new “Guatemalan awakening” is the product of a historical process of accumulation of social frustration and exclusion in the face of an inoperative political system. As well as from an immediate context characterized by a state of multi-sector crisis (health, environment, economic).

At the electoral level, a general election was organized in 2019 in a context of high politicization and judicialization of the electoral process (annulment of candidates of Thelma Aldana, Zury Ríos and Edwin Escobar) and of very low quality of the electoral offer, echoing the structural weakness of the Guatemalan political parties. The election took place without channeling the major social demands and there was a massive decline in participation, 61.8% in the first round and 42.7% in the second. Thus, the dysfunctionality of electoral democracy in a context of high social demands and expectations was fertile ground for social anger to be unleashed. 

The vote on the budget was the last straw, which transformed the population’s exhaustion into a new cycle of protests, some violent (burning down of Congress), some peaceful (#5D for the December 5 demonstrations, and #12D). The fed-up citizenry has favored a growing convergence of traditionally independent social sectors: indigenous associations, businesses, public and private universities and human rights organizations, etc.

At the political-institutional level, #21N represents the fed up with a government delegitimized by a critical management of the pandemic and by a late attention to populations affected by hurricanes Eta and Iota. On the other hand, the legislative branch also suffers from a significant lack of credibility due to the accumulation of corruption issues and instrumentalization of appointments of officials (see the recent case of judges to the Supreme Court of Justice and the Court of Appeals).

In this framework, the protests revealed fractures in the elites, with a deep political rupture between President Giammatei and his Vice President Guillermo Castillo, who immediately proposed a joint resignation in the face of the wave of protests “for the good of the country”. The latter also questioned the President’s invocation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (of the Organization of American States, OAS).

With the declaration of the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office that human rights violations occurred during the #21N protests, Guatemala’s political system seems even more weakened. Day by day the government shows an inability to protect both people and territory, and to legitimately exercise its sovereignty. And Guatemala’s dysfunctional democracy faces increasing citizen and social demands.

In the end, as in the Chilean case, it is clear that this is not a one-time outrage since voices are now being raised for a profound change in the political system. Some are calling for a change in the way the elections are run with a reform of the Electoral and Political Parties Law to achieve true political representation. Others call for more profound changes through a reform of the Constitution (the current Constitution dates from 1985).

It is not possible to anticipate or foresee the future of these protests, but we can say that they are part of an ascending trajectory of citizen and social demands in the face of a collapsed state. Undoubtedly, Guatemalan democracy is at a crossroads. 

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo of Surizar at Foter.com / CC BY-SA

The Consummation of Venezuela’s Last Vestige of Democracy

Xavier Rodríguez-Franco
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The Consummation of Venezuela’s Last Vestige of Democracy

The last democratically-elected body that Venezuela had, has been sentenced to death with the recent parliamentary elections. These elections, defined from Miraflores Palace, mark the end of a series of uninterrupted attacks against the biggest political victory the opposition has registered in two decades. It has been an aggressive siege on all sides that lasted the entire legislature: Persecutions and imprisonments of lawmakers, armed assaults on plenary sessions, budget cuts, blocking of all constitutional powers and, even, the hijacking of parliamentary powers to be able to appoint the electoral authority. This is the greatest authoritarian display—by far—against a functioning parliament in Latin America in the last few decades.

This occurs as human rights’ massive violation, along with the destruction of the productive network and the country’s growing international isolation continue. A government, which electoral integrity, civil rights, public services and the food security of citizens are of almost no concern in light of its aspiration to totally control the State.

Against this backdrop, and due to a more aggressive version of Chavism, the call for elections to the National Assembly was an opportunity to give the final blow to the institutional space in which the opposition achieved its most important political advances. Despite the siege, since January 2019—and thanks to its 2015 electoral legitimacy—the opposition was able to have certain influence, nationally and internationally. However, the growing abstentionism that began in 2017 ended up favoring the authoritarian drift and the dismantling of the institutions.

Election without voters or winners

Once Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) had counted the few valid votes, it announced the results on Dec. 7. Despite the precarious credibility, data showed an undeniable drop in the participation rate, from 74% in 2015 to 30.5% currently. An equivalent cut of approximately 44% of the electorate, which would be half of the voters in the last election. This is more than the 31% reduction in voter turnout that occurred after the opposition withdrew from the 2005 parliamentary elections. 

In this way, the government, without any fuss or celebration, regained the majority in the parliament, not to advance its political agenda, but to keep a non-existent opposition in that platform. One less space to be silenced. After the arbitrary handling of the National Constituent Assembly in 2017, it is clear that Chavism’s political leadership doesn’t require deliberative organs, but rather popular tribunals of punishment and public derision. The fact that three out of ten Venezuelans voted, and that two of them have probably been forced due to their condition as public officials, is no reason for any celebration.

Maduro’s government once again made clear the majority’s undemocratic overrepresentation in the 2020 elections. It garnered 93% of the seats, with 60% of a few valid votes registered by the NEC. The same electoral manipulation that it did in the 2010 elections. So that, in 2021 Venezuela will have a single-colored parliamentary arch, similar to that in 2005, and only comparable to Cuba’s National Assembly of People’s Power, Nicaragua’s National Assembly, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan or the Russian State Duma.

International pronouncements

As the days went by, rejection expressions emerged from democracies of the world. A group of actors, being a minority in the concert of nations, and yet influential, recognize the illegitimacy of this election, but doesn’t have a clear approach to the Venezuelan crisis. For now, they maintain their support to Juan Guaidó, but it is uncertain what the diplomatic management or minimal international agenda will be, in light of the largest migratory wave that the region has ever known.

In the first week after the election, the European Union, the United States, Canada and a large part of Latin America, except for Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico, made official statements not recognizing the elections. On the other hand, supporters, including Cuba and Russia—whose governments are not precisely characterized by the plurality of their parliaments or by electoral transparency—are expected to endorse the election results.

The support of more than 40 democracies in favor of the opposition, however, will do little, if there isn’t a strategic renewal that could offer alternatives beyond abstention, since the electoral asymmetry and lack of fair play are to be expected in a dictatorship. A rethinking that promotes greater coordination with the diaspora and Latinamerican governments as well as a redesign of communitary political activism within the country are necessary. This, considering the growing risk of doing politics in Venezuela and taking into consideration rural and urban areas where the state is conspicuous by its absence. This situation poses a dilemma for the Interim Government. As the time goes, the continuity and sustainability of foreign support is seriously threatened.

The opposition, for its part, consults

As for the opposition, it has launched the Popular Consultation. This is a mechanism that seeks to gather Venezuelan citizens’ will about Nicolás Maduro’s permanency in power, the holding of free presidential and parliamentary elections and a request to the international community to collaborate with the democratic cause. However, the very wording of the questions denotes a lack of ideas and the imprecision of the courses of action: A statement of purpose with three questions,  with no immediate or tangible political effect. 

Beyond the debate around participation and abstention, what the opposition is looking for with the consultation is to rebuild part of the legitimacy lost and justify, somehow, the possibility of extending its mandate beyond Jan. 5 of 2021, which is the date on which the legislature constitutionally ends. This is an important political challenge for the political continuity of the Interim Government led by Juan Guidó, who still considers himself the president in charge and owes his legitimacy to his position as the National Assembly’s president. 

In summary, these past legislative elections, rigged in the eyes of all, will exacerbate the country’ collapse and move it further away from a democratic transition with the suppression of both the parliament’s plurality and the vote’s political value as an instrument of social transformation. Therefore, the electoral path is being blurred from any collective content, dismembering the dialogue of a society that has been decimated, exiled and repressed. In 2021, Venezuela will have a parliament unaware of the humanitarian suffering of its people, without answers or dissent. It will have more seats but will represent 7.5 million fewer voters, many of them walking the world in search of better opportunities.

Translation from Spanish by Ricardo Aceves

Photo by huguito at Foter.com / CC BY-NC-SA

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