September is a month full of national holidays in many Latin American countries. The 7th in Brazil, the 15th in Mexico and Central America, the 18th in Chile… Days that allow the exaltation of the nation and the excitement of identitarian enthusiasm. Catalonia has not been immune to this. Whoever was its president between 2010 and 2016, the period in which the political tension between that Autonomous Community and the central state that would explode in 2017, Artur Mas, declared last September 14th: “I cannot end my political career in a project that could lead to separation”.

The separation he referred to was not from Spain but from the forces of the deeply divided pro-independence nationalism. His political trajectory was finished not only since he ceded the presidency of the Catalan government to Carles Puigdemont but before, even though he pretended not to know it, when the validation of his political project was frustrated. This happened in the early elections of November 2012, called to expand his majority but ended with his party loosing 2 seats. A defeat that in any parliamentary democracy would have brought with it the departure from politics of the leader who called the elections.

This could be the closure to the Catalan nationalism events that are being celebrated around September 11. This is the date on which nationalist mythology lays to rest Spain’s alleged injuries against Catalonia as a result of the 1714 dynastic lawsuit to rule the Spanish monarchy. There, the supporters of the House of Austria, made up of a good part of the Catalan notables, were defeated by the Bourbon ascendants.

The languid popular expression for the events called for that day as a consequence, without a doubt, of the restrictions to mobility that COVID-19 entailed, disguised, however, the serious fracture of the independence front. This is due, at least, to three factors that are becoming increasingly peremptory.

In the first place, there is the ideological rift that separates conservative sectors from other centrists and from some third parties that are located in a left that sometimes flirts with anti-system expressions. In the second place, there is a notorious struggle in leadership since figures of a very different nature are confronted against each other, which, moreover, as time goes by have reflected opposing styles of action.

Carles Puigdemont is not only a politician on the run who did not confront his responsibility, as his vice-president, Oriol Junqueras, did, but he also still rules the Catalan government

Carles Puigdemont is not only a politician on the run who did not confront his responsibility, as his vice-president, Oriol Junqueras, did, but he also still rules the Catalan government, and more specifically, its current president, Quim Torra, in a vicarious manner. In his two years in office, Quim Torra has shown a worrying political ineffectiveness and has been charged with the crime of judicial disobedience.

Finally, the loss of political capital dragged along by the cases of corruption due to the illegal financing of the party and to the illicit enrichment of its unquestionable leader and Catalan president for more than two decades, Jordi Pujol, undermines the credibility of certain nationalist sectors that are now independent.

All of this does not prevent September 11 from being used, once again, in the inefficient and unnerving scenario drawn up on many occasions by the Spanish government, to try to consolidate the story of affront. This is one of the milestones over which Catalan independence movement intends to consolidate its claim along with myths that exacerbate differences. As Benedict Anderson stated in “Imagined Communites”: Reflections on the origin and diffusion of nationalism”, if the nation is “a political community imagined as inherently limited and sovereign… the magic of nationalism is the conversion of chance into destiny”.

It is in this direction that today the discourse is elaborated according to which in Spain there are political prisoners or that it is a country where the violation of human rights is systematic. However, the evidence shows the existence of politicians who have been tried and convicted, not for issues that violate freedom of expression, but for serious proven crimes of sedition and embezzlement of public funds in processes with full guarantees and total transparency, having been transmitted live to the judicial sessions.

However, the situation thus described is far from a more complex reality that is inserted in a territory where independence, adding its different families, has never had a social majority in a community with higher quotas of self-government than the Latin American federal states. Quotas such as the election by the citizens’ direct vote of their authorities, broad fiscal autonomy, absolute respect for their culture with the use of Catalan as the official language, which on many occasions has relegated Spanish, and with its own public security forces.

This is an independence project with policies that project xenophobic expressions against those who, supposedly, are not integrated into the organized community

This is an independence project with policies that project xenophobic expressions against those who, supposedly, are not integrated into the organized community. A community that exclusively extols what is different on the basis of a constant manipulation of history, which advocates the path of a single language and, in the case of the rupture, excludes from Spanish citizenship all Catalans who have expressed their will to be Spanish.

A scenario that does not welcome dialogue but rather unilateral imposition and whose articulation ignores complexity, structuring its work in a permanent advertising campaign that hides the reality and the responsibility of characters as sadly relevant as Artur Mas. A character who now happens to have left politics, as did his predecessor, Jordi Pujol, through the back door.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo of Photomovement at Foter.com / CC BY-NC-ND

During the 2017-2019 electoral super cycle, South America experienced a “turn to the right”. With the exception of Argentina, progressive governments gave way to a new wave of neoliberalism. Ecuador lived a sui generis experience, since the turnaround occurred more during the administration of President Lenin Moreno than as an immediate result of the elections.

During the campaigns, both in the presidential debates and in the interviews with candidates, the priority issues were national. Even so, certain aspects of international relations were addressed and there were divergences regarding the issue of Venezuela and Latin American integration. The right was more focused on recognizing the presidency of Juan Guaidó and negotiating the “exit” of Nicolás Maduro and his government, while the left was more inclined to a negotiated transition that implied the recognition of both parts as valid interlocutors.

Similarly, the right rejected the processes of regional integration considered “ideologized” such as UNASUR, CELAC, ALBA and to a lesser extent MERCOSUR, while the left did not succeed in articulating an alternative that recognized the difficulties of those integration processes, but at the same time was also capable of safeguarding the integrationist spirit.

integration is going through one of its worst moments and that there is no sign of Nicolas Maduro leaving soon

Today, with these governments in different periods of administration, we ask ourselves what the is their balance. The first impression is that integration is going through one of its worst moments and that there is no sign of Nicolas Maduro leaving soon.

The election of the U.S. candidate Mauricio Claver-Carone as president of the IDB, ignoring the unwritten rule that such a function should be exercised by a Latin American, is a symptom of the current breakdown of the Latin American integrationist spirit. The region has fallen into a kind of realpolitik in which national interests prevail, with transactional arrangements whose only reference is the correlation of forces. Ivan Duque and Jair Bolsonaro positioned themselves in favor of the United States, in exchange for financial and political advantages, Mexico maintained its line of not importuning its northern neighbor, and there was no single alternative line with capacity for negotiation. Thus, the IDB joined the OAS in being the other great inter-American organ affected by post-electoral unpleasantness.

This new trend has lost sight of the long-term advantages of building international relations with the understanding that it’s better to have an international order in order to face, jointly and in a coordinated manner, the challenges of modernity. From the Covid-19 pandemic to deforestation and climate change. This is the perspective that Ikenberry calls “liberal internationalism” in his recent work, “A world safe for democracy”.

In contrast to political realism, Ikenberry proposes an order that is embodied in a system of international organizations and rules based on defined values and principles. These values include the defense of representative democracies, human rights, legality and public freedoms, and a market economy. Not a “neo-liberal” order, but an evolving liberalism that should include all human rights, as well as a vision of the development of capitalism marked by formulas of redistributive justice with full force solid social protection systems. Where the importance given to international trade is not a plea for unregulated free trade zones, but rather the opposite.

it is necessary to understand that the success of each person depends on the validity of a Latin American community.

The path chosen by the right has been that of aspiring to transactional success, case by case. However, the pandemic and post-pandemic crises are so severe that solutions are unlikely to be found through such an approach. Today, more than ever, it is necessary to understand that the success of each person depends on the validity of a Latin American community. The menu of concerns in the region is very varied, but one can begin by addressing issues where there is political consensus between the center-left and center-right. Issues such as tax evasion, corruption, citizen security, the formalization of the economy, employment, the transition to a knowledge-based economy, control of environmental impacts, infrastructure development, safeguarding democracy, the rule of law and the fight against organized crime, poverty reduction and social inclusion, among others. A range of issues that could be better addressed through an order of the kind advocated by liberal internationalism.

This is a region-wide approach that requires a certain type of leadership. One that is nourished by a vision of the State and therefore understands that foreign policy is not something that can be conceived from a particular political position. The same super-election cycle showed that the South American political world and to some extent Latin America is mostly manifested within a spectrum from center left to center right. And it is that great pluralistic political center that should build a long-lasting integrationist policy. An integrationist project that will endure beyond successive governments and parties.

Finally, we would say that an important part of this political effort has to do with the treatment of the Venezuelan issue. This is one of the obstacles that divide and prevent the region from advancing with broader consensus. During the campaigns the issue was used as a political watershed, establishing false equivalencies between recognizing Guaidó and being in favor of democracy and not recognizing Guaidó and supporting 21st century socialism.

The dilemma for the vast majority of political forces, however, is rather methodological: how to recompose democracy in Venezuela? In his recent inaugural speech before the meeting of the Lima Group, Ivan Duque repeated that the first of the four objectives of the Group is to “end the usurpation, end the dictatorship” and from there proceed with the transition. Is this so? If we thought about it in another order, wouldn’t we have better chances of strengthening the alignment and commitment of the countries with the return of democracy in Venezuela?

After the initial enthusiasm a year and a half ago when Juan Guaidó declared himself the legitimate president of Venezuela and achieved important international recognition, the usurper’s exit has been fading away. Is it perhaps the time to reconsider the order of factors? The question now takes on greater relevance in light of the new divisions within the Venezuelan opposition.

Perhaps the time has come for a change of strategy that brings together a broader regional front to propose a negotiation that emphasizes the transition to the end of the dictatorship, and thus also to stop the sharpening of political differences in the region. This would be an important step.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo of the Casa de America at Foter.com / CC BY-NC-ND

Today (September 18), for the first time in history, a U.S. Secretary of State will set foot on the world’s largest river island. Immediately, Mike Pompeo will be in Georgetown, Paramaribo and Boa Vista, three of the main cities on the island of Guyana. Most of the news coverage and analysis of this has focused on Donald Trump’s attempt to present a tougher and more effective agenda on Venezuela for the Republican vote hunt in Florida. But there are other factors that explain this unprecedented last minute announced visit.

The context of political fragmentation and trade disintegration in South America makes our subcontinent an open stage for extra-regional power struggles. The division between Brazil and Colombia, on the one hand, and Argentina, Mexico and Chile, on the other, made it possible, also for the first time in history, that last Saturday (September 12) an American was elected to preside the Inter-American Development Bank. The son of a Cuban mother, Mauricio Claver-Carone was special advisor to Donald Trump and executive director for Western Hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council. His main campaigning argument was the instrumentalization of the bank as a counterpoint to Chinese expansion in Latin America. On Tuesday (Sept. 15), Pompeo’s visit to North and South America was announced.

The island of Guyana is unique, but the integration of its infrastructure is very poorly developed and was never planned on its entirety. Its 1.7 million km² is equivalent to the European territory of Germany, France, Spain and Italy combined. Located in the north of South America, it is, at the same time, Atlantic, Caribbean and Amazonian, having as main demarcations the two main rivers of northern South America, the Amazon and the Orinoco, and the natural interconnection between them by the Cassiquiare channel and the Rio Negro; its northern part is divided in the middle by the Esequibo River. In addition to Suriname and Guyana, this territory is shared by Brazil – the states of Amapá, Roraima and the northern floodplain of the Amazon from the entire state of Pará and Amazonas to the Rio Negro -, Venezuela – the states of Delta Amacuro, Bolivar and Amazonas – and France – the overseas department of Guyana.

Earlier this year, general elections were held in both Guyana and Suriname. In both countries the election results were very close and it took a while for those defeated to concede. Irfaan Ali’s victory in Guyana was only formalized after four months. In contrast, in the 2015 elections, the now abandoned and dying Union of South American Nations (Unasur) had sent electoral missions with the participation of Brazil and the results were immediately accepted by all political actors in both countries.

It is possible that in a few years Guyana’s oil production will surpass that of Venezuela.

Economically, Guyana and Suriname have few relations with South America. Only 2% of their foreign trade is with the other ten countries in the region. In the last two years there has been an oil boom in Guyana that makes it the only country in the Americas that will have positive economic growth in 2020. Offshore oil production is also expected to expand in Suriname. It is possible that in a few years Guyana’s oil production will surpass that of Venezuela. Although it has the largest oil reserves in the world, Venezuela has seen its oil production fall due to its own inefficiency and the United States’ embargo in recent years.

The strategy of overthrowing the Venezuelan government with political isolation and economic asphyxiation designed by the United States and the Lima Group in 2017 had as concrete results the collapse of oil production, the deepening of the Venezuelan social crisis and the internal political and economic strengthening of the military loyal to Nicolás Maduro. Seeing itself isolated from its traditional allies, Venezuela became the largest Chinese debtor in Latin America. With every step taken by the US and NATO within the Russian sphere, Moscow reinforces its economic, political and military ties with Caracas.

In 2002, when the management of the state oil company PDVSA tried to overthrow the government, Hugo Chávez went to Brazil to send ships to ensure the internal supply of gasoline. Now it is Iran that fulfills this role. In the December 2015 parliamentary elections, won by the opposition to Maduro, the main external electoral observation mission was Unasur. In the December 2020 parliamentary elections, with low opposition participation, Turkey should take over its role.

This is not the first time that Guyana and Suriname have found themselves in the midst of major geopolitical disputes. Guyana became independent from the United Kingdom in 1966 and inherited long-standing territorial disputes between the British and Venezuelans. Suriname became independent from the Netherlands only in 1975 and was quickly recognized by Brazil. Guyana and Suriname were born threatened by the thesis of the internationalization of the Amazon, which was gaining strength in Europe and in various international organizations, and by the shadow of the cold war.

In 1978, under the leadership of Presidents Ernesto Geisel of Brazil and Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty was signed with the aim of promoting the integral development of the region and its populations and reaffirming the exclusive sovereignty of the eight countries of the region over the management of the world’s largest biodiversity reserve. Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela vetoed the possibility of extra-regional powers participating in the treaty at that time and in the future.

In 1983, the Government of Suriname was accused by the United States and European countries of serious human rights violations. Both the former metropolis and the hemispheric power tried to isolate the country politically and economically in order to overthrow its government. Cuba and other socialist-oriented countries had increased their activities in Suriname. The Soviet Union increased its presence in the Caribbean.

The United States, governed by the Republican Ronald Reagan, sought support from João Figueiredo’s Brazil for an intervention in Paramaribo. Brazil refused and, alternatively, sent a diplomatic mission led by General Danilo Venturini to Suriname. A broad Brazilian cooperation was initiated for the organization of the State of Suriname, which distanced itself from the socialist countries, avoided the American invasion and guaranteed a relative stability for the country in the last decades. Months later, due to a similar situation, the United States invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada and killed its president Maurice Bishop.

Brazil’s action in northern South America was effective in deterring extra-regional presence

Brazil’s action in northern South America was effective in deterring extra-regional presence, whether it acted through regional consultations with the cooperation treaty with the Amazon or bilaterally with the Venturini mission. The Geisel and Figueiredo governments knew that the biggest loser in a conflict driven by extra-regional interests in South America would be Brazil itself.

Mike Pompeo’s presence in Guyana, Suriname, Roraima, and Colombia on the same trip can only be understood in this context of fragmentation of South American regional governance and less Brazilian prominence.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

How many times in the world of personal and political intrigues, disputes for power, honor and the enemy’s anger, have we seen poison appear as a character in history.

Nor will we speak here of the massive use of chemical weapons, which are part of legacies of wars we hope never to see again, like the use of Zyklon B in concentration camps like Nazi Germany and napalm in the Vietnam War by the United States. Or, of sarin gas used to cowardly murder 1,500 civilians, a third of them children, in the case of the Ghouta bombing outside Damascus in 2013.

These, among other cases, are visible and unscrupulous actions taken in an attempt to eliminate the perceived enemy in situations of war. Countless cases that can be cited that involve poisoning as a weapon of war always seem to us to be cowardly and excessive actions in the face of asymmetric forces or conditions of resistance. Despite the relevance of this topic, war situations will not be the focus of this article.

The deaths by poisoning populate fantasies of secrets, cunning and cowardly actions, denunciations and seek to repair reputation and dignity through humiliation or injustice.

Let us think of times of peace, when suicides and murders impregnate symbolic narratives that we recall in unchecked history, such as the condemnation of Socrates, the suicide of Cleopatra or the intrigues of Lucrécia Borges. The deaths by poisoning populate fantasies of secrets, cunning and cowardly actions, denunciations and seek to repair reputation and dignity through humiliation or injustice.

From Shakespeare’s literature to Gustave Flaubert. From Hamlet to Romeo and Juliet, interests and escapes from life’s misfortunes, as Emma Bovary did, dramas populate some of the most read and staged stories in classical literature. However, more recent true stories have competed with fiction, emphasizing the poison’s protagonist character.

Suicide by poisoning is a traditional strategy to keep state or war secrets, avoiding the suffering of torture or the risk of succumbing to pain, as was the case with suicide capsules of secret agents in the cold war. The novelty in this area is the euthanasia pill (drion pill) for the elderly or terminally ill, which has the same purpose: to shorten the suffering of the body, either by torturing the enemy or by the pain of a certain death.

In 2017, we saw hemlock in the live broadcast of Slobodan Praljak’s suicide. Praljak gave visibility to his trial against the crimes committed in the Bosnian war by seeking to demonstrate his indignity through his 20-year prison sentence by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the ICTY. The former Bosnian general turned his death into a digital event, substituting his sentence with a toast for discontent with international justice.

Poison is perhaps the oldest character in stories of intrigues, deceptions, unscrupulous actions that are kept in sacrificed bodies, either by their own owners or by third parties who want to silence them.

Operation Lava Jato, launched in Latin America since 2014, generated allegations of corruption linking politicians and businessmen. Unlike Brazil and Peru, where investigations for corruption and money laundering involved arrests and even the suicide of President Alan Garcia in 2019, in Colombia the impact of the accusations has not brought down any political forces.

However, reports of allegations of poisoning of key witnesses in the Lava Jato investigations in Colombia have reached international news. In 2018, former auditor Jorge Pizano died of a cardiopulmonary arrest and Rafael Merchán, former secretary of transparency, committed suicide with cyanide. Four days after Jorge Pizano’s death, his son Alejandro also died, after ingesting cyanide-intoxicated water from one of his father’s bottles. Complaints about an unprovoked story led to a question about the real causes of so many deaths related to ongoing investigations that would have changed the course of Bogota’s politics.

In Russia, cases of poisoning are mixed between tried and untried, old and new.

In Russia, cases of poisoning are mixed between tried and untried, old and new. Anti-Kremlin activists, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, with a long history of opposition to Putin, and Pyortr Verzilov (linked to Pussy Riot) have stories to tell, as survivors and whistleblowers of the recent use of the poisoning method as a way of silencing the competitor.

In the midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic, in times of taking refuge at home for fear of dying from a virus we do not yet know well, we have been able to follow the last chapter in which our character returns to the scene. This is the second attempt to kill Aleksei Navalny by poisoning.

It is not the first time that an attempt is made to intoxicate the vessels of protest and denunciation. Neither will it be the last time that a government that does not accept the alternation and competition of ideas, the uncertainty of the outcome, or even the criticism of its mistakes, resorts to the poisoning of everything that could threaten its permanence.

In Czarist Russia, when he was no longer accepted, Rasputin resisted cyanide. In the England of Brexit, the Skripals survived the novichok. However, it is not yet known if Nalvany will succumb to the same poison and become another character in the history of an experience of power where the word is silenced, destroying, from within, the possibility of an opposition.

*Translation from Spanish by Emmanuel Guerisoli

Photo by Xavier P. Garcias in Foter.com / CC BY-NC-SA